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Abstract 
 
 
In a large-scale single industry case study insights are provided into factors affecting 
innovation into the superannuation industry in Australia, one of the country’s most 
significant service industries. In addition, the links between innovation and corporate 
governance are explored.  
 
The major factor leading to innovation was the CEO’s leadership. Barriers to 
innovation include structural and cultural inhibitors, low competition within the 
Australian Superannuation Industry, high costs involved with the risk and uncertainty 
of innovation, difficulties in measuring the success of innovation and a general 
resistance among employees. The “sole purpose” test imposed on trustees by 
regulation was also perceived as a major inhibitor of innovation.  Factors affecting 
corporate governance were inadequate trustee skill sets, board decision-making 
processes, board composition, current regulations and an ever changing and highly 
regulated environment.  
 
In the sphere of governance I found that strategic leadership by the CEO was the most 
important factor and the role of the board was minimal. Board composition and trustee 
skill sets were not important in innovation. 
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Terminological Note 
 
 
As a matter of terminology, the Australian usage of the term superannuation is unique 
compared to other countries, where the corresponding term used for the provision of 
benefits upon retirement is pensions.  For the purposes of this doctoral thesis, the term 
superannuation is used in the majority of cases throughout this thesis and is deemed 
synonymous with the term pension. 
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | x  
 
 
Table of Statutes 
 
Commonwealth Acts and Regulations 
 
 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 
 Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 
 Corporations Act 2001 
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
 Occupational Superannuation Standards Act 1987 (repealed) 
 Occupational Superannuation Standards Amendment Act 1993 (repealed) 
 Occupational Superannuation Standards Regulations 1987 (repealed) 
 Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997 
 Retirement Savings Accounts Regulations 1997 
 Superannuation (Financial Assistance Funding) Levy Act 1993 
 Superannuation (Rolled- Over Benefits) Levy Act 1992 
 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 
 Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Consequential Amendments Act 1993 
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment Act (No. 3) 1999 
 Superannuation Supervisory Levy Amendment Act 1993 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xi  
 
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper provisions) Act 2012  
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Further MySuper and Transparency 
Measures) Act 2012 (Act 171 of 2012)  
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Service Providers and Other Governance 
Measures) Act 2013 (Act 61 of 2013) 
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment Regulation 2013 
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper Measures) Regulation 2013. 
USA Act 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA) (2002) (Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 
30, 2002. 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xii  
 
Table of Cases 
 
 
 APRA v Derstepanian [2005] FCA 1121. 
 Austin v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 215 CLR 195. 
 Raymor Contractors v FC of T 91 ATC 4259. 
 Re Montgomery Wools Pty Limited as trustee for Montgomery Wools Pty Limited 
Super Fund v. Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 61.  
 Swiss Chalet case (Case 43/95, AAT Case 10301). 
 
 
   
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xiii  
 
 
Selected Abbreviations 
 
ACSI: Australian Council of Super Investors  
ACTU: Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ADF:  Approved Deposit Fund 
AIST: Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
APRA: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  
ASF:  Australian Superannuation Fund 
ASI:  Australian Superannuation Industry 
ASFA: Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia  
ASIC: Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
ATO: Australian Taxation Office 
ASX:  Australian Stock Exchange 
CEO: Chief Executive Officer 
CFO: Chief Financial Officer 
CIO:  Chief Information Officer or Chief Investment Officer 
CTH: Commonwealth of Australia 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xiv  
 
DAF:  Development Australia Fund 
EMT: Executive Management Team 
ETP:  Eligible Termination Payment. 
FCA:  Federal Court of Australia 
FOFA: Future of Financial Advice (Financial Reform) 
FUM: Funds under Management 
GFC: General Financial Crisis 
IBS:  Information Based Strategy 
ICAA: The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
IFS:  Industry Fund Services  
ISC:  Insurance and Superannuation Commission 
ISH:  Industry Super Holdings 
ISPT: Industry Super Property Trust 
MEB: Members Equity Bank 
NDP:  New Product Development 
NFP:  Not-For-Profit 
OSS ACT: Occupational Superannuation Standards Act 
RBLs: Reasonable Benefit Limits 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xv  
 
RDT: Resource Dependent Theory 
ROI:  Return on Investment 
RSA:  Retirement Saving Account 
SGC:  Superannuation guarantee charge 
SIS:  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
SMSF: Self-managed superannuation fund 
UK:  United Kingdom 
USA:  United States of America 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xvi  
 
List of Tables 
Table 01: Rollovers to Self-Managed Superannuation Funds 
Table 02: The number of superannuation entities in Australia from 2004 – 2012 
Table 03:  A comparison between industry funds and retail funds  
Table 04: The superannuation share of financial industry assets in Australia  
Table 05: Consolidations 
Table 06: Principal and Agent problems in the ASI 
Table 07: Expertise of different type of directors or trustees 
Table 08: Examples of incremental and radical innovation in the services industry 
Table 09: Different types of innovation with the service industry 
Table 10: Interview Schedule 
Table 11: Classification of the superannuation funds participating in this research 
Table 12: The types of innovation discovered within the ASI  
Table 13: Differences in the types of innovation between the different sectors in the  
                ASI. 
Table 14: Perceptions of the Trustees skill sets on an ASF Board 
Table 15: Board Dynamic Themes 
Table 16: Perception of skill sets amongst the Trustees of the Board 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | xvii  
 
 
List of Diagrams 
Diagram 01: Eligibility for tax concessions for superannuation funds in Australia 
Diagram 02: Regulation of superannuation funds in Australia 
Diagram 03: Total superannuation assets in Australia 
Diagram 04: Assets by type of fund as a percentage of total superannuation assets 
Diagram 05: Global significance of Australia’s Investment Fund Assets Pool 
Diagram 06: Corporate Governance Framework, Governance in the 21st Century 
Diagram 07: Tricker’s model of corporate governance 
Diagram 08: A framework for considering board behavioural dynamics 
Diagram 09: Phases of innovation processes 
Diagram 10: Stages of Innovation 
Diagram 11: Three phases of an innovation process 
Diagram 12: Barriers to innovation 
Diagram 13:  The Innovation Space Model 
Diagram 14: Product Development and Service improvement Framework by Fund 2 
Diagram 15: Responses to the question – Does your superannuation fund have an  
                     emphasis on new product development? 
Diagram 16: Interviewees responses to the question – Does your superannuation fund  
                     measure the success of new product development (NPD)? 
Diagram 17:  Ancillary Services offered by Fund 4 
Diagram 18: Collaborative projects of Industry Super Holdings Pty Ltd. 
Diagram 19: Factors Affecting Managerial Discretion
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The extent of innovation in the superannuation industry has not been investigated 
globally.  The only researchers to date that have explored the topic of innovation 
within the context of this industry are; Dr Gordon Clark, Halford Mackinder Professor 
of Geography in the UK and global investment specialist Roger Urwin in the USA.  
The topic has not been investigated in Australia, which is astonishing since it is the 
fourth largest pension fund market in the world.    
 
Both governance and innovation are arguably central to the improvement of the overall 
performance of superannuation entities in a fast moving global economy. Yet there are 
no legislated governance requirements applicable for the governance of superannuation 
plans in Australia or encouragement of innovation.  
 
Although the superannuation industry differs from the corporate sector, many of the 
superannuation governance guidelines published by Association of Superannuation 
Funds Australia (“ASFA”) are aligned with corporate governance practices 
recommended by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council (2007).   
 
Historically, literature in the area of corporate governance or innovation has not 
specifically addressed the links or relationship between corporate governance and 
innovation.  O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (1998) appear to be the first researchers 
to attempt to explain the link between corporate governance, innovation and economic 
performance in detail and they found that without a theory of innovation in the process 
of economic development, the link between corporate governance and economic 
performance cannot be made.  These researchers also found that the introduction of 
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innovation complicates corporate governance theories as there is no recognition of 
innovation in any of the theories.  Studies relating to innovation within the context of 
the service industry are a relatively new area of research that has been led by 
innovation scholars such as Miles (2005) or Tether (2002).  “Innovation in service-
orientated sectors can differ substantially from innovation in many manufacturing-
orientated sectors.  It is often less formally organised, more incremental in nature and 
less technological” (OECD- Eurostat, 2005: 11).   Within the literature several issues 
emerge, firstly, the constraints placed on innovation (DTI, 2007) and secondly, the 
actual strategic role of the board in relation to the concept of innovation. This research 
explores both these issues. 
 
Innovation in superannuation is vital for this important industry yet the current 
landscape in Australia involves a maze of legislative requirements and competition in 
the global economy.  Innovation is nevertheless considered a key to the improvement 
of performance over time.  To understand the position of innovation in this field of 
research, it is important to first gain an understanding of the corporate governance 
frameworks that reign within this industry.   The King Committee on Corporate 
Governance (2002) Report noted that a board of directors should aim to conform to 
corporate governance constraints while at the same time perform in an innovative and 
entrepreneurial way.  
 
It is clear that corporate governance has a major role to play in the superannuation 
industry as superannuation funds have become increasingly developed and to perform 
corporate governance functions effectively; the industry itself must be efficient and 
drive productivity.  
 
The question of how superannuation funds should be governed to enhance corporate 
and economic performance has received increasing attention from international 
organisations and leading academics such as Ambachsheer (2007). Previous published 
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research has acknowledged that good governance is required to be effective in the 
competitive and complex environment of superannuation.  Prior research by 
Ambachtsheer demonstrated a ‘governance shortfall’ (the return foregone due to 
internal governance and management problems) between good and bad governance of 
100 to 200 basis points per annum in his database of funds.  
 
Good corporate governance promotes innovation that is deliberate, consistent, 
encouraged, nurtured and actively managed, according to de Villiers (2003).  However, 
this may not be the usual practice in this industry.  Similarly, Drucker (1985) 
recognised that innovation is a vital part of any responsible director’s role and “…It is 
the act that endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth. Innovation, indeed 
creates a resource” (1985:27).  
 
It is clear from the literature that both corporate governance and innovation have a 
major role to play within this industry. The establishment of an effective corporate 
governance system requires an efficient financial sector subject to regulation and 
supervision to protect the economy and wider society from systemic failures (Mallin et 
al. 2005) as witnessed firsthand throughout the global financial crisis in 2008.   
 
Research indicates that innovation is a complex interaction between a number of 
variables such as intellectual capital, corporate governance, financial performance, 
leadership, competitive intensity, industry/market, and structure.  Teece (2004) states 
that formal structures such as governance, powerfully influence the rate and direction 
of their innovative activities.  This research seeks to determine whether or not 
innovation occurs within the Australian Superannuation Industry (ASI) and whether 
innovation is hindered within a fund by established corporate governance frameworks 
and whether the board of trustees’ conduct as an element of corporate governance has 
an influence on innovation.  
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The ASI is already an established service industry and continues to grow in size and 
importance quickly as self-funded retirees and government mandated superannuation 
funds proliferate.   This research will examine the link between corporate governance 
and innovation within the ASI.  To achieve this objective the following two broad 
research questions will be investigated: 
1. Is there innovation in the ASI, and if so how does innovation manifest in this 
industry? And: 
2. What role do boards and CEOs play in the innovation process in this industry? 
 
There are four objectives of this research which include: firstly, to advance the 
governance agenda by reviewing and researching the governance platform in Australia 
in relation to superannuation boards; secondly, to examine whether or not current 
governance frameworks in Australia promote or hinder innovation within the 
superannuation industry; thirdly, to advance the knowledge of service industry 
innovation; and finally, to gain insight into the range of innovations across different 
sectors of the ASI and the new product range offered to members. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first six chapters establish the 
background for the research.   
 
Chapter One sets the scene by providing an overview of the history of the 
superannuation environment in Australia. More specifically, it commences with a 
broad historical perspective of the superannuation environment in Australia.  This is 
followed by a detailed analysis of the current law governing the operation of 
Australian Superannuation Funds (herein referred to as “ASFs”) and examines the 
prudential supervision of ASFs.  This chapter outlines the type of funds available in 
Australia, and the aspects of regulatory compliance, which face trustees within this 
industry.  An analysis of the prudential standards, in particular the investments 
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standards that govern the industry are provided. This chapter also considers the milieu 
within which superannuation operates and includes a historical background and the 
current law which regulates the industry. 
Chapter Two provides an outline of the corporate governance framework of all the 
funds used in this thesis.  
Chapter Three provides a literature review in relation to innovation within the 
services industry that incorporates research current to January 2014.  
Chapter Four proceeds with a theoretical framework from a literature review on the 
interaction between corporate governance and innovation and culminates in specific 
research questions to be investigated in this research.   
Chapter Five outlines the case method used to gather the necessary data required to 
answer the broad research question set out in this introduction and the two main 
research questions set out in Chapter Four.   
Chapter Six presents the findings of the ASI case study that were coded and 
categorised into common themes emerging from the interviews.  
Chapter Seven provides a discussion on the key findings of the research, future 
research and the limitations of this research.   
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CHAPTER 1 - THE SUPERANNUATION ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter Overview 
 
SECTION ONE 
 A broad historical perspective of the superannuation environment in Australia. 
 An analysis of the current law governing the operation of Australian 
superannuation funds. 
 An examination of the prudential supervision of superannuation funds in 
Australia. 
 An understanding of the types of superannuation funds available in Australia, 
some aspects of regulatory compliance which face trustees. 
 An analysis of the prudential standards, particularly the investment standards, 
governing the industry. 
SECTION TWO 
 Illustrates the structure of superannuation funds in Australia. 
 Provides an overview of the different types of funds within the ASI. 
 Provides an overview of the trustee’s prescribed covenants set out in the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. 
 Identifies the use of the investment standards in the SIS legislation. 
 Identifies and explains the legislative requirements of the ‘sole purpose’ test. 
SECTION THREE 
 Provides an overview of the trends in the superannuation industry in Australia. 
 Identifies and understand the growing trend towards consolidation within the 
ASI. 
 Provides a financial market summary of the ASI at the time of data collection. 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 7  
 
 
SECTION 1: THE SUPERANNUATION ENVIRONMENT IN 
AUSTRALIA:  A BROAD HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Superannuation in Australia can be traced back to the mid-1800s, when banking 
entities and insurance companies provided benefits to their staff, typically senior 
executives.  The benefits provided were mainly pensions or lump sum benefits.  In 
addition, pension benefits were provided to defence force members for military service 
and for retired members of the public service. 
 
There were various changes to legislation concerning superannuation during the period 
between 1960-1990.  The objective of these changes was to encourage an increase in 
superannuation coverage across the Australian workforce.  For example, during the 
1960s significant changes were made to the qualifications for a fund established for 
employers to receive tax concessions.  Many of the changes required fund trustees to 
notify members that actually belonged to the fund and that the amounts being 
accumulated for the members were reasonable in the opinion of the Tax 
Commissioner.   
 
Significant change occurred in 1983, as there were changes to the tax rules which had 
been in place since 1915. The original rules required that five per cent of lump sum 
benefits paid in consequence of the termination of employment were taxed at the 
recipient’s personal tax rate.  These lump sum benefits included redundancy payments; 
ex gratia payments from employment and superannuation fund lump sums.  The rules 
applying from 1 July 1983 placed a higher rate of tax essentially on that part of the 
benefit, which accumulated from that time.  As part of these changes to the tax 
legislation a new retirement vehicle was created, the Approved Deposit Fund (ADF).  
The role of an ADF was to be a holding account for superannuation and other 
retirement benefits while a member was deciding where to invest their superannuation. 
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In comparison to the significant change in 1983 to the taxing of lump sums, throughout 
the 1980s the administration of the tax law for superannuation funds was supervised 
through publications of the Tax Commissioner.  This was accomplished through the 
Tax Rulings system and by notifying professional organisations of how the law was 
being administered.  Subsequently, the administration of superannuation fund 
operations was transferred from the Tax Commissioner to a newly established 
organisation, the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC) in the late eighties.  
The role of the ISC was to supervise the operation of superannuation funds and to 
determine whether a fund should receive tax concessions if it satisfied the requirements 
of the legislation.  Initially, the ISC took over the administration of the relevant parts 
of the tax legislation and in November 1987 these responsibilities and others were 
incorporated as part of the Occupational Superannuation Standards Act (“OSS Act”).  
The main reason for the change in the regulator came from developments in the 
industrial relations area and the requirement that superannuation was now compulsory 
for the majority of workers covered by industrial awards. 
 
In 1986, the first attempt to introduce a form of compulsory superannuation 
contributions via the industrial agreement regimes occurred. Under this arrangement 
employers were obligated to make a contribution equal to three per cent of salary to a 
superannuation fund in respect of each employee who was covered by an industrial 
award or agreement. In a policy sense this initiative was consistent. However, in 
practice, the level of non-compliance on the part of employers was unacceptably high, 
plus the mechanism for policing compliance was ineffectual.  This lead to the 
introduction of ‘preservation’ in December 1986, where all employer contributions 
were either made under an industrial agreement or award obligations, or as a result of 
an improvement in benefits and would be required to be preserved until genuine 
retirement (Peetz, 1985). 
 
In 1988, the government of the day determined that the income of superannuation 
funds were to be taxed.  Prior to that time, providing superannuation funds met the 
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relevant compliance requirements under the income tax rules and/or the OSS Act, the 
income of the fund was not taxed.  However, from 1 July 1988 the income of the fund 
was taxed at a rate of fifteen per cent if the fund satisfied the compliance requirements 
under the relevant legislation. 
 
In 1988, there was a complete overhaul of the tax regime applying to superannuation 
funds, including: 
i. Introduction of a 15per cent contributions tax on deductible contributions. 
ii. Introduction of a 15 per cent tax on fund earnings. 
iii. A reduction in the rate of tax applicable to the post ‘83 component of an ETP        
(reduced to 15 per cent). 
 
Notwithstanding the introduction of the new tax regime, superannuation remained the 
most tax efficient mechanism for the accumulation of wealth, particularly for top 
marginal tax rate payers.  However, in 1996 the federal government introduced a 
superannuation surcharge regime for ‘high income earners’.  This regime was later 
simplified by the introduction of a flat 15% rebate applicable from 1 July 1994 (subject 
to assessment against the relevant Reasonable Benefit Limit or RBL). 
 
By the early 1990s it was considered that the operation of the OSS Act did not give the 
ISC the power to penalise trustees of superannuation funds who may have made 
decisions in breach of the Act.  The penalty under the OSS Act was to deny the tax 
concessions to the fund and tax the fund’s income at a penalty rate.   
 
In 1991, Federal Budget papers included a discussion paper on the subject of 
prudential supervision of superannuation. The release of this paper both foreshadowed 
the introduction of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (“SIS”) regime 
which was to come later (1994) and reinforced the policy imperative to ensure that the 
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increasing level of savings through the superannuation system, which the evolving 
retirement income policy was delivering, would be subject to appropriate safeguards. 
 
These safeguards included: 
i. The introduction of the substantially self-employed category—that is a person 
will be considered substantially self-employed as long as any employment 
income in respect of which employer financed superannuation is provided 
accounts for less than 10 per cent of the person’s total assessable income. 
 
ii. The introduction of a 10 per cent rebate for up to $1000 of personal 
superannuation contributions subject to the individual’s level of assessable 
income—often referred to as the low income superannuation income rebate.   
 
iii. The removal of the option for a person to select between either the pre 1983 or 
post 1983 component when withdrawing an ETP from a rollover fund, 
meaning, all withdrawals of pre/post components were required to be taken in 
the proportions defined by the eligible service period.  
 
iv. The introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee Charge regime (‘SGC’) 
imposed an obligation on all employers to contribute a minimum prescribed 
amount to superannuation in respect of all employees. Significant 
characteristics of the SGC regime include: 
 All employees now receive a minimum level of employer support to their 
superannuation fund, whether or not they are covered by an industrial award or 
agreement. 
 The level of employer contribution, initially set at 3 per cent, was subject to a 
legislated transitional arrangement which saw the level of employer support for 
all employees increase to 9 per cent. 
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 Compliance with the SGC obligation was linked to the tax system, which 
ensures effective monitoring of the employers’ contributions in accordance 
with this obligation and reasonably material penalties for non-compliance. 
 
Trustees were not penalised under this legislation for their failure to act as required.  It 
was for this reason that in 1993 the SIS was enacted in Australia and continues to be in 
existence two decades later. 
 
The role of the SIS legislation was to bring superannuation funds and related 
retirement income vehicles under federal control.  Previously, trustees were not held to 
account under this legislation, however, this position changed with the enacting of the 
SIS legislation.  SIS imposed penalties on the party responsible for the operation of the 
fund and others associated with matters related to its operation.  It also required the 
trustee to make an irrevocable election for the operation of the fund to be bound by the 
SIS provisions.   
 
The SIS Act was designed to supervise the superannuation industry and to ensure that 
there was greater security of superannuation savings.  The objective of the legislation 
was achieved by requiring superannuation funds to have a prudential framework in 
place.  That framework not only ensured that there were restrictions on superannuation 
funds investing in particular areas and members were notified about their benefits, but 
that fund trustees also have proper systems in place.  Superannuation entities are 
defined as regulated superannuation funds, approved deposit funds, and pooled 
superannuation trusts seeking concessional tax treatment.   
 
The SIS Act outlines the conditions with which superannuation entities must comply 
with to be eligible for taxation concessions. In summary, the SIS Act: 
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 Contains the eligibility standards for trustees, investment managers and 
custodians. 
 Codifies the basic duties, responsibilities, standards for and obligations of 
trustees, investment managers, custodians, auditors and actuaries. 
 Provides the mechanism for dealing with unclaimed benefits of members who 
cannot be found. 
 Provides APRA with direct enforcement powers to monitor and supervise the 
industry. 
 Provides a regime of penalties for breach of the prudential requirements and 
obligations under the SIS Act. 
 Establishes the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal and the mechanism for 
resolution of disputes in superannuation matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: Eligibility for tax concessions for superannuation funds in Australia. 
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The basis for supervision is that the funds and trusts are subject to regulation under the 
Commonwealth's powers with respect to corporations or pensions (for example, 
because the trustee is a corporation). In return, the supervised funds and trusts may 
become eligible for concessional taxation treatment. The scheme of the SIS Act that 
enables a fund to receive the relevant tax concessions is illustrated in Diagram 1 above. 
 
In 1994, in conjunction with the introduction of the SIS legislation a number of 
changes were made to the income tax legislation.  The changes related to contributions 
to funds and the transfer of rules from the OSS Act, which limited the amount that 
could be paid for superannuation and retirement purposes, imposed tax at concessional 
rates.  These limits were the RBLs and amounts paid in excess of the relevant limit 
were taxed at the maximum personal tax rate. 
 
In 1997 as a result of the Wallis Inquiry, a report commissioned to review the 
Australian financial system, it was recognised that the Australian financial system 
needed regulatory reform for competition and efficiency reasons.  There were a 
number of recommendations that affected superannuation from the point of view of 
regulation.  First, the role of the ISC, which administered most of SIS legislation, was 
to be amalgamated with regulators of other financial deposit taking entities to form a 
new organisation the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).  
 
APRA supervises the superannuation, insurance, banking and related industries.  Its 
role was to identify problems that may pose a threat to members’ entitlements.  This 
included a wide range of fund operations including the management of the fund and its 
ability to deal with or avoid problems associated with the operation of the fund.   
 
APRA is the primary regulator of the superannuation industry as a whole. This is as a 
result of the Wallis Inquiry recommendations. It is responsible for: the administration 
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of the SIS Act; the extensive regulatory and investigative powers, including the power 
to suspend and remove trustees of superannuation entities; the appointment of acting 
trustees where necessary, and the power to grant exemptions from, and make 
modifications to, certain provisions of the SIS Act in respect of a fund. 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) is another 
government organisation that is responsible for consumer protection and market 
integrity.  In the superannuation industry this means ensuring consumers receive 
adequate information so they can make informed decisions about the superannuation 
products and services that are being offered.   ASIC may also prohibit people or 
organisations from providing superannuation products and advice where the 
information provided is found to be incorrect or misleading. 
 
In addition, the Australian Tax Office (“ATO”) has a number of roles in relation to 
superannuation that covers a great deal of legislation.  The ATO has a traditional 
revenue collection role for superannuation funds under the income tax legislation.  In 
addition to this role it also has responsibility for the redistribution of superannuation 
benefits to funds and under SIS, it supervises the operation of self-managed 
superannuation funds. 
The role of each main regulator of superannuation can be illustrated in Diagram 2: 
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Diagram 2: Regulation of superannuation funds in Australia 
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When the Liberal/National Party Coalition was elected to government in 1996 it 
continued with the superannuation system consisting of compulsory and voluntary 
components.  This included the age pension, occupationally based superannuation, 
such as the Superannuation Guarantee and voluntary personal retirement savings.  New 
initiatives such as the co-contribution, expansion of contributions to superannuation, 
choice of superannuation funds and splitting contributions between spouses expanded 
the opportunities for people to contribute to superannuation and to increase their 
wealth for retirement. 
 
The introduction of the superannuation surcharge as an additional tax applying to 
certain deductible contributions and employer Employment Termination Payments 
(ETPs), identified an extremely turbulent period in the history of superannuation in 
Australia. The relevant provisions were subject to a number of technical amendments 
during the first 18 month period immediately following the original announcement.  
The High Court of Australia concluded during this period that the surcharge was 
unconstitutional in relation to State judicial officers (refer to: Austin v Commonwealth 
of Australia, (2003) 215 CLR 195). 
 
The introduction of allowing people to choose funds arising from the proposal outlined 
in the 1997 Federal Budget announcement (subsequently legislation passed in 2004) 
was expected to significantly alter the ‘superannuation landscape’ in Australia. As 
from 1 July 2005 a person who was covered by certain employment conditions was 
able to direct his or her employer to contribute superannuation guarantee contributions 
to a complying superannuation fund or their choice. 
 
In the May 2006 Budget the Liberal/National Party Coalition (LNP) government 
announced substantial changes to superannuation in ‘A Plan to Simplify and Streamline 
Superannuation’. The objective of the reform was to make the superannuation system 
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easier to understand, improve incentives to save and introduce greater flexibility in 
how superannuation savings can be drawn down in retirement.  Major changes 
commenced from 1 July 2007. The main features of the reform included: 
1. Lump sums and pensions paid from a taxed source would be tax free to anyone 
aged 60 or over. 
2. Abolition of Reasonable Benefit Limits, meaning that tax penalties on the 
withdrawal of excessive amounts from superannuation were removed. 
3. Removal of the mandatory requirement of the payment of benefits from 
superannuation on a member reaching a particular age. 
4. Changing the rules for tax-deductible and non-deductible superannuation 
contributions. 
5. Allowing self-employed persons access to the co-contributions system. 
6. Increasing the amount a small business person can use for superannuation 
purposes from the sale of certain business assets. 
7. Making it easier to transfer superannuation benefits between funds. 
8. Changing the rules for employer termination payments. 
 
These changes were intended to make it easier for Australian residents to understand 
the superannuation regime and encourage individuals to increase the amount of their 
retirement savings. 
 
When the Labor Party came to power in late 2007 it undertook to retain the 
superannuation simplification measures introduced by the previous government.  In its 
first budget in May 2008 there were no changes to the superannuation system.  
 
In 2008, a governance review of superannuation and also of financial services 
legislation– identified: 
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 There were approximately 385 000 superannuation funds in Australia which 
controlled about $1.1 trillion in assets (APRA, Mar 2008). 
 Enormous growth occurred in the number of funds and the assets they controlled 
particularly since the inception of SIS. 
 The majority of growth in the number of funds has been in self-managed 
superannuation funds (also known as DIY funds).   
 Public offer funds (i.e. usually those promoted by life offices, banks and fund 
managers) and industry funds controlled approximately $600 billion of the total 
amount invested in superannuation. 
 
Many government committees have reviewed and reported on the operation of 
superannuation funds and the tax concessions and exemptions provided for 
superannuation in Australia.  This included the reports of the Spooner Committee, the 
Ligertwood Committee, the Hancock Report, the Asprey Committee Report, the Wallis 
Committee, the Henry review of taxation and the recent Cooper review and his 
introduction of the MySuper framework.  
  
With the ever-changing complex environment that the ASI operates within, the new 
mandatory MySuper framework, the cost of providing ‘Choice’ features and benefits, 
no longer permit cross-subsidisation among the different plans operating within one 
superannuation entity.  The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper 
provisions) Act 2012 which received Royal Assent on 28 November 2012, which 
established the legislative framework for the key aspects of MySuper products from 1 
July 2013.  MySuper products were eligible as default superannuation funds since 1 
January 2014.  As a result of the enactment of this legislation, where employees have 
not chosen a fund, a default funds that offer a MySuper product from 1 January 2014 
will be allocated to that employee.   
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In addition, further legislation was passed in the form of the Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment (Further MySuper and Transparency Measures) Act 2012 (Act 
171 of 2012) which provides for the transition of accrued default balances to MySuper 
by 1 July 2017.  The final piece of legislation passed in relation to MySuper, the 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Service Providers and Other Governance 
Measures) Act 2013 (Act 61 of 2013) received Royal Assent on 26 June 2013, pertains 
to superannuation service providers, contributions to Choice products, taking legal 
action against trustees for breaches of directors duties, legal defence for trustees, 
reasons for trustees decisions and other miscellaneous matters. Other features of the 
MySuper and governance reforms appear in regulations: Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment Regulation 2013 and Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper 
Measures) Regulation 2013. 
 
The ongoing advice required in relation to superannuation issues has become central to 
the financial planning process both internal and external to the industry.  Formulation 
of financial planning advice (an innovation now offered within this industry by the 
majority of ASFs) in relation to superannuation assets will often involve consideration 
of the choice of utilising public offer funds or self-managed funds.  The Federal 
Government has enacted legislation for the implementation of the Future of Financial 
Advice (FOFA) Reforms and the Stronger Super Reforms.  
 
Licensees such as ASFs, who provide financial advice, are required to implement the 
new FOFA Reforms. In addition, the Trustees of Australian Superannuation Funds 
should implement the new Stronger Super Reforms.  There is a  natural synergy 
between the legislative provisions for both Licensees and Trustees.   The 
implementation of FOFA Reforms requires mandatory compliance from 1 July 20131. 
                                                      
1 Regulatory Guide 175 Licensing: Financial product advisers – conduct and disclosure has been 
updated to include guidance about ASIC's expectations for meeting the best interests duty and to 
ensure that it is consistent with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 244 (Giving information, general 
advice and scaled advice).  Regulatory Guide 244 incorporates guidance that was previously in 
Regulatory Guide 200 Advice for super fund members (RG 200).  
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It is important to acknowledge these current reforms as all the participants involved in 
this research highlighted that financial advice was either presently offered by their fund 
as a service to its membership or was currently in the planning phase to be offered in 
the future.  The requirements of the FOFA Reforms are outlined in Appendix 1.  
 
The current provisions for advice are required to be in accordance with the Future of 
Financial Advice Reforms and the Stronger Super Reforms in a manner which is 
efficient, honest and fair in accordance with section 912A (a) of the Corporations Act 
2001. 
 
The FOFA Reforms introduced on 1 July 2013 now require a statutory fiduciary duty 
(rather than the established common law duty) for financial advisers to act in the best 
interests of their clients. 2  The communication between the adviser and the client is 
critical to ensuring the best interest duty is discharged. An adviser will be required to 
scope the necessary advice and to ensure the client fully understands the advice 
provided and it is properly documented. 
 
The FOFA Reform and Stronger Super Reform requirements regarding 
implementation through the range of activities are outlined in Appendix 1.   The 
ongoing compliance with the requirements will need to continue after commencement 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regulatory Guide 244 Giving information, general advice and scaled advice makes it clear that advisers 
will need to make preliminary enquiries to determine the scope of advice being sought and whether 
that scope is appropriate.  If a member seeks advice which is beyond the adviser's authorisation, then 
it may not be possible for an adviser to give advice on a more limited scope and he or she may need to 
refer the member to another adviser if they still want further advice or decline to provide advice if the 
best interests duty cannot be met.   
Regulatory Guide 246 Conflicted remuneration deals with the application of the FOFA provisions with 
respect to conflicted remuneration which is any remuneration that could “reasonably be expected to 
influence” a choice of product or advice which is monetary or non‐monetary. 
Regulatory Guide 183 Approval of financial services sector codes of conduct outline the approach of 
ASIC to the exercise of its relief powers and approval of a Code in accordance with the FOFA Reforms. 
Regulatory Guide 245 Fee disclosure statements outlines the fee disclosure statement (FDS) obligations 
that will apply to AFS Licensees and their Representatives from the FOFA reforms. 
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on 1 July 2013 to ensure ongoing compliance is maintained for ASFs that choose to 
offer financial advice. 
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 SECTION 2:  SUPERANNUATION FUNDS IN AUSTRALIA  
 
Superannuation funds in Australia operate as a trust structure.  The trustees of the fund 
are the legal owners of the assets of the scheme held in trust for the members of the 
fund (“the beneficiaries”).   Trustees appoint custodians to hold the assets of the trust 
in a secure manner.  Trustees have common law fiduciary duties in relation to the 
beneficiaries, for instance: to act honestly; to act in the interests of the beneficiaries; 
and to act prudently. In addition, trustees have legislative requirements imposed under 
the SIS Act. 
  
These key requirements from the SIS Act are:  
  
1. Equal membership of employer and employee representatives are mandated on 
trustee boards of employer sponsored funds.  
2. Membership reporting rules require regular reporting to members.  
3. APRA is required to approve trustees for public offer superannuation funds. 
4. Lodgment of audited annual reports by superannuation funds is mandated. 
5. Preservation of benefits is required and balances are not to be paid to 
contributors until they reach the age of 55 years. 
6. Superannuation funds are required to have an investment strategy which 
allocates contributions to asset classes and which selects individual securities 
within the asset classes.   
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What is a superannuation fund in Australia? 
 
A superannuation fund is established as a legal trust in order to provide benefits to 
fund members or their dependants upon sickness, retirement or death. The term 
“superannuation fund” is defined for the purposes of the SIS Act as meaning a fund 
that is an indefinitely continuing fund.  The fund is constituted under a trust deed 
(commonly known as governing rules) and sets out who can be a member, how 
contributions are to be invested and the conditions under which benefits are paid.  The 
major characteristics of the fund include a separate and identifiable fund of money or 
investments set aside and invested to earn income or capital growth for the main 
purpose of providing benefits to members of the fund upon retirement after a 
prescribed age (Australian Financial Planning Handbook, 2013). 
 
The ASI may be broken down into five different sectors: industry funds, corporate 
funds, public sector funds, retail funds and self-managed super funds (SMSFs).   
 
Industry funds 
 
Typically, industry funds gain their membership from a particular industry segment 
(such as hospitality, retail or construction) and have historically been associated with 
trade unions, where there have been negotiated membership arrangements entered into 
by the employer and the union.  At the time of data collection, industry funds 
represented seventeen per cent of the total funds under management for the industry. 
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Corporate funds 
 
Historically, corporate funds have been established by an individual employer for its 
employees and in 2008, represented five per cent of the total funds under management 
for the industry. 
 
A ‘standard employer-sponsored fund’ is defined in section 16 of the SIS Act. It is a 
regulated superannuation fund that has at least one standard employer-sponsor. In 
broad terms, a ‘standard employer-sponsor’ is an employer that contributes to the fund 
pursuant to an arrangement between the employer and the trustee of the fund. 
In Australia, typically ‘corporate funds,’ and many ‘industry funds,’ are standard 
employer-sponsored funds. 
 
Historically, when an employee commences employment, that employee will 
automatically join a superannuation fund of the employer’s choosing. Since member 
choice legislation was introduced the landscape of default funds has changed and with 
the Strong Super reforms, employers can only use a superannuation fund that has a 
default MySuper fund registered with APRA as at January 2014.   This process in time 
will see a reduction in the number of ASFs in the ASI from January 2014. 
 
Public sector funds 
 
These entities are operated by both State and Federal governments on behalf of their 
employees and at the time of data collection for this thesis comprised 14.5 per cent of 
the total funds under management for the industry. 
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Retail funds (Public Offer) 
 
Offer superannuation options to the general public and employers who do not wish to 
establish an occupational fund. While they comprised 29 per cent of the industry in 
2008, it is suggested that this sector will increase considerably with the 
commencement of the Stronger Super Reforms in 2014. 
 
Self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) 
 
There is a variety of considerations that may influence the decision as to when a SMSF 
approach is appropriate for any individual.  Reasons for electing a SMF include: 
 desire for complete control; 
 a preference for investment in certain assets or asset classes which are not 
readily available  through other types of funds; and 
 a belief that fund managers do not add value to your asset portfolio and hence a 
superior investment return can be achieved in the self-managed fund. 
 
The ATO is the responsible authority for the prudential supervision of self-managed 
superannuation funds.  The ATO (2012) reported the inward rollovers to SMSFs from 
period June 2006 – June 2012, which highlights a significant switch to SMSFs during 
the global financial crisis (“GFC’). See Table 1 over the page. 
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Table 1: Rollovers to Self-Managed Superannuation Funds 
 
     
There is still a significant swing towards the establishment of SMSFs in Australia. 
Table 1 reveals the number of rollovers out of existing funds to SMSFs in Australia.  
During the decade to June 2012, the SMSFs had turned out to be the single largest 
sector in the ASI.  The primary driver of growth within the self-managed sector has 
been the high value of assets per member that have been rolled over from other 
superannuation entities to SMSFs since ‘choice of fund’ was introduced in July 2005. 
There was a sharp rise in the year 2008 for the establishment of SMSFs.  
 
The changing landscape of the structure of the superannuation industry is best 
illustrated by the period between June 2004 and June 2012, in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: The number of superannuation entities in Australia from 2004 – 2012 
Source: APRA 2012 
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Table 2 shows the number of corporate funds declined from 1,405 in June 2004 to 122 
in June 2012 compared to industry funds and SMSFs which have grown in size.  
Industry funds have become significant financial entities in Australia with expanded 
financial services and in the next decade to 2024, several large industry funds may 
compete directly with the major four banks in Australia. 
  
The differences between industry and retails funds in Australia are provided in Table 3 
below2. 
                                                      
  2. The Australian Financial Planning Handbook 2013 provides a similar comparison for SMSFs, public 
sector and corporate funds. 
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Table 3:  A comparison between industry funds and retail funds3 
                                                      
 
 
Points of Comparison Industry Fund Retail Fund 
Cost of fund The cost of the fund is the same whether the 
person obtains advice or invests without advice 
or assistance. 
The cost of the fund is the same whether 
the person obtains advice or invests 
without advice or assistance. 
Disclosure of fees 
From 1 July 2005, all 
ASFs must disclose costs 
Can have hidden fees – eg. investment 
management costs are deducted before the net 
earnings rate of the fund is declared. 
Full disclosure of fees both at 
superannuation fund and underlying 
investment levels. 
Life insurance 
 
 
Set levels of insurance cover.  
Many offer a low fixed sum insured.  
Some permit increases to the sum insured at a 
cost to the member. 
Widest variation of premiums depending on age, 
occupation, sex and whether smoke.  
Broader offerings.  
Can offer a high level of automatic cover. 
Retail corporate funds provide 2-3 times 
higher level of cover without evidence of 
health. 
 
Investment choice within 
fund 
Investment choice can 
make a difference to the 
outcome 
Larger range of investment options 
Direct shares cannot be purchased  
A range of investment options  
Direct investment 
Unique investments 
Administration  Service standard for all transactions.  Service standards for most transactions. 
Interactive voice 
response   
Provide up to date account balance. Provide up to date account balance and 
unit price. 
Frequency of member 
statements  
Only provide annual statements.  
Many funds provide 6 monthly record of 
contributions but does not include investment 
earnings. 
Majority provide annual statements. 
Some provide 6 monthly transaction and 
account balance including investment 
earnings. 
Timing of member 
statements 
Send out within 3 months of end of period. Send out within 2 months of end of period. 
Ongoing monitoring of 
portfolio 
 
 
No fund promotion of ongoing monitoring as 
one of its services 
Clients receiving ongoing monitoring 
service receive benefits such as: 
- contact with their adviser 
throughout the year 
- periodic reviews to ensure 
financial plan stays current and 
relevant to economic climate and 
changing lifestyle 
-monitoring and active 
management of investments 
Retirement options Limited to the options available within the fund. Limited by options available on Approved 
Product List. 
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Evidence on the performance of these two types of superannuation funds, was 
provided for the first time by Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003). Using APRA annual 
data from 1996 to 2002, the evidence suggested that there were significant 
differences in outcomes across the different type of funds. For example:  
 Returns were highest for corporate funds and lowest for retail funds. 
 Retail and industry funds had the lowest returns and volatility and the highest 
expenses. 
 Many funds, particularly retail funds, have failed to outperform the return 
available from a risk free investment in Treasury notes. 
 There was evidence of a negative return between returns and expenses 
suggesting that fund members receive little advantage from investing in 
superannuation funds with high expenses. 
 Retail funds exhibit potential problems with low returns and high fees. 
 
Statutory duties for trustees of superannuation funds in Australia 
Prescribed Covenants set out in the SIS Act 
 
While the Australian government has resisted telling superannuation trustees what to 
invest in, trustees must invest the funds entrusted to them carefully. Specifically, they 
must comply with prescribed covenants to make and give effect to an investment 
strategy that has regard to risk, return, cash flow, diversification, liquidity, tax, costs 
and the liabilities of the fund.   
 
In addition, the trustees have to exercise due care and act in the best interests of the 
membership as a whole.   There are important prescribed covenants contained in the 
SIS Act that are applicable for all types of funds within the ASI.   Some of these 
covenants mirror common law requirements of directors in Australian public 
companies.  Given these legislative requirements it is important to move the focus 
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from a traditional perspective of fund governance and trust law to a perspective that 
focuses around a modern approach to governance and its guiding principles within the 
context of the ASI.  Historically, a superannuation fund inherited its governance 
procedures from English common law and the trust entities and still remains an 
important reference point for superannuation funds trustees (Ellison, 2002).  The trust 
institution provides superannuation funds with a generic form.  There are different 
types of superannuation funds; governed by a single trustee; governed by sponsor-
nominated trustees; governed by a mix of sponsor and beneficiary representatives; 
including independent and professional trustees.  There are both private and public 
funds and funds may vary according to the nature of the benefits offered: defined 
benefits, defined contributions and hybrid versions. 
 
The SIS Act outlines various statutory requirements in respect to the appointment and 
removal of trustees, investment managers and custodian.  Part 6 of the SIS Act 
prescribes requirements in relation to the content of the governing rules of 
superannuation entities.  Given the mandate of each fund when established, and given 
the presumption in favour of supervision instead of direct regulation, trustees have 
wide ranging powers consistent with the English common-law trust entities (Langbein, 
1997). In Australia, trustees must act in accordance with the covenants set out in the 
SIS legislation.  These covenants are provided for two main reasons: firstly, to 
understand broadly what trustees’ responsibilities are and secondly to highlight how 
tightly legislated the industry is. 
 
The SIS Act requires that the governing rules of a regulated superannuation fund must 
either contain, or is deemed to contain, certain covenants (s.52). Section.52 statutory 
covenants require the trustee of a superannuation fund in Australia: 
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1. ‘To act honestly in all matters concerning the entity.’ 
 
This is a fundamental duty of a trustee under trust law—that is to act honestly and in 
good faith in all matters in relation to a trust and all beneficiaries. 
 
2. To exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the same degree of 
care, skill and diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in 
dealing with property of another for whom the person felt morally bound to 
provide. 
 
This is an objective test on the standard of care required of the trustee in all matters 
relating to a fund, including the matters specifically set out in the SIS Act.  A trustee is 
therefore not assessed on the basis of the trustee’s own skills or experience (the 
subjective test) but is required to exhibit in the performance of its duties a standard of 
care, skill and diligence to equate with the objective standard that might be expected of 
an ordinary prudent person in the position of being a trustee of a superannuation fund. 
 
3. To ensure that the trustee’s duties and powers are performed and exercised in 
the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
 
This requires the trustee, when exercising its powers and duties, not to compromise the 
interests of the beneficiaries in favour of other parties (e.g. a purchaser of an asset 
being sold by a fund) or the trustee’s personal interest. The promise to act in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries also implies that the trustee will act impartially between 
beneficiaries, not favouring one over another. 
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4. Not to enter into any contract, or do anything else, that would prevent the 
trustee from, or hinder the trustee in, properly performing or exercising the 
trustee’s functions and powers. 
 
This does not prevent the trustee from engaging or authorising persons to do acts or 
things on behalf of the trustee (s.52 (3)). However, the trustee remains liable for any 
acts or omissions by the delegates of the trustee. 
 
5. To formulate and give effect to an investment strategy that has regard to the 
whole of the circumstances of the entity including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
 
i. The risk involved in making, holding and realising, and the likely return 
from, the entity’s investments having regard to its objectives and its 
expected cash flow requirements. 
ii. The composition of the entity’s investments as a whole including the 
extent to which the investments are diverse or involve the entity in 
being exposed to risks from inadequate diversification. 
iii. The liquidity of the entity’s investments having regard to its expected 
cash flow requirements; 
iv. The ability of the entity to discharge its existing and prospective 
liabilities. 
 
In addition, there are more general duties that impose qualities of decision-making that 
are relevant in the investment context. These include covenants that the trustee will 
exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the same degree of care, skill 
and diligence as a prudent superannuation trustee would exercise in relation to an 
entity of which it is trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries of which it makes investments. 
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Where trustees are responsible for the new MySuper (default) product, they are 
specifically required to promote the financial interests of the beneficiaries of the fund 
who hold the MySuper product… 
 
The SIS Act requires that a fund has an investment strategy and that the strategy is 
implemented.  Failure to have a strategy or to implement that strategy will be 
construed as a breach of the investment covenants and may invoke the penalty 
provisions of the legislation.  The main aspects of formulating an investment strategy 
are to consider the risks involved in making, holding and realising the investment 
returns, cash flow, diversification or lack thereof, liquidity and the ability of the fund 
to discharge its liabilities as they become due.  Providing the trustees of an ASF can 
justify the position they have taken then they will meet the investment strategy 
requirements.   
 
An investment strategy is taken to be in accordance with this covenant if it provides for 
beneficiary choice, which allows a specified beneficiary or a specified class of 
beneficiaries to give directions to the trustee where: 
 The directions relate to the strategy to be followed by the trustee in relation to 
the investment of a particular asset or assets of the entity. 
 The directions are given in circumstances covered by the SIS Regulations. 
 
This legislative requirement in respect of investments needs to be made on an ‘arm’s-
length’ basis. For instance, the transaction needs to be commercially orientated.  
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The ‘Sole Purpose Test’ requirement for trustees set out in the SIS 
Act 
 
Finally, the all-encompassing duty of the fund is the ‘sole purpose’ of providing 
retirement benefits to members.   
 
The ‘sole purpose test’ is raised here to highlight that trustees within this industry are 
mandated to make decisions for the ASF in conjunction to this test.  The sole purpose 
test ensures that a superannuation fund that has elected to be regulated is maintained 
solely for one or more of the ‘core’ purposes and may be maintained for one or more 
of the ‘core’ purposes. The ‘sole purpose test’ requires the fund to be exclusively 
maintained for core or, where relevant, ancillary purposes.  The governing rules for 
superannuation funds in Australia grant the trustee power to provide a wide range of 
benefits for members.  Trustees are individuals that are appointed to the fund to 
represent the beneficiaries’ interests, which is in keeping with trust law principles and 
modern day fiduciary duties of their role. 
 
Where there has been a failure of funds to meet the requirements of the ‘sole purpose 
test’ it has usually been based around the use of the fund solely for purposes other than 
the provision of core and/or ancillary benefits to members or their dependants.  
Examples of the failures by trustees include whether a particular investment of a fund 
has been solely maintained to provide benefits that satisfy the sole purpose test.  
Another example was the Swiss Chalet case (Case 43/95, AAT Case 10301) where it 
was decided that the assets of the particular fund, which were used by the members for 
ostensibly private purposes, were not maintained solely for superannuation purposes.   
 
The case of Raymor Contractors v FC of T 91 ATC 4259 is an example of where the 
ASF was used as a cheap source of working capital for the sponsoring employer rather 
than intending to provide superannuation benefits to fund members.  It is now 
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considered that a fund that owns shares in a company that provides discount shopping 
facilities at minimal cost would be in breach of the ‘sole purpose test’.  However, 
where there is no cost to the fund then it is acceptable as the benefit is merely 
incidental to the fund owning the shares.4 
 
Other issues relating to the ‘sole purpose test’ also concerned a superannuation fund 
advertising to attract new members due to the commencement of the choice of fund 
legislation.  The issue here was whether the fund was solely providing the required 
benefits to members or whether the fund was using its resources for purposes not 
related to the current member’s interests.  This ‘sole purpose test’ is important in the 
context of trustee decision making and innovation, which will be explored in the 
Discussion Chapter as it plays an important part in the role of the trustee and the 
findings for this research. 
 
Despite the fact that the legislation requires superannuation fund trustees to satisfy a 
‘sole purpose test’ there is no prohibition on funds having an equitable interest in 
suppliers of ancillary services such as financial planning, insurance or legal service 
provided that the investment is considered justifiable on financial grounds by the 
trustees and approved by APRA as part of portfolio allocation.  Examples of these 
ancillary services will be highlighted in the Results Chapter.   
 
There is a general law requirement that the trustees of a superannuation fund exercise 
its investment power for a ‘proper’ purpose which is defined narrowly, as being for the 
purpose for which the power was granted.  The proper purpose within this context is to 
achieve the financial objectives of the fund.  The question as to whether the investment 
power can be exercised properly can create issues where there is an additional or 
subsidiary purpose.
                                                      
4 Other cases include APRA v Derstepanian [2005] FCA 1121 (purchase of assets at an inflated price 
from an employer‐sponsor); Re Montgomery Wools Pty Limited as trustee for Montgomery Wools Pty 
Limited Super Fund v. Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 61 (supporting a family owned business). 
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SECTION 2:  EMERGING SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY TRENDS 
WITHIN AUSTRALIA 
 
The ASI is a fundamental element of the Australian financial sector and the broader 
Australian economy.  The number and proportion of Australians drawing pensions from 
superannuation funds has increased substantially in recent years. The proportion of the total 
population of pensionable age is approximately 23 per cent, and growing strongly.  Treasury 
estimates that the number of people receiving some form of superannuation pension will 
roughly double to 1.4 million by 2035. 
 
As at 2012, the industry accounts for twenty one per cent of total Australian financial sector 
assets.  Superannuation assets are now approximately 120 per cent of the Australian share 
market capitalisation and 90 per cent of Australia’s annual gross domestic product. These 
assets grew by 10.5 per cent per annum in the decade to June 2012, increasing from 
approximately $500 billion to $1.4 trillion. 
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Diagram 3:  Total superannuation assets in Australia 
 
Diagram 3 outlines the total assets in the ASI and future forecasts for total assets within this 
industry as at June 2017. Today, the average size of superannuation entities (measured by 
assets) is approximately $2.6 billion as at financial year ending June 2012.  
 
With increasing competition within the ASI and the introduction of new legislative 
requirements in respect to FOFA and Strong Super reforms, it became important for 
superannuation entities to consider reviewing their strategic plan and their strategic direction 
to allow continued growth and maintenance of their assets and membership were important.    
Factors such as the ageing population, the growth of the SMSF sector, potential growth in the 
size of competitor entities and the consequences of the upcoming ‘Stronger Super’ reforms, 
will have an impact on the current landscape.  One way in which the financial sector plays a 
key role in assuring good corporate governance is by creating competition among fund 
markets.  Through competition, an efficient allocation of capital (investment strategy) on a 
continuous dynamic basis should be achieved.   
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To remain competitive within this industry over the next decade, from the start of the new 
financial year 1 July 2014, superannuation entities in Australia should consider: 
 Reviewing their product offerings from a strategic perspective. 
 Consider a possible merger with other superannuation entities, or: 
 Collaborate resources with other entities preferably within the same sector, (as  
            witnessed action already taken by several industry funds.)  
 
Superannuation entities that are unable to strategically adapt to competitive pressures from 
SMSFs and other more efficient superannuation entities will face the issue of diminishing 
assets and eventual decline of their assets fund. 
 
 
Table 4 below highlights the growth in the superannuation industry’s share of total financial 
entities assets from June 2002 – 2012. In 2002 superannuation was fifteen per cent of the 
overall share of the total financial entities assets and in 2012 it had increased by six per cent 
to twenty one per cent. 
 
Table 4: The superannuation share of financial industry assets in 
Australia
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The ASI grew by approximately 10.5 per cent per annum, increasing from approximately 
$500 billion to $1.4 trillion over the decade to financial year ending June 2012.  
 
Diagram 4: Assets by type of fund as a percentage of total superannuation assets 
 
Diagram 4 outlines the distribution of assets by segment, as a percentage of total assets held 
within the ASI and shows that it has changed dramatically in the past decade to June 2012.  
SMSFs have become the single largest segment in the industry. Approximately, one third of 
superannuation assets now reside in SMSFs.  The industry funds sector also acquired a 
greater share of superannuation assets over the same period, growing from approximately 14 
per cent to 20 per cent of total superannuation assets, than the other three sectors within the 
industry.  
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Table 5: Consolidations 
 
 
Table 5 highlights a growing trend towards consolidations of superannuation entities in 
Australia, and the forecast is to continue to June 2017 due to the recent legislative reform 
mentioned earlier in relation to Stronger Super reforms. 
 
With the ever-changing, complex environment that the ASI operates within, the new 
mandatory MySuper framework no longer permit cross-subsidisation among the different 
plans.  One strategic option remaining for superannuation entities to attract and retain 
members’ assets and contributions, is to become more cost competitive and by reducing total 
costs per member.   This strategic objective would be achievable through an increased 
emphasis on operational efficiency, by either a merger with another more operationally 
efficient superannuation entity or to collaborate with other entities in that sector, which is 
evident within the industry fund sector.   
 
The ASI has witnessed successful collaboration strategies by industry funds across a wide 
range of activities which will be outlined in the Results Chapter.   Collaborative strategies 
will also be discussed in the Discussion Chapter. In summary, they include: administration of 
member accounts; investment activities including managing investments; and retirement 
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product provisions, governance activities and finally political lobbying activities (Brown and 
Davis, 2009).   
 
Diagram 5 below has been included in this section to highlight the significance of Australia’s 
Investment Fund Assets Pool in the Australian Trade Commission’s Benchmark Report 2010 
by Maragiannis and Giovas (2012).  
  
Diagram 5: Global significance of Australia’s Investment Fund Assets Pool 
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Financial Market Summary for the ASI at August 2008 
 
By way of background, the shape of the financial markets at August 2008 in Australia is 
outlined to understand the context of the ASI environment at the time of data collection. 
The financial markets were best described as tumultuous. Markets resumed their downward 
slide during September 2008 as the problems with the US banking and insurance sectors 
became evident.  Global inter-bank lending came to a standstill after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse.  The US government committed $700bn to a Troubled Assets Relief Plan designed 
to provide capital to the banking system.  The UK government announced that they would 
purchase a stake in the troubled banks to calm markets. 
 
Fears had moved away from the credit crisis to a more general concern in relation to the 
austere outlook for the global economy. A global recession appeared inevitable with the 
majority of developed economies experiencing several quarters of negative growth, and 
emerging economies slowing down, as evidenced by slowing Chinese growth. 
 
After the falls in markets witnessed in September and October 2008, the valuation measures 
entered extreme territory fostered by fear and panic rather than rational assessment of the 
likely impact on corporate earnings and dividends (Mercer, 2008). 
The ongoing credit crisis and fears of a global recession weighed heavily on the performance 
of Australian and international listed property trusts, with both posting falls in the last quarter 
to 2008.   Appendix 2 provides very detailed charts produced by Mercer for Fund 15 on the 
global equity market performance, equity market valuation, emerging markets, resource 
sector, property sector, small companies sector, monetary policy, bond markets, corporate 
bond market, currency, global growth, inflation, earnings and risk warnings, which provides 
insight into the tumultuous landscape that trustees within the ASI had to make decisions in. 
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Conclusion   
 
There is a new competitive landscape in which the fundamental nature of competition is 
changing.  The new landscape challenges those responsible for making effective strategic 
decisions to adopt a new mind set (Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 2014) that is global in nature.  
Through this mind-set, trustees of ASFs must learn how to compete in a highly turbulent and 
uncertain environment. 
 
Superannuation statistics by ASFA for January 2014, report that during 2012-13 industry 
funds’ assets increased by 21.5 per cent, public sector funds’ assets increased by 15.4 per 
cent, retail funds’ assets by 13.9 per cent, small funds’ assets including SMFs increased by 
15.5 per cent and corporate funds’ increased by 9.1 per cent. 
 
This chapter focused on a broad historical perspective of the superannuation environment in 
Australia.  It also provided an analysis of the current law governing the operation of 
Australian superannuation funds; the prudential supervision of superannuation funds in 
Australia; an understanding of the types of superannuation funds available in Australia, some 
aspects of regulatory compliance which face trustees and an analysis of the prudential 
standards, particularly the investment standards, governing the industry. 
 
The next chapter will introduce the concept of corporate governance within the context of the 
ASI and draw out from the literature on corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER 2: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK WITHIN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Introduction 
 
Corporate governance should be linked with the direction and performance of an 
organisation.  Monks and Minow (2004) refer to a tripod of participants in governance: 
shareholders5, management (led by the chief executive officer) and the board of directors.  
The recognition that a board of directors (or trustees) is essential in the definition of corporate 
governance is important because boards are important to both the accountability of the 
organisation and the compliance regime.  
 
To date, the impact of boards has been studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives, 
which has resulted in a number of competing theories concerning corporate governance. 
These theories include: Agency; Stewardship; Resource Dependency; Shareholder and 
Stakeholder. Other less dominant theories include: Cybernetics; Financial (derivate of 
shareholder theory); Intellectual capital; Managerial hegemony; Network governance; 
Organisational behaviour; Political; Power; Resource based; Transaction cost; and 
Population-ecology.  Scholars from organisational theory (Johnson, 1997) strategic 
management (Boyd, 1995), sociology (Useem, 1984), finance (Fama, 1980), economics 
(Tirole, 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and law (Richards and Stearn, 1999) have all 
contributed to the corporate governance research platform6.  
 
                                                      
5 In the context of the ASI, “shareholders” in this tripod would be substituted for “members” of an ASF. 
6 From an international perspective on corporate governance there have been significant legislative reforms, in 
particular in countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA).  In the UK, 
corporate governance standards are clearly set out in the Cadbury Committee (1992), Greenbury Committee 
(1995), Hampel Committee (1998), LSE (1998) to protect shareholder’s interests.  In the USA, the Round Table 
(1997) and The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 20026 set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards 
to observe.  
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From the outset it should be recognised that ASFs7 are subject to many of the same 
governance problems of other modern organisations (Jensen, 2005 and Clark, 2006).   The 
challenge of governance within the global superannuation industry is greater than that of the 
majority of modern organisations as funds also operate in global financial markets where the 
management of risk and uncertainty is critical to the creation of long-term value.8  Stewart 
and Yermo (2008:7) recognised that “Good governance can also bring benefits to pension 
funds… The stronger the governance of the fund, the better risks (such as operational, 
investment risk) will be managed and controlled.  Better corporate governance can also 
enhance investment returns”9.  Yet, Evans, Orszag and Piggott, 2008) note that there have 
been “plenty of disappointments in fund governance”.  
 
In the USA, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was designed to improve the 
governance and accounting standards of American companies, however, this legislation left 
pension funds and their issues untouched (Evans, Orszag and Piggott, 2008) and this 
legislation was a heavy handed approach to solve underlying governance problems. The 
potential implications of pension legislation are concerning because the levels of capability 
and expertise to develop and implement legislation are so much more limited.  The Watson 
Wyatt survey in 2007 discovered that pension fund governance is a big issue for the majority 
of multinationals because of the underlying risks. 
 
Within the overall direction and performance of an organisation, corporate governance should 
not be a hindrance to innovation.  The board should drive innovation strategically as an 
important issue for sound ongoing business.  Drucker recognised that innovation is a vital part 
of any responsible director’s role as; “It endows resources with a new capacity to create 
                                                      
7 Commonly referred to in other countries as pension funds or pension plans. Hereinafter are referred to as a 
superannuation fund for the purposes of this research. 
8 Clark and Urwin’s research on the schematic of corporate governance budget and risk budget demonstrated 
that the governance challenge here is to function efficiently in the fast changing risk domain, adapting 
effectively to market signals. 
9 The impact of governance from good to bad may be as high as 100 to 300 basis points per year 
(Ambachtsheer, 2007a: Watson Wyatt, 2006) within the superannuation industry in terms of the fund’s 
investment performance.   
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wealth” (1985: 27). Unless innovation is recognised as being part of responsible business 
practice, blinkered application of corporate governance has the potential to stifle it.  The King 
Committee on Corporate Governance (2002) Report conducted in the UK acknowledged this 
conflict, noting that the board of directors should aim to conform to corporate governance 
constraints while at the same time performing in an innovative and entrepreneurial way. 
 
Despite universal interest in corporate governance, there had been very few studies on the 
conduct of boards and directors (Pettigrew, 1992b).   For the purposes of this research, the 
board of trustees of an ASF represents the major element of the corporate governance 
framework within this industry.  
 
Definition of Corporate Governance  
 
One of the fundamental issues involved in corporate governance research is a basic 
definitional problem. Many definitions of ‘corporate governance’ or related concepts in the 
literature of the subject matter are not definitions at all, and could be described, at best, as 
simply descriptive statements informing what corporate governance may "include", or "may 
do", and the like. Often these quasi-definitions appear in authoritative academic literature 
such as the Journal of Finance where Schleifer and Vishny (1997) considers corporate 
governance as the set of methods to ensure that investors suppliers of finance, shareholders, 
or creditors get a return on their money. 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury’s definition of corporate governance is the most fitting for this research. 
‘Corporate governance’ is defined as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies, 
ensuring that they are well run” (1992:2).  Within the context of the ASI, it is ensuring that 
the board of trustees govern the ASF in the best interest of the membership, within the ambit 
of current legislative requirements.  The significance of corporate governance was captured in 
a broader definition authored by Sir Adrian Cadbury (2004) who noted that the governance 
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framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources.  
 
In governance theory, one of the main challenges for leaders today is to maintain the board’s 
key role in the governance system (Demb and Neubauer, 1992) and it is recognised by this 
researcher as a major challenge moving forward for boards of ASFs. The clear ramifications 
for governance of a superannuation board from an agency perspective is that adequate 
monitoring or control mechanisms need to be established to protect the members of the fund 
from management’s conflict of interest – the so called agency costs of modern capitalism 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  This research supports the notion that in most instances, the board 
of trustees of an ASF is an important mechanism to alleviate agency problems in principal-
agent relationships.  
 
One of the main challenges of the board is to alleviate agency problems.  Regular and close 
monitoring is required by a governing board to ensure that the management is conforming to 
the interests of the organisation or the fund’s membership.  Trustees or directors are 
responsible for the development and the implementation of internal control mechanisms that 
align the interests of the management with the owners of the organisation, including control 
over innovation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990).   
 
Clark and Urwin (2008) examined pension funds in the UK and observed that pension 
beneficiaries (principals) are unable to monitor the actions of fund administrators and trustees 
(agents), which is problematic in itself.  Further, there is an extensive network of agents (such 
as investment or fund managers) whose motivations and rewards may be difficult to align and 
impossible to observe (Black, 1992). 
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Table 6: Principal and Agent problems in the ASI 
 
Source:  Drew and Stanford (2003) Principal and Agent Problems in Superannuation Funds.  Australian 
Economic Review. 36 (1), 98-107. 
 
In Table 6, Drew and Stanford (2003) outline briefly the principal and agent problems within 
the context of the ASI.   The third row of the above Table illustrates that members of the fund 
are not involved in the decision on the determination of trustees’ remuneration or expenses 
and have no incentive to incur monitoring costs because the expected benefit is zero. Trustees 
remain at ‘arm’s length’ to members. In the fourth and fifth rows, the trustee is in a position 
to influence the behaviour of the agents. An important role of both asset consultants and fund 
managers within the ASI is to be ‘trustee managers’ with the aim to influence trustees to 
accept the conventions of the industry. Uncertainty within this industry is also a powerful 
force that encourages imitation by so called ‘trustee managers.’  Also a major problem this 
industry faces is that trustees of superannuation funds are more than likely to persist with 
under-performing funds managers (Drew and Stanford, 2003).  
 
Members of superannuation funds, “are unable to select their agent, are unable construct the 
contract under which the agent operates and are unable to replace the agent for inferior 
performance. Members of superannuation funds experience averse selection and moral hazard 
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problems and find that their superannuation fund produces a low return, high cost and 
inefficient result” (Drew and Stanford, 2003:9).  
 
Since these researchers have published their work, it has become out-dated with the employee 
choice of fund (as recommended and implemented by the Wallis Committee, 1997).   With 
the introduction of member choice in Australia, it allows for employees to select their own 
agent to nominate and monitor the fund for their contributions; they have the ultimate 
sanction of withdrawing and transferring their balances. This would appear to create an 
incentive for trustees to be responsive to members’ wishes and to be more accountable for 
their decisions (Drew and Stanford, 2003) yet this change has been slow due to inertia with 
members (ASFA, 2008). 
 
In summary, principal and agent issues faced in the superannuation industry are not dissimilar 
to those faced by shareholders of publically listed companies globally.  Within the 
superannuation context, the major problem centres around the fact that, for 
contributors/members10 of any superannuation fund, there is little control over decisions made 
in relation to their benefits or the agents who make these decisions. Trustees who are the legal 
owners of the assets of the fund are required to act in the interests of the beneficiaries as they 
make decisions. 
 
The current structure of superannuation funds in Australia, “leads to poor corporate 
governance; poor investment decisions by trustees; lack of disclosure by trustees to members; 
absence of arm’s length investments by trustees; failure to address member complaints; poor 
consumer protection for members; inadequate prudential regulation of superannuation funds; 
                                                      
10 The aim of a member of an accumulation fund is to maximize the accumulated benefits at the date of 
retirement in order to purchase the highest value annuity or pension. This aim is achieved by gaining the 
highest crediting rate (i.e., the highest net returns) consistent with a given degree of risk (Drew & Stanford, 
2003). 
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lack of competition in the superannuation industry; and a lack of market discipline on 
superannuation funds,” (Drew and Stanford, 2003:11).  
 
Corporate Governance framework 
 
This chapter will now outline a corporate governance framework by Kiel, et. al., (2012) and 
then discuss both the internal and external influences (variables) that may impact on the 
Corporate Governance framework in relation to an ASF. Key elements of corporate 
governance include: organisational structure; CEO influence; board behaviour; board 
composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6: Corporate Governance Framework, Governance in the 21st Century 
Source: Keil, G., Nicholson, G. Tunny, J.A. Beck. J. (2012). Directors at Work: A practical guide for 
Boards. Thomson Reuters: NSW. 
 
Diagram 6 is particularly relevant in the context of the ASI. The owners are substituted for 
the collective membership of the fund and the board of directors can be substituted for the 
board of trustees within this framework.  Good governance within the ASI also requires 
effective interaction and communication among all participants both the board of trustees, 
management, CEO, and industry stakeholders such as APRA, auditors and the membership. 
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Internal influences 
 
1. The role of the board  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 7: Tricker’s model of corporate governance 
 
Tricker’s model of corporate governance in Diagram 7 provides a good starting point to 
examine the role of the board. The various roles of trustees include: compliance through the 
monitoring of the fund; self-regulation of individual trustees and the board’s collective 
performance, which includes both strategy formulation and policymaking. These factors have 
an impact on whether or not innovation is driven at the board level in an ASF. 
 
The board of trustees is an important internal governance mechanism. The board with its mix 
of skills, experience and expertise, independence and legal power is a powerful governance 
mechanism (Li, 1994) there to protect the interests of the members. Conversely, Hill and 
Snell (1988) view the board as a ‘rubber stamp’ which serves only to legitimise management 
decisions. 
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2. Board structure 
 
Board structure concerns the size of the board, board appointments, skill sets and is important 
in the effectiveness of a board determining the ability of the board members to work together 
(Kiel, et al. 2012). 
 
This research is based on the assumption that the board structure could directly or indirectly 
influence innovation. Research to date has focused primarily on the size of the board and the 
distinction between executive and non-executive directors. 
 
Structures, membership composition and processes of the board of trustees are central to the 
governance of the fund, the accountability of the fund and the way the fund complies with the 
legislative requirements set out in the SIS Act and other prudential legislative requirements 
relevant to the ASI.    
 
Demb and Neubauer (1990:156) acknowledge “there is no “perfect” structure for a board.  
Each organisation must put a board in place with a composition and shape – tailored to fit its 
legal environment, the company’s size and development stage, and the personality of its 
Chairman and CEO.”  Similarly, Keil, et al. (2012:201) acknowledges that, “no one particular 
board structure will impact corporate performance more favourably than another structure.”  
The structure of each board should be determined by the characteristics of each entity.  
Appendix 3 has been included to outline the various board roles such as monitoring and 
ratifying role (Bosch, 2005), supervisory and management function (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992b) and strategic and control roles of directors identified by leading international 
academics. 
The different attributes of the board structure are reviewed below:   
i. Size: Clark (2004) argues that size is a real hindrance on governance capacity and 
performance.  Research by Jensen (1993) recommends a limit of eight directors as any 
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larger number will interfere with group dynamics and inhibit board performance and a 
larger board brings greater level of bureaucracy.  Dalton, Johnson and Ellstrand’s 
(1999) viewpoint was less definitive noting that it is not the size of the board that is 
critical, in relation to governance, but rather the number of outside members of the 
board. Notwithstanding this viewpoint, Keil et al. (2012) notes that the key 
consideration should be around whether there are enough directors to provide the 
skills that the board needs at the boardroom table.  
ii. Board composition: Research suggests that board composition does matter and 
contradicts earlier research by Galbraith, (1967) and Mace, (1971). Dalton, Daly, 
Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) note that the board’s composition and leadership 
structure can influence a variety of organisational outcomes (Baliga, Moyer and Rao, 
1996; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1995; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Simison and Blumenstein, 1995)11. Factors such as culture and ownership 
structure impact on board composition (Kiel, et al. 2012).  Related studies on the issue 
of the diversity of boards of directors, and other have identified that the large majority 
of directors are white males from a managerial or professional background in their 
fifties or sixties and that a number of observations could be made about their 
personalities, including a personality profile to be much less risk averse than a diverse 
board (CAMAC Report, 2009). 
iii. Trustee skill set: Trustee competence is gained from experience, skills, attitudes and 
knowledge (Kiel, et al. 2012).  For the ASF board, competencies of the trustees 
matter.  Behavioural competencies also influence the relationships around the 
boardroom table, in particular, between the board and management and between 
trustees or directors (Kiel, et al. 2012).   
 
Table 7 below provides insight into the sorts of expertise available by different types 
of directors or trustees. Notwithstanding,  research by Thomas, Kidd and Fernandez-
Araoz (2007) found that after investigating over 100 boards over a five-year period, 
many boards lack competent members. 
                                                      
11 This is evident in my findings, that the Board can directly or indirectly drive innovation at a strategic level if it 
chooses to. 
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Table 7: Expertise of different type of directors or trustees 
The resource dependence roles of directors 
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3. Board process 
 
Board processes is another element in any corporate governance framework. Process 
variables include: Frequency and length of board meetings; formality of board proceedings; 
board evaluations; professional development; board meeting agendas, board minutes and 
committees. These processes are important in the overall context of corporate governance, 
and this research will explore whether any of these processes influence whether or not 
innovation occurs within a superannuation entity. 
4. Board behavioural dynamics 
 
Kiel et al. (2012:608) defines board behavioural dynamics as resulting from, “social and 
psychological processes occur between directors and between the board and other groups, 
especially management. The individual and collective behaviours of the board and its 
members are dynamic as they continually change over time resulting from the changing 
issues facing the board at a particular point of time and the coming and going of individuals 
on both the board and in other groups.”   
 
The effectiveness of the board in making decisions is clearly influenced by the behavioural 
characteristics of the directors that make up the board (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). 
 
Board behavioural dynamics are central to effective board outcomes (Kiel et al. 2012) and 
appropriate boardroom behaviours are an essential component of best practice corporate 
governance as outlined by the UK Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators. 
 
Board behavioural dynamics can be an extremely difficult area for board members to address 
when they are dealing with individual trustees whose, “personality characteristics detract 
from the overall performance of the board (Kiel et al. 2012). Another level of complexity is 
added in the context of the ASI, where the trustee of an ASF is a representative appointed by 
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a class of members and retains the support of that particular class of members.  Kiel’s 
research positioned the board behavioural dynamics at the centre of the corporate governance 
Practice Framework. 
 
The concept of board behavioural dynamics is often cited by other academics as board 
culture, which is an issue that will be investigated and discussed further in the Result and 
Discussion Chapters. 
 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005:11) acknowledge that board effectiveness, “depends upon 
the behavioural dynamics of a board and how the web of interpersonal and group 
relationships between executive and non-executives is developed in a particular company 
context.” 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 8: A framework for considering board behavioural dynamics 
Source: Keil et. al (2012). Directors at Work. Thomson Reuters. Pyrmont: NSW. p.610. 
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These researchers note that there are four important drivers of board behavioural dynamics 
(which are set out in the Diagram 8 above). The first driver is in relation to the governance at 
a particular point in time. The second is the impact of both organisational and board cultures. 
The third driver relates to the Chair and CEO’s personalities and how they interact with each 
other.  The fourth driver involves the personalities of the trustee/directors.  These researchers 
acknowledge that the behaviours of trustees reflect the board culture and the wider 
organisational culture (Keil et al. 2012).   
 
Tricker (2003:26) acknowledges that it is often more complicated. “Board behaviour does not 
consist of sets of contractual relationships, but is influenced by interpersonal behaviour, 
group dynamics and political intrigue”.   Judge (1989:24) further notes that board behaviour 
is often treated as a black “box” in these studies and researchers can only “… speculate on 
actual board behaviour”.   
 
5. Leadership 
  
Clark and Urwin (2008a) consider that leadership in pension plans play a crucial role in 
mobilising the resources of decision-making by the board.  Leaders must leverage 
organisational structures and processes to build a culture of innovation, attend to formal and 
informal incentives, manage an open flow of information, and manage the perception of risk 
around innovating if they are to succeed at service innovation (Lyons et al. 2006).  
Leadership should be about encouraging and enabling people to continually create and deliver 
small innovations daily.  To enable innovation within the business model, leaders must 
provide resources and trust their employees.  
 
Kanter (2006) believes that companies that cultivate leadership skills are more likely in 
business to net successful innovations. The ability to manage human capital may be the most 
important of the strategic leader’s skills (Reimann, 1995).  In the opinions of Lumpkin and 
Dess cited in Hitt et al. (2002:439), the key to competitive advantage “will be the capacity of 
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top leadership to create the social architecture capable of generating, intellectual capital… By 
intellectual capital, I mean know-how, expertise brain power, innovation (and) ideas”.  A 
strategic leader’s role among other things is to inspire an organisation’s work force to work 
co-operatively in the pursuit of meaningful outcomes (Hitt, et al. 2002).   
 
6. Legitimacy and commitment   
 
Gupta and Wilemon (1990) reported that they were concerned that senior managers within 
organisations are often not committed to innovation and note that while there is lip service 
paid to it; innovation is often not legitimate within the organisation, which further reduces the 
probability of a commitment to it.  Innovation requires a deeper commitment than regular 
work.  Burns and Stalker (1961) note that, as the boundaries of responsibilities must be 
broader and more inclusive in the rapidly changing, ambiguous conditions of innovation.  
Govingarajan and Trimble (2013:11) acknowledged that; “... Innovation teams feel a hostility 
towards the people responsible for day-to-day operations that is just as biting…” 
 
External influences on the Corporate Governance Framework of an ASF 
 
External factors placed on an ASF board include: Legislative requirements in the industry in 
which an organisation is located; its ownership structure; and the presence of other influential 
stakeholders. 
 
Within the ASI, regulatory systems and regulatory compliance are fundamental external 
influences on any ASF board.  Further, pressures from legislators and institutional investors 
are also placed on the shoulders of these boards.  In the case of ASFs, the additional pressures 
from industry and professional bodies such as APRA, ASFA, AIST, unions and AISC and 
emerging new legislation (such as FOFA and stronger super reforms) and pressures from 
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institutional investors impact on corporate governance systems.  “Each board operates in a 
unique environment comprising different pressures” (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005:32). 
 
Earlier research by Judge and Zieithaml (1992) noted that institutional forces may influence 
the board’s decision making processes, (such as legislation, and pressures from institutional 
investors).  
 
Globally, institutional investors are increasingly putting pressure on superannuation funds to 
alter the composition of the board and structure of boards.  In particular, institutional 
investors and large pension funds in the United States, such as CALPERS12 have taken a 
committed lead in shareholder activistism.  Institutional investors collectively accounted for 
approximately eighty per cent of all share trading in the United States. 
 
In summary, the two most notable external factors that impact on the ASI in today’s current 
environment are: Federal Government and external stakeholders such as APRA, ASIC (who 
set the rules for the operations of the ASI and Industry and Professional bodies (such as 
ASFA, AIST)). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Evans et al. (2007:3) recognised that, “academic literature on this topic is sparse” and 
research into fund governance is in the initial stages relative to corporate governance 
literature.   Watson Wyatt’s survey found that “pension fund governance is a big issue for 
most multinational” (2007:2).  Leadership is crucial within this context and it is argued that 
boards should have a role in innovation since it is a fundamental factor in determining 
performance. 
                                                      
12 $USD 133 billion dollars in Funds under Management.  
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CHAPTER 3: INNOVATION IN THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY 
 
“Pension funds often seem unable to deal with the institutional costs of change, are slow to 
adapt, adopt or innovate, and tend to rely on past practices notwithstanding the uncertainties 
of global financial markets. Inertia tends to dominate…” 
(Urwin and Clarke, 2009:7) 
 
The concept of innovation 
 
A definitive explanation of what innovation is, whilst the concept is often discussed by 
scholars, has proven difficult to clearly define.  In a recent Harvard Business Review (2013) 
publication on innovation with leading innovation academics such as Martin, Govindarajan, 
Trimble, Immlet, Bettencourt, Ulwick, Day, Thomke, Reinertsen, Kanter, Macmillan, 
Drucker, Christensen, Kaufman and Shih the concept of innovation was discussed by all 
scholars albeit never defined.    
 
The concept of innovation has been variously defined by other academics to include:  the 
commercial or industrial application of something new, a new product, process or method of 
production; a new market or sources of supply; a new form of commercial business or 
financial organisation (Schumpeter, 1983), and innovation covers a wide range of activities to 
improve organisation performance, including the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved product, service, distribution process, manufacturing process, marketing method or 
organisational method (European Commission, 2004).   
 
Ramsey, Bastian and Schaik (2007:395) define innovation (used by Clark with his pension 
fund research in the U.K. and discussed later in this section) as, “the process that generates in 
an individual (or an institution) a novel learned behaviour (or change in institutional form) 
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that is not simply a consequence of social learning (imitation or emulation) or environmental 
induction (adaption)”.  
 
A broad definition of innovation is offered by Gorman: “Innovation is the act of developing a 
new product, service or process based upon a new idea” (Gorman, 2007—vi).   This provides 
a good starting point and a more complex definition of innovation is provided by Mezia and 
Glynn (1993:78) noting that innovation is, “non-routine, significant and discontinuous 
organisational change that embodies a new idea that is not consistent with the current concept 
of the organization’s business.” This approach defines an innovative organisation as one that 
is intelligent and creative (Glynn 1996; Woodman et al. 1993), capable of learning effectively 
(Senge, 1990) and creating new knowledge.   
 
Cutting through these somewhat obtuse descriptions, the broad definition published in the 
third edition of the Oslo Manual (2005) has been the one most applicable to the context of the 
ASI.  That is, innovation is defined as, “the implementation of a new or significant improved 
product (good and services) or … a new marketing method.”   This definition was used for 
the purposes of data collection for this research.  Other useful contributions to the definition 
of innovation include Lyons, Chatman and Joyce (2007) who focus on both the production of 
novel and useful ideas that improve effectiveness as well as the methods used to put creative 
ideas into practice.  Innovation can include doing old things in new ways rather than 
developing completely new inventions (2007:175).  In the next chapter, research by 
O’Sullivan (2000) is focussed on, so this definition also needs consideration. O’Sullivan 
(2000:2) defines innovation as, “the process through which productive resources are 
developed and utilized to generate higher-quality and/or lower cost products that had been 
previously available and the concept of innovation is used in a general sense”. 
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Academic research has also focused on innovation being termed as; ‘radical’, ‘incremental’, 
‘disruptive’ or ‘game changing’13 and the use of the distinction between incremental and 
radical will be discussed later in this chapter as it is beneficial with the categorisation of the 
different types of innovation within the ASI. 
 
Innovation in services 
 
Innovation in services has some unique features and the service sectors have become 
increasingly important in a global context.   The OECD (2001) noted that in ‘services’ there 
appears to be less of a concern that market power would be a prerequisite for innovation than 
there is in manufacturing.  The DTI Project (2007) found that innovation in services is 
believed to be more multi-dimensional and organisationally orientated than manufacturing 
innovation.  While service firms do innovate, Clarke (2006) states that innovation in UK 
pension funds is rare.   
 
Literature in the field of innovation has primarily focused on the manufacturing industry, 
rather than the service sector that has played an important role in the economic development 
and innovation systems (Coombs and Miles, 2000; Howells, 2000; Miles, 2001, Tether et al. 
2002a, 2002b).   
 
Attention given to innovative activities of service sectors internationally has nevertheless 
increased over the last decade, since the influential work by Miles et al. (1995).  Far from 
being innovative laggards, services are becoming an ever more important locus for innovative 
activity (Howells, 2000; Tether and Metcalfe, 2004).  Tether (2005) states that innovation in 
services (as opposed to manufacturing) is more likely to entail, and be orientated towards 
organisational change, rather than product/process innovation.    
                                                      
13 Refer to C.M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fall 
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); G.Hamel, Leading the Revolution (New York, NY: Plume, 
2002); A. Hargadon, How Breakthroughs Happen: The Surprising Truth about How Companies Innovate. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999). 
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The literature on innovation in services is nevertheless sparse and presupposes that service 
organisations do innovate (Normann, 1991; Crozier, Normann and Tardy, 1982).  Even where 
literature presents the empirical results of innovation activities in service firms (Gadrey et al. 
1993) it does not explore whether it is reasonable to presuppose that innovation is happening 
in service firms.  As Sunbo, (1997) quite rightly points out, it can nevertheless be deduced 
that innovations are taking place14.  Dated, albeit relevant, research by Reidenbach and Moak 
(1986) and Reidenbach and Grubs (1987) investigated innovation in American banks, and 
found that banks innovate albeit under different conditions to the manufacturing sector. Lyons 
et al. (2007), in the context of investment banking, identified four fundamental enablers for 
innovation:  
i. Client demand for services that span boundaries; 
ii. Broad and deep client relationships;  
iii. Tight integration between design; and  
iv. Execution, and the vision of innovation articulated at the top.   
 
Innovations are largely market-driven and are formulated within the framework of a strategy 
(Sundbo, 1997). Innovations are primarily determined by the strategic situation of the 
organisation. The top managers of the organisation control the innovation process by making 
decisions about whether to implement a specific innovation idea or not, albeit the ideas for 
innovations come from all parts of the organisation.  In the field of innovation, a 
Schumpeterian perspective suggests that as a strategy, innovation is of greater significance 
amongst larger firms (Scherer, 1984).   
 
                                                      
14 During the 1990s an investigation by Gadrey, Gallouj, Lhuillery, Weinstein and Ribualt of innovation in 
service firms was undertaken for the Ministry of Education and Research in France. It included representation 
from the banking, insurance, electronic information services and management consultancy industries.  The 
research found that: innovation was taking place in all of them; innovation activities were spread out 
throughout each organisation; and the innovation process was generally systemic, however, there was an 
increasing tendency to systemise and manage it. 
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Sudho’s (1997) research also discovered that any innovation process could be divided into 
four phases:  
i. Idea generating;  
ii. Transformation into an innovation project;  
iii. Development; and  
iv. Implementation.  
The innovation process can be characterised as cumulative, collective and uncertain. It is also 
subject to technological uncertainty, market uncertainty, unforeseeable changes to product 
demand, factor prices, capabilities and the strategies of competitors may hinder the generation 
of high quality, lower cost products by an organisation. 
 
It is acknowledged that this process should not be construed to suggest innovation is a 
smooth, rational and linear process as it has been reported that this is rare in services 
industries (Voss et al. 1992; Gadrey et al. 1993).  Innovation processes in financial service 
organisations were organised in different ways and often gained a life of their own which 
broke all planned organisational patterns (Sudho, 1997 cf. Scarborough and Lannon, 1989).  
 
Innovations within the service industry have by enlarge been product innovations instead of 
process driven ones. Yet, process and product innovation drive long-term economic growth 
and the financing of innovation is a crucial ingredient in this process. 
 
Service organisations typically innovate on the basis of a quick idea and not on scientific 
results and therefore innovations tend to develop in adhoc ways and are not the product of 
permanent research and development departments.   The process in service organisations is 
considered to be more a search and learn process, “there is some systematic organisation of 
the process … but much of it is trial and error or search process,” (Sudho, 1997:450). 
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While there are many different definitions of ‘services,’ for the purposes of this research, 
‘services’ have been identified as those activities that are not agriculture, manufacturing or 
mining.  Overall research in services innovation has been extremely limited for several 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, services have been regarded as innovation laggard compared with manufacturing 
sectors.  Coombs and Miles (2000) observed that the growth of the ‘services sector’ to an 
increasingly dominant share of industrial economies’ output, means that we can no longer 
treat service sector innovation as negligible or residual. 
 
Secondly, services have their own features in innovations and measurement of output, which 
create difficulties for innovation studies (Wang and Miozzo, 2004).  Gallouj and Weinstein 
(1997) argue that service activities, particularly, the “fuzzy” nature of their output, make it 
particularly difficult to measure them by the traditional economic methods.   
 
Services are important and services do innovate both technologically and organisationally 
(Miles, 2001; Howells, 2000, 2002; Tether et al. 2002a, 2002b: Coombs and Miles, 2000).  In 
economics, services have long had a, “Cinderella status … being neglected and marginal” 
(Miles, 2000:371).  Tether’s article (2003) raises questions about the adequacy of our 
understanding of innovation activities in service-dominated activities, particularly as 
innovation is regarded as fundamental to the competitiveness of advanced economies 
(European Commission, 2000).  Within innovation studies, this ‘supplier- dominated’ 
perspective on services is related with Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy of technological activities.  
Pavitt classified all private services (alongside traditional manufacturers) as ‘supplier 
dominated’.  Following on in the ‘Pavitt tradition’ of research (Barras 1986, 1990), 
Evangelista (2000) and Miozzo and Soete (2001) translated a manufacturing sector 
understanding of innovation from studies to fit a service sector context. 
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Another emerging view of innovation applicable to services draws on the research by Kirzner 
(1997) and evolutionary economics (Metcalfe, 1998) and the competence-based theory of the 
firm (Foss and Knudsen, 2013).  These researchers view competition and innovation as 
related processes and there is a wide variety of possible innovation trajectories within each 
particular sector (Tether, et al. 2001) whether it is manufacturing (or product) or service 
based. For instance; “Product innovation can widen the market and hence promote industry 
growth and/or it can enhance product differentiation.” (Porter, 2004:177) Also innovations in 
marketing may influence industry structure directly by increasing demand.  An example in 
the ASI context is the use of advertising media to reach new members and increase their 
market share.  Innovations in marketing that result in better efficiency can lower the cost of 
the product. Innovations in marketing also have effects on other elements of the industry 
structure. For instance, new forms of marketing can be subject to increased or decreased 
economies of scale and hence affect mobility barriers (Porter, 2004).   
 
There is an overall need of innovation for an entity to be competitive (Hitt, et al. 2002).  
Innovation is a direct requirement of specific strategies such as differentiation (product 
innovation) and cost leadership (process innovation).  Innovation is also associated with 
competitive dynamics and effective innovation results in sustainable competitive advantage 
(Hitt, et al. 2002).   Due to the link between the development of competitive advantages, 
many entities are interested in producing innovations and in effectively managing the 
innovation process. In relation to the management of the innovation process in service 
organisations, Sundho (1997) noted that innovation must be a strategic task; have a broad 
organisational process; and the innovation process follows the four stage approach of; idea 
generating; transformation into an innovation project; development; implementation. 
 
The innovation process is based on the need to commit resources and the consideration of the 
uncertainty of returns from innovative investments, which requires a need for a control of 
resources by the decision makers who shape the innovative process (Schumpeter, 1996; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996).  The phases involved in the innovation processes are 
highlighted below in Diagram 9. 
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Search, Select and Implement 
Diagram 9:  Phases of innovation processes 
Source: DTI (2007: 69). Innovation in Services. DTI Occasional Paper No. 9. June 2007. Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
Diagram 10 below outlines the stages of innovation, which include: invention; 
commercialisation; diffusion and integration.   Hansen and Birkinshaw (2011) also outline an 
excellent framework that ASFs could adopt, and then select practices to strengthen an 
innovation value chain within their fund, if innovation is considered strategically significant.  
This chain includes three phases: idea generation; idea conversion and idea diffusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 10: Stages of Innovation 
Source: DTI (2007: 37) Innovation in Services. DTI Occasional Paper No. 9. June 2007. Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
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Diagram 11 below illustrates three phases of an innovation process.  Phase One highlights 
that incremental process innovations are aimed at improving efficiency and reducing costs of 
delivery of existing products.  Phase Two shows that radical process innovations aimed at 
improving the quality of services delivered.  The final phase is the generation of new 
products.  This diagram draws a distinction between incremental and radical processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 11: Three phases of an innovation process 
Source:  DTI (2007:75). Innovation in Services. DTI Occasional Paper No. 9. June 2007. Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills.   
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Different types of innovation- incremental versus radical 
 
The division between incremental and radical innovations (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) is 
that incremental innovations, “produce only small jumps” (Sundho, 1997:439) while  
‘radical’ innovations would create disruptive changes. Incremental innovation refers to, “do 
better” innovations including extensions to original concepts.  On the other hand, radical 
innovation describes, “do different” innovations that are completely new ways of doing things 
(Bessant & Davies 2007; Bessant & Tidd 2007).  
 
Table 8 below provides examples of both incremental and radical innovation in the services 
industry. 
 
Table 8: Examples of incremental and radical innovation in the services industry. 
Source DTi (2007: 68). Innovation in Services. DTI Occasional Paper No. 9. June 2007. Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
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Drivers of Innovation 
 
Innovations that result from a conscious, purposeful search for innovation opportunities are 
found in only a few situations within an organisation or industry (Drucker, 2002).  These 
opportunities include: unexpected occurrence, incongruities, process needs, industry or 
market changes, demographic changes, changes in perception, and new knowledge.  
Organisations may engage in innovation for various reasons including trying to drive 
efficiency or to create quality products to offer the market (OECD, 2005).  Innovations in 
marketing can drive efficiency and lower the cost of the product. Yet new forms of marketing 
can be subject to increased or decreased economies of scale and hence affect mobility barriers 
(Porter, 2004).   
 
Culture and Innovation 
 
Culture within an ASF also plays an important role as a possible driver of innovation.  Earlier 
research has identified several determinants of innovation, including leadership, 
cohesiveness, organisational size and structure and resource availability.  Lyons et al. (2006) 
acknowledges that a less obvious source of influence on innovation is an organisation’s 
cultural norms. Culture is defined as a system of “shared values that define what is important 
and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviours for organizational members” 
(O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996).  Culture increases an organisation’s ability to attain valued 
goals by executing more efficiently on its strategy (Lyons et al. 1996). 
 
Sustained innovation requires a cultural foundation that permeates the organisation, 
embedded in how people are led and how people lead. Lyons et al. (1996) identified that 
cultural norms can be a powerful way of stimulating innovation by attaching social approval 
to activities that facilitate innovation.  
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“The successful service innovation may depend on the unique cultural norms that 
organizations develop and the extent to which an organizations cultural orientation aligns 
with, and is supported by, its overall strategic orientation” (Amabile et al. (1996) in Lyons, et 
al. (2007: 179). 
 
Chatman and Flynn (2001) challenged the belief that strong culture and innovation are 
opposing forces in organisations and viewed strong culture as fuel rather than a constraint to 
innovation.  Conversely, Sorensen (2002), reports that a strong culture within an organisation 
would seem to hinder innovation. While these organisations may experience superior 
performance in stable businesses, they may be unable to engage in innovative practices.  
Other researchers have agreed that strong cultures may be detrimental to innovation, claiming 
that strong agreement in any form effectively stifles innovation.  Earlier research by Nemeth 
and Staw (1989) argued that cohesion among organisational members intensifies group think 
and less deviation and it is this very deviation that can provide the potential for innovation 
within an organisation (as noted that freedom to express ideas without fear of reprisal from 
others increases the likelihood that people will express creative solutions rather than suppress 
them). 
 
Inhibitors of Innovation 
 
Innovation activities within organisations are often hindered by a number of factors which 
include: high costs; economic factors; lack of demand; lack of skilled personnel or 
knowledge; and restrictive legal requirements.  
 
Diagram 12 below, published by DTI (2007), illustrates ten factors cited by service industry 
organisations as barriers to innovation.  These ten factors are: customers do not pay or are 
unable to pay; regulations create barriers; costs of risks are too high; a lack of key staff; too 
busy to innovate; customers are unresponsive; innovation is unnecessary; innovations are too 
easily copied; organisational rigidities and a lack of required technology.  Similarly, research 
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by Robson and Ortmans (2006) found that costs, risk of innovation, as well as regulations 
were cited as factors that were barriers to innovation of high importance. Hitt et al. (2011) 
also recognised that considerable political activity within an entity may centre around 
resource allocation and different business units may have to compete aggressively with each 
other to obtain adequate or needed resources and that may lead to tension and conflict 
between the units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 12: Barriers to innovation 
Source: DTI (2007:48) Innovation in Services. DTI Occasional Paper No. 9. June 2007. Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 74  
 
In summary, service innovation with its regulatory requirements and standards create a barrier 
to innovation, however, these barriers should not be so arduous as to prevent change (Tether, 
2002b).  
 
As there was no published research on the topic of innovation within the context of the ASI, 
Clark and Urwin’s (2009) research provides insight into the UK pension industry which is 
similar to the ASI in terms of legislative requirements and governance standards.  
 
In relation to the extent of innovation within this industry, Clark and Urwin (2009) observed 
that funds in the United Kingdom sought to innovate where: 
 
i. Innovation involved inserting a well-informed independent risk management function into a 
decision making process, as funds were better placed to respond to the GFC. 
ii. Innovation involved segmenting and parcelling risk for placement with market agents, this 
strategy has effectively simplified the survival strategies of the entities. 
iii. Innovation involved creating institutional excellence through the formation of expert 
investment platforms, this type of response has played a vital role in enhancing the 
intensification of effort associated with responding to the crisis. 
iv. Innovation has transformed board deliberation through the use of “dashboards’ to improve the 
allocation of responsibilities and setting the priorities, this enabled funds to actively 
engage with market volatility rather than simply holding a ‘watching brief’ or assuming 
that ‘reversion to the mean’ will absolve funds of responsibility for formulating plans for 
worst-case scenarios. 
 
Clarke (2009) notes that innovation has been both ‘rare’ and difficult to achieve within UK 
pension funds, given inherited constraints, such as legislative requirements and institutional 
capacity.  Highlighting this is the fact that there were only a few instances of fully-fledged 
institutional innovations within this industry as opposed to adaption or adoption.  Clarke and 
Urwin (2009) argued that entities (similar to ASFs in Australia) are routinely turned inside 
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out by challenging trustee boards and management to be innovative within the bounds of 
institutional capacity and legislative requirements.  Clark (2006) considered that the problem 
with legislative models of pension fund regulations is that they tend to respond to past 
problems and reduce the scope for local innovation.  
   
Our civilization is built on financial innovation. Finance begets and 
supports almost all activities; it makes the world turn in a modern and 
civilized way. Innovation is necessary if finance is to remain relevant as 
a means of achieving society’s goals. (Shiller, 2013). 
 
Financial markets (such as the superannuation industry) should be “innovation machines” that 
test investors’ fitness to succeed – and there are significant rewards for those that are able to 
identify and exploit unacknowledged market opportunities as well as significant rewards for 
those that create markets and financial products to price and distribute risk, such as in 
derivates and alternative investments (Baumol, 2002 and Clark and Urwin, 2006).   Like 
Baumol (2002), Clark (2003:51) “believes that the rate of product and process innovation 
drives long-term economic growth, and that the financing of innovation is a crucial ingredient 
in this process”. Baumol (2002: 79) advocates that, “innovation is essential to the survival of 
firms in a capitalist economy”. Baumol further argues that in a capitalist economy, innovation 
rather than price is the primary competitive dimension and firms that do not innovate will find 
their market shrinking as they lose business to more innovative competitors. 
 
The governance challenge here, “is to exploit the premium from innovation through the 
application of judgment and experience to new opportunities, recognising that conventional 
risk-related procedures may be poorly tuned to the frontiers of finance” (Clark and Urwin, 
2006:10).   New market designs, new financial products, advanced IT and developments in 
the studies of the theory of finance have led to rapid advancement in the global financial 
markets and financial and superannuation entities.  As Merton (2006:61) noted the 
“cumulative impact has significantly affected all of us – as users, producers, and overseers of 
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the financial system – most importantly in long-horizon asset management providing for 
retirement benefits.” 
 
Innovation Patterns within the service industries 
 
Table 9 below highlights the various innovation patterns among three different sectors, such 
as: retailing, transport, logistic services and financial services.  Of particular interest to this 
researcher, are the new products on offer within the financial services industry?   Table 8 
refers to green banking products covering various life stages and other products such as a 
multi-functional smartcard within the financial services.   The life-stages approach is 
discussed in more detail in the Results Chapter in relation to Fund 2.   
 
Table 9: Different types of innovation with the service industry 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 77  
 
The Innovation Space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 13:  The Innovation Space Model (Bessant & Davies 2005:13) 
 
The Innovation Space Model by Bessant and Davies (2005:13), illustrated above in Diagram 
13, was modelled for the service industry. It suggests that different types of innovation can 
occur within an organisation, which includes product, process, position or paradigm. The 
different types of innovations within the ASI will be outlined in the Results Chapter. 
 
The first type of innovation which can occur within an organisation is a ‘Product innovation’ 
which involves changes to the products or services offered by an organisation.  The second 
type of innovation which can occur within an organisation is a ‘Process innovation’ which 
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involves a change to the way in which the product is created and delivered.  The third type of 
innovation which can occur within an organisation is a ‘Position innovation’ which involves 
changing the context in which the products or services are introduced. The fourth and final 
type of innovation which can occur within an organisation is a ‘Paradigm innovation’ which 
involves changing the underlying mental modes which frame what the organisation does.  
 
Product innovation is one of the four specific types of innovation depicted in Diagram 8. The 
ability to develop new products and services is important to many organisations and will be 
explored within the context of the ASI. The benefits to the industry through product 
innovation would enable superannuation entities to improve the quality of their output, 
revitalise mature businesses, enter new markets, and react to competition or competition 
encroachment.   
“For organizations which must adapt to changing competition, markets, technologies, product 
innovation is not simply a fad. It is a necessity.” (Zahra and Covin 1995) 
 
Measuring innovation 
 
“Product innovation’ is defined as the conceptualisation, development, operationalization, 
manufacture, launch and ongoing management of a new product or service” 
(Dougherty, 1992a). 
 
To measure whether any product innovation had occurred (or is about to occur) within an 
ASF, the below definition of product innovation15 was used as a guide for this research. 
 
                                                      
15 In addition, the 3rd edition of the Oslo Manual (2005) acknowledges that in many services the distinction 
between product and process innovation is blurred, and the innovation activity in services is frequently more 
continuous, consisting of numerous incremental changes, none of which may individually be considered an 
innovation, however, when taken together they may amount to significant innovation (OECD‐Eurostat, 
2005:para110‐111). 
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What ‘new’ means to the organisation may involve; new customers, new uses, new 
manufacturing, new distribution and/or logistics, new product technology, or any combination 
of these (Doherty, 1996:425).  A new product “is a package of features and benefits, each of 
which must be conceived, articulated, designed and operationalised, or brought into existence.   
 
To determine the extent of innovation within the ASI, it is necessary to investigate how 
innovation was being measured within an ASF and what type of performance metrics (if any) 
were used to measure New Product Development (NPD)  
 
NDP has been defined by Gorman (2007:33) to be “the act of conceiving, designing, testing, 
building, and launching new products and services for customers”.  The most popular 
performance metric at a business unit level was found to be the percentage of sales revenue 
derived from new products (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 2004).16   
 
The concept of ‘open innovation’ by Chesborough (2003) is applicable directly to the ASI.  
The open model is based on multiple internal and external sources of ideas and channels to 
market.  The concept may be applied directly to service innovation also.  Open innovation 
provides for the many specialised external suppliers, rather than internal functions performed 
by large corporations (or industry funds).  Within the ASI external suppliers include 
outsourced administrative services and asset allocation advice provided by specialised 
external suppliers to the board of trustees of ASFs.  
 
Examples of innovation in the global superannuation industry 
 
The only published examples of innovation within a global superannuation context are 
provided by Ambachtsheer (2007) who noted two examples of innovations within the global 
                                                      
16 Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt (2004), best performance metric was not adopted as a form of 
measurement within the ASI. An alternative is not offered at this stage. 
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superannuation industry.  One international example is the Dutch Health care system and the 
second example is the Australian based Sunsuper which was formed as a ‘co-op’ as a result of 
private-sector employers in a specific geographical area who had joined together to create 
their own accumulation plan “co-op”.  Collectively, it created a membership base measured in 
the hundreds of thousands of participants.  It created an arm’s length, large, single purpose 
“co-op” to manage members’ superannuation in a remote location which was a first time in 
ASI.  Sunsuper outsourced individual investment mandates and administrative functions to 
“value for dollar” providers, which is categorised by Chesborough’s open innovation model 
(2003) as a ‘radical innovation’ by using a specialised external supplier rather than an internal 
function performed by internal staff of the ASF. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter outlined that innovation is ‘novel’ and defined by the Third edition of the Oslo 
Manual (2005) as the, “implementation of a new or significantly improved product (goods or 
services)…”  Innovation endeavours are by nature, uncertain and risky. There are many types 
of innovation within the service industry that are categorised as radical and incremental 
innovation by academics such as Abernathy and Utterback (1975;1978); Sundho (1997); 
Chesborough (2003); Bessant and Davies (2007); Moller, Rjala and Westerlund (2008). 
 
Innovation is largely market driven and is driven by organisational culture and should be 
related to the strategy of the organisation. There are a number of barriers to innovation 
including costs and legislative requirements. These issues are discussed in Chapter four. 
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CHAPTER 4 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION 
 
Introduction 
  
To date, there have been limited studies on the relationship between corporate governance 
and innovation.  The objective of this chapter is to examine the current literature on this topic 
and add to the research agenda in this field of knowledge.  The leading theories of corporate 
governance do not however, incorporate a systematic analysis of innovation in their analytical 
frameworks.   
 
Theoretical Framework:  Disconnected Governance and innovation  
 
The two dominant theories of corporate governance, that is agency and stakeholder, have 
ignored how the requirements of developmental, organisational and strategic characteristics 
of resource allocation affect an organisation’s governance, and their ability to be innovative.   
 
From an agency theory perspective, adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to be 
established to protect the members of any superannuation fund from a management conflict 
of interest – the so called agency costs of modern capitalism (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
O’Sullivan (2000) points out that the empirical problems of this theory are rooted in its 
theoretical framework.  Far from providing an analysis of the relationship between corporate 
resources and innovation, it makes no attempt to deal with innovation and its implications for 
resource allocation.  She further contends that, “financial economists make no attempt to deal 
with innovation and its implications for resource allocation” (2000:289). 
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According to Blair (1993:322; 2004) the stakeholder theory defines organizations as;  
…multilateral agreements between the enterprise and its multiple stakeholders.  
The relationship between the company and its internal stakeholders 
(employees, managers, owners) is framed by formal and informal rules 
developed through the history of relationship.  This institutional setting 
constrains and creates the strategic possibilities for the company.  While 
management may receive finance from shareholders, they depend upon 
employees to fulfil the productive purpose and strategic intentions of the 
company.  External shareholders (customers, suppliers, competitors, special 
interests groups and the community) are equally important, and also are 
constrained by formal and informal rules that business must respect. 
 
The stakeholder theory of governing boards is based on the notion that there are many groups 
in society besides owners and employees to whom the corporation is responsible. Blair (1993; 
2004) contends that the governance of corporations should recognise the central importance 
of investment in human assets to the success of the organisation and the prosperity of the 
economy.  Wang, Dewhirst and Dudley (1992) considered that this theory can best explain 
how members of the governing board think about the interests of corporate constituencies and 
therefore how organisations are actually managed.  The theory has been used to describe the 
nature of the firm and the way managers think about managing (Brenner and Molander, 
1977), how board members think about the interests of corporate constituencies (Wang, 
Dewhirst and Dudley, 1992) and how corporations are actually managed.  
 
In summary, this theory offers a different perspective of corporate governance that provides 
useful insights for theoretical development for the platform of corporate governance, yet it is 
silent on the issue of resource allocation and any possible link with innovation within the 
organisation and it is argued that this theory plays no significant role within the context of 
explaining the relationship between a corporate governance framework and innovation for the 
usefulness of this research.  Sternberg (1997) notes that the theory is fundamentally 
misguided and incapable of providing better corporate governance. 
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According to O’Sullivan (2000) the stakeholder theory of governance has been unsuccessful 
in delving into the question of how corporations allocate resources to generate innovation. 
Further, this theory provides no analytical basis for dealing with the fact that with all 
corporate governance frameworks there are insiders and outsiders to the process of 
innovation. 
 
Another theory of corporate governance is the stewardship theory which claims that managers 
are trustworthy individuals and good stewards of the resources assigned to them (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991, 1994: Donaldson, 1990).  Scholars of this theory contend that superior 
corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they work to 
maximise profit for shareholders. The reasoning behind this is that inside directors understand 
the business they govern better than independent directors and so can make better decisions 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994: Donaldson, 1990).   
 
Advocates of this theory seek formal board structures that empower managers through 
structures that integrate decision management with decision control (Davis et al. 1997).  The 
theory argues that non-executive directors do not always have the expertise and inside 
knowledge of executive directors to effectively contribute to strategic decision-making.  
Whereas, executive directors offer direct working knowledge and experience (Davis, 1991: 
Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Arguably, insider-dominated boards are likely to be better 
informed about the sources of uncertainty and the potential returns stemming from innovative 
projects.    
 
According to Donaldson (1990) there is no motivational problem or non-alignment of interest 
between management and ownership, and the governing board will be responsible mainly for 
the setting of strategies for the organisation.   
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This theory is not without criticism, for example, Tricker (1994:56) notes that the stewardship 
theory, “ignores the dynamics of boards, inter-personal perceptions of roles and the effect of 
board leadership”. Donaldson’s view is important with respect to contemporary leadership 
practices for the requirement of the CEO and the board of directors or trustees in an overall 
corporate governance framework. However, it would appear not a complete model of 
corporate governance. 
 
In relation to any link between corporate governance and innovation, the stewardship theory 
is silent on the topic of innovation and its implications for resource allocation within a 
corporate governance framework. 
 
In contrast to both agency and stewardship theories, Resource Dependant Theory (RDT) 
attempts to explain how organisations use their boards to further their interests with external 
stakeholders. For instance, the directors or trustees play an important role in providing 
essential resources or securing those resources through linkages to the external environment 
(Boyd, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a,b: Gales and Kesner, 1994; Hitt et. al., 1996; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992: Pfeffer, 1972: Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  This 
theory recommends that boards are a mechanism for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1972) and reducing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972) as well as 
reducing the transaction costs associated with environmental interdependency (Williamson, 
1984). 
 
RDT holds that organisations are dependent upon external resources and seek to manage them 
through a variety of means.  The linking role of a governing board is most convincingly 
explained by RDT and maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the 
external resources that a firm needs to maximise its performance (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; 
Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Zald, 1969).  Ornstein (1984) reports that governing boards are viewed 
as vehicles that corporations use to control other organisations; to co-opt threats in their 
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environment from competitors, suppliers, customers and regulatory agencies; and generally, 
to co-ordinate their business activities with other corporations.  
 
A key criticism of this theory is that empirical findings can be interpreted by the paradigm of 
the researcher and ignores activities and responsibilities such as providing advice, monitoring 
(Hitt et al. 1996; Bainbridge, 1998; Fama, 1980) and strategizing (Kesner and Johnson, 1990: 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) that are important in the overall corporate governance framework 
at board level. The theory also fails to consider organisations’ internal resources, which can 
be used to create value. The resource allocation component of the theory (O’Sullivan and 
Lazonick) is important in the overall composition of a corporate governance framework.  In 
the literature on corporate governance for the RDT there has been no treatment of the issue of 
innovation, so any examination of the relationship between corporate governance and 
innovation has to be left in abeyance at this point of the Literature Review. 
 
In Australia, a board is a legal requirement set out in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  
Legislation also outlines certain powers and responsibilities of a board. In summary, this view 
is not concerned so much with adding value to the organisation but rather ensuring that 
shareholders rights are protected.  The legal perspective is based on the traditional 
conventions of Anglo-Saxon trust law. This view is also noticeably silent on the topic of 
innovation and its implications for resource allocation within a corporate governance 
framework. 
 
The managerial perspective advanced by Michael Porter (1996) recognises the integral role of 
manager insiders to corporate resource allocation.  O’Sullivan (2000) noted that this 
perspective on corporate governance;  
 
…neglects the way boundaries of corporate innovation processes are 
constructed. In particular, it neglects the fact that how control over 
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corporate resources is vested in an economy, who the insiders are, and 
the identity of corporate strategists are shaped by institutional evolution 
of the economy in which corporations are embedded. (2000:96).   
 
However, unlike the dominant theories of shareholder and stakeholder, this perspective does 
include innovation as a central issue to its concept of corporate resource allocation within the 
corporate governance framework.  The advocates of managerial control recognise that the 
competitive success of the organisation depends on investment in innovation, which among 
other things, involves specialised in house knowledge, time and financial commitment to 
achieve.  The difficulty with this managerial control perspective is that it does not connect a 
theory of innovation and investment.  As O’Sullivan (2000) points out there is no systematic 
explanation of the conditions under which managers will make investments that promote 
innovation and generate returns and those under which such investments will not be made.  
 
The above-mentioned theories of corporate governance do not offer a holistic approach to 
advancing a corporate governance framework in Australia for ASFs.  As O’Sullivan (2000) 
points out, a research agenda that seeks to understand the relation between corporate 
governance and innovation requires comparative studies of resource allocation and 
competitive performance of corporate enterprises.  As indicated above, research on the 
relationship between the process of innovation and corporate governance has been limited to 
date because the leading theories on corporate governance do not systematically integrate an 
analysis of the economics of innovation (O’Sullivan, 2000). This thesis aims to fill this gap in 
the literature. In addition, a further explanation for being overlooked is that empirical research 
on innovation, to date, has ignored issues of corporate control, for example, (Nelson, 1993; 
Freeman and Soete, 1997; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998).   
 
Historically, Schumpeter recognised that innovation was expensive and the key decisions on 
resource allocation were a component of the corporate governance, in particular of large 
organisations.  After Schumpeter, the innovation literature fell silent on innovation and 
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corporate governance until two Harvard scholars, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) published 
research in the area. The study of corporate governance and innovation has not grown as an 
integrated field of study and these concepts still remains detached from each other.  To date, 
there appears to be only a handful of scholars who have examined at some level the 
relationship between corporate governance and innovation and there appears to be a systemic 
oversight to examine and analyse corporate governance in an innovative framework 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). Both Lazonick and O’Sullivan developed an alternative theory that 
analyses the conditions needed are to support an innovation process within an organisation.   
  
O’Sullivan and Lazonick focused their research in the late nineties and onwards. They 
examined the relationship between corporate governance and innovation.  
 
Debates on these issues are needed, as well as additional empirical research 
that seeks to explore the dimensions of the innovation process and its 
relationship to institutions of corporate governance. Yet intellectual progress 
on these issues cannot be made without a common recognition of the 
importance of innovation in analysing the relationship between corporate 
governance and economic performance.  The contemporary debates on 
governance have blocked the path to theoretical and empirical development 
along these lines by neglecting the economics of innovation… (O’Sullivan 
(2000:10).   
  
O’Sullivan (2000) adds value to the debate by linking the economics of innovation and 
corporate governance in a synthetic analytical framework.   O’Sullivan (2002a) recognised 
that a system of corporate governance generates institutional conditions for innovation that 
supports (1) financial commitment; (2) organisational integration and (3) insider control.  
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 88  
 
The first institutional consideration, ‘financial commitment,’ was described by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) as where the entities supports the ongoing access of the organisation to the 
financial resources required to undertake and sustain the development and utilisation of 
productive resources, until such time that the resources can generate returns that provide 
financial liquidity and that allows the enterprise to survive. The second institutional 
condition, organisational integration, describes where social institutions support incentives of 
participants in a complex division of labour to commit their skills and efforts to the pursuit of 
the objectives of the organisation. The final institutional condition of “insider control, ensures 
that control over the allocation of corporate resources and returns is in the hands of decision 
makers who are integrated with the learning process that generates innovation.  Insider 
control ensures that those who exercise control over resources have the abilities and 
incentives to make innovative investments” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000:60). 
 
Both researchers point out that the organisational and financial requirements of innovative 
investment strategies vary across business activity.  With particular types of organisational 
integration, financial commitment and insider control may either promote or hinder 
innovation depending on the business activity and the competitive environment.  O’Sullivan 
(2000) recognised the complications of the relationship between organisational control and 
innovation as: Firstly, the dynamics of organisational control and, the effect of enterprise 
development on the integration of strategists with learning processes that generate innovation: 
Secondly, differences in what constitutes innovation given variations in the nature of 
competition across business activity and within business activity over time, and finally: the 
dynamics of institutional change. 
 
The gap in the literature here is the lack of emphasis and importance placed on strategic 
leadership by a CEO of an entity and their influence over the entire entity’s resource 
allocation budget and the process places requirements on the governance of the entity if they 
are to be innovative. 
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Debates on corporate governance have ignored these institutional conditions as the leading 
theories on corporate governance do not systematically integrate an analysis of the economics 
of innovation (O’Sullivan: 2000).  In this context an important question that needs to be 
considered is that if innovation occurs within the ASI, then how do we understand it? This 
thesis attempts to provide insight in relation to this question. 
 
Schumpeter’s work (1934) is important as he recognised that with the growing separation of 
ownership and management, the entrepreneurial function within the organisation lies within 
the executive function of management.  The emphasis on the division of ownership and 
executive responsibilities has implications for the management of innovation within any 
organisation, whether it is a publically listed company or an ASF.  Schumpeter’s research 
however, did not take into consideration the structure of the organisation, governance and 
other factors that shape innovation activities.  For example, superannuation funds operate 
within the same industry but within the different sectors of the ASI, and there may be a 
difference in their commitment in resources, structure, strategies and developing new 
products (Freeman, 1982; Dosi, 1988: Patel and Pavitt, 1988). 
 
Teece (1996) addressed the relationships between corporate structure, strategy and innovation 
by reviewing the characteristics of innovation and types of organisations and suggesting that 
the formal and informal structures of the firm, as well as the inter-firm linkages have an 
important bearing on the strength, as well as the kind of innovative activity conducted by 
private entities.  Teece did not offer a theoretical explanation as to how different governance 
models vary in support of innovation.   
 
Further, Chandler (1977) examined the relationship between corporate capabilities, corporate 
structure and strategy, however, he did not explore how these significant elements should be 
integrated into a framework of corporate governance and innovation.  His study did not 
address the interaction of corporate structure and strategy in respect of a corporate 
governance framework.  That is, to the extent that an organisation can successfully innovate 
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by generating new knowledge through learning so that can build or sustain a competitive 
advantage (Penrose 1995; Teece, Pisano and Sullivan; 2000).  If a superannuation entity 
successfully learns to innovate, then it can develop integrated structures of abilities and 
incentives for their participants that cannot be replicated through the market coordination of 
economic activity (O’Sullivan, 2000).  The process of resource allocation as considered by 
O’Sullivan (2000) as organisational and that there is substantial ambiguity in the relationship 
between innovative investments and returns. Given the collective nature of the innovation 
process, it is difficult to closely link individual contributions to a joint outcome (Teece, 
Pisano and O’Sullivan, 2000).   
 
All three characteristics of innovation: cumulative, collective and uncertain, imply that 
resources are allocated to generating innovation through a strategic process (O’Sullivan, 
2000).  Economic actors (in this instance of the ASI, CEOs or the Board) strategically 
allocate resources and there appear to be no objective guidelines for making these decisions.  
Innovation strategy is inherently subjective according to O’Sullivan and relies on the 
perception of the decision-maker and involves more than one decision at any one given point 
in time.  It is a process that occurs as the uncertainty inherent in the innovation process 
unfolds over time. “The corporate strategies that allocate resources to innovation confront and 
seek to overcome uncertainty inherent in the transformation of markets and technologies.” 
(O’Sullivan, 2000:23). 
 
The limited discourse on the relationship between the process of innovation and corporate 
governance was researched and published by O’Sullivan (2000). O’Sullivan’s research 
provided insight into the fact that there needs to be some level of recognition of the 
importance of innovation in analysing the relationship between corporate governance and 
economic performance to progress this field.   Accordingly, for the theoretical platform to 
progress with superannuation, it is necessary to examine the innovation process and its 
relationship with corporate governance.  This research attempts to examine innovation within 
the ASI and its relationship with the corporate governance framework within the ASF.  The 
first step, within this context, was to research whether innovation occurred within an ASF. 
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In conclusion, a research agenda that seeks to understand the link between corporate 
governance and innovation in the ASI requires study of ASFs, and the factors that drive 
innovation. Empirical research on innovation, to date, has ignored issues of corporate control. 
 
This thesis examines the link between corporate governance and innovation within the 
superannuation industry in Australia.  To achieve this objective the following two broad 
research questions will be examined in the ASI: 
 
1. Is there innovation in the ASI? and if so, how does innovation manifest itself in this 
industry; and 
 
2. What role do boards and CEOs play in the innovation process in this industry? 
 
This research also examines whether or not legislative requirements, such as the ‘sole purpose 
test’ for trustees set out in the SIS Act within the ASI acts as a hindrance of innovation at 
board level.  
 
To better direct research, the two broad research questions have been divided into eight sub-
questions: 
i. To what extent are Australian superannuation funds innovative? 
ii. What types of innovation occur within an ASF? 
iii. Is innovation measured within an ASF? 
iv. What differences in the extent and type of innovation are evident between the ASF 
sectors? 
v. What factors may inhibit innovation? 
vi. To what extent are boards influential in driving innovation? 
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vii. Are there any board factors that influence innovation? 
viii. To what extent are CEOs influential in developing and initiating innovation? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through examination of the innovation process within the ASF’s, insight will be gained on 
whether traditional models of corporate governance are strategically aligned to the service 
innovation business models within a superannuation context. Typically, service innovation 
with its regulatory requirements and standards, create a barrier for innovation (Tether, 
2002b).  An assumption based on an extensive literature review was that there would be ‘rare’ 
occurrences of innovation within the ASI like that of the UK pension system. 
Methods used to investigate these issues in the Australian context are detailed in Chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 5:  METHODS 
 
Objectives of the Chapter 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the rationale and process of the research and detail 
the methodological principles and procedures that were engaged to investigate whether or not 
corporate governance frameworks within the ASI promote or hinder innovation.  Due to the 
exploratory nature of the research, qualitative research methodologies were applied in the 
process of data collection and analysis.  Twenty superannuation funds located in Australia 
participated with in-depth semi-structured interviews with key players within each of the 
superannuation funds selected as part of this research.  Data collection began in early 2008 
and the process of intensive data collection took place in Melbourne, Victoria from August 
2008 to December 2008.   
 
Overview 
 
A qualitative research design was used for this study because of its investigatory and 
exploratory nature (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) in which extended 
interviews were employed.  This facilitated probing and follow-up questions on related issues 
and problems during the interviews. A semi-structured in-depth format was employed for 
interviewees to answer questions regarding corporate governance and innovation. The 
extended interview format permitted exploration of personal work experiences of learned 
individuals as well as their views regarding possible explanations for innovativeness, or lack 
thereof, within the superannuation industry.  Some questions were open-ended, providing 
interviewees also with an opportunity to raise matters of particular concern or interest to 
them.  In order to ensure consistent coverage of issues, a schedule of standard questions were 
developed.   
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The interviews were drawn from superannuation funds in Tasmania, South Australia, New 
South Wales and Victoria. The majority of the interviews were conducted face to face in the 
Melbourne central business district. A range of interviewees from different occupations 
within the superannuation industry were interviewed including chairmen, trustees, chief 
executive officers, chief financial officers, chief information officers, senior management, 
marketing experts, asset allocation consultants, actuaries, accountants, investment managers, 
other industry experts and fund managers.  Participants employed within the industry were 
from both the private sector and public sector but not SMSFs.  
 
Rationale for the Research Design 
 
The broad aim of this thesis is to develop a more detailed understanding of the ASI. 
Specifically, this research aims to understand the extent and types of innovation occurring 
within the industry and to explore the link (if any) between corporate governance and 
innovation and any impact by this framework on innovation within an ASF.  A qualitative 
research approach was adopted. The case study here was oriented towards a professional 
audience.   
 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
Researchers need to determine whether their investigation will be studied through qualitative 
or quantitative means.  Yin (2003) acknowledges that a quantitative methodology is 
appropriate for focusing on “what” or “how many” type questions.  Quantitative researchers 
believe that the data that is gained though quantitative inquiry is hard, reliable and replicable, 
whereas qualitative researchers believe their data is rich in understanding (Bryman, 2004; 
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Walle, 1997).   Conversely, qualitative methodologies lend themselves to questions that are 
more exploratory in nature. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative research has advantages and disadvantages.  Quantitative 
research offers statistical measurement meaning that results can be presented succinctly and 
hypotheses tested (Patton 1990).   This type of research permits repetition in future studies, 
causality and generalisations to be established (Bryman 2004).  There is a natural tension that 
exists between the fields of qualitative and quantitative research. Despite this tension, 
qualitative research is ideally suited for inductive theory building and interpretive research 
projects (Gephardt, 2004).   
 
Gordon and Langmaid (1988) note that the strengths of qualitative research are that it can 
increase understanding, expand knowledge, clarify the real issues, generate hypotheses, 
identify a range of behaviour, as well as explore and explain motivations. It is also dynamic 
and flexible, provides deeper, broader and richer understandings (Patton 1990).   
Accordingly, these factors make it very attractive to undertake this type of research for this 
topic area. However, it is recognised that qualitative research is not without criticism and 
more recently criticised for its inability to carry out replications of findings (Bryman, 2004) 
and its inability to generalise (Patton, 1990).   
 
A qualitative study was deemed most suitable to the research subject at hand, as this topic 
requires exploration of a service industry, occurrence of innovation and corporate governance 
frameworks. Qualitative analysis can identify mechanisms beyond mere association, “is 
unrelenting local, dealing with complex network of events, can untangle temporal factors and 
can search for links between variables and processes, looking for connections over time” 
(Miles & Huberman 1994: 147). 
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This qualitative study allowed for the collection of data in Australia, from both insiders and 
experts within the industry. A qualitative research strategy using a single case study of the 
ASI, was adopted as a method to assess whether or not innovation occurred within the twenty 
superannuation funds that participated in this research.  Twenty superannuation funds were 
involved and while this may appear statistically insignificant, in terms of the collective funds 
under management of these twenty ASFs it equates to $AUD 255 Billion dollars, which was 
twenty five percent of total funds under management in superannuation funds and is a 
significant amount of money in the Australian economy.   
 
The question as to which qualitative approach is appropriate for this research is another issue 
that is addressed in this chapter.  Firstly, this research could have been conducted by either 
multiple case studies with the various superannuation funds that had agreed to participate; or 
secondly, through a hybrid qualitative approach where interviews are conducted with the 
individual ASFs that had agreed to participate in this research; and several ASFs would be 
examined in detail, by way of case study method; or finally, the preferred approach that the 
superannuation industry in Australia is used as the actual case study to be examined, by way 
of a series of interviews with each superannuation fund participating in this research.   
 
Given the phenomena under investigation, a decision by this researcher and a co-supervisor 
of this thesis was taken to employ a single embedded case study method for theory building.   
Yin (1994:38) suggests that a single case study research is a method suitable: 
 
…To confirm, challenge or extend the theory, there may exist a single case, 
meeting all the conditions for testing the theory.  The single case can be 
used to determine whether a theory’s proposition is correct or whether some 
alternative set of explanations might be relevant. 
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Yin (1994; 2000) suggests that the single case study is ideal where the case is ‘unique’.  The 
case of the ASI can be argued in the sense it holds under $1.5 Billion AUD in funds under 
management and very little research has been conducted within this industry, and no 
published research on the innovation within the ASI.  
 
The Case Study as a Research Method 
 
Definition of a case study 
 
A case study relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data collection and source.  Bromley 
notes that case study research is defined as a, “systematic inquiry into an event or a set of 
related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest” (1990:302).   
 
The case study method has received ever-increasing attention over the past two decades, with 
noteworthy efforts made to establish it as a credible method, including case study design 
(Yin, 1993, 1994) and qualitative data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and theory 
building from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Leonard-Barton, 1990).  Subsequently, Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) assisted with further recognition of the use of a case study as a credible 
research method (Perry & Coote, 1994). 
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Case study research concentrates on a phenomenon within its social context, using multiple 
data collection modes and sources (Yin, 1994, Eisenhardt, 1989a). Eisenhardt (1989:8) states, 
“the case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings.”  Case studies can be either single or multiple cases, and involves 
numerous levels of analysis (Yin, 1994).    
 
Purposes of this case study research 
 
A major strength of the case study methodology is that it allows holistic real life events to be 
investigated (Gomm et al. 2000; Gummesson, 2000, 2007; Yin 1994).  This is an ideal 
methodology for developing detailed understanding of the complexity in social situations, and 
enables the researcher to provide rich and thick descriptions of the social world (Black, et al. 
2006; Davies, 2003; Gummesson, 2007).  In particular, qualitative case studies are 
characterised by the researcher spending a vast amount of time on site, “personally in contact 
with activities and operations of the case, reflecting, revising meaning of what is going on” 
(Stake, 1994:242).  However, while it may be “more expensive, time-consuming … that’s the 
price of developing knowledge about the real world” (Brun & Kaplan, 1987:4). 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) and Stake (2005) identified three different forms of case study 
research – intrinsic, instrumental and collective.   The intrinsic case enables a superior 
understanding of that particular case.  The instrumental case, aims to provide insight into 
specific issues or to refine a theoretical construct.  The final type of case study research to 
consider is a collective case, which involves the study of multiple instrumental cases.  
Multiple ASFs have been chosen to interview because, “understanding them will lead to 
better understanding, perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases” (Stake, 
2005: 446).   
 
However, a single case study will be used to explore whether or not there are any linkages 
between corporate governance and innovation within the ASI to provide insight into an issue 
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(Stake, 1994) and is selected to advance our understanding.   The case study method is suited 
to research questions that are explanatory, and focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.  The 
case study method allows investigation into ‘how’ and ‘why’ internal contextual factors 
impact either by way of promotion or hindrance of innovativeness within the superannuation 
fund. This enables the method to fulfil the objective of identifying emergent themes from the 
data. The approach was deemed appropriate to conduct a series of interviews within twenty 
superannuation funds.   
 
A case study methodology has been identified as ideal for investigating new topic areas (such 
as service industry innovation), in a way which develops rich pictures of the phenomenon in 
question and allows theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perry, 1998; Stake, 2005; Yin, 1994).  
This methodology allows for exploratory research to be conducted in this thesis (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994).  There is little research in this area, and it is exploratory in nature as the 
phenomenon is complex and human centred.  A case study approach here offers clear 
advantages for this type of investigation as it provides the different contexts on how 
innovativeness may occur.  
 
One of the most important steps in case study research is the identification of the unit of 
analysis, or what constitutes a case (Granbaum, 2007).  Gerring (2007: 19): notes that, “a case 
connotes a spatially delineated phenomenon (the unit) observed at a single point in time or 
over some period of time.  It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to 
explain”.  Case study research is “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
that study is – at least in part –to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” (Gerring, 
2007: 21).  Given this, the unit or analysis or case may be an individual, a group or 
organisation, or the entire population of a country.  Therefore, this method was adopted which 
involves 20 funds of analysis within four sectors, (public sector, corporate, retail and industry 
funds) and the units of analysis are the ASFs interviewed as part of this research.  While the 
method adopted for this analysis was qualitative it is acknowledged that the data from the 
twenty ASF’s does allow for intra group quantitative analysis but this was not the object of 
the thesis.  Notwithstanding this, I have undertaken some intra-industry comparison based on 
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fund characteristics.  These ASFs are legal entities, heavily regulated by the Superannuation 
Industry Supervision legislation in Australia.  
 
Mintzberg (1979:585) highlighted that, “No matter how small our sample or what our 
interest, we have always tried to go into an organization with a well-defined focus – to collect 
specific kinds of data systematically”. Accordingly, this researcher was focused on 
interviewees in their office and focused on questions specifically around the topics - corporate 
governance, innovation and any linkages between the corporate governance and innovation.   
 
Criticism of the Case Study Method 
 
It is important to recognise that case study research is not without criticism, and this criticism 
may be placed into two main categories.  Firstly, there are some academics that criticise 
validity and the reliability of case studies as a research methodology.  For instance, Gerring 
(2007) highlights how some academics view case study research as unscientific and 
undisciplined research, producing stories that are ungeneralisable to other contexts.  
Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2006) identified five misinterpretations about case study research:  
i. Theoretical knowledge is better than practical knowledge.  
ii. Generalisation is not possible from single case studies.  
iii. Case studies are only primarily used for generating hypothesis.  
iv. Case studies contain a bias towards verification, and;  
v. It is difficult to summarise specific cases. 
 
Limitations of the case study method  
 
Like all research methods, there are limitations with each type of method used, and both 
qualitative and quantitative research are not without their limitations.    
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Parkhe (1993), notes that the case study approach has drawn scepticism from the scientific 
community.  Two concerns include the lack of rigor and the limited basis for scientific 
generalisation (Yin, 2005).  To avoid this weakness, whether perceived or not, the approach 
taken is to generate high reliability and validity and to produce reasonable analytic 
conclusions and rule out alternative interpretations (Yin, 2005). 
 
Yin (2005) recognised that one important criticism is the element of potential bias of the 
interviewer and that biased views can influence the direction of the finding. However, this 
can be overcome by reporting the evidence fairly and objectively, displaying sufficient 
evidence and in this instance providing a multiple source of evidence for the results of the 20 
superannuation funds represented in this research.  Rose (1991) highlighted another general 
criticism of case study research, that interview techniques can often lack representativeness.  
Some of the interviews were found as a result of the researcher’s own networks, after the 
initial process of choosing the funds through the Australian Institute of Superannuation 
Trustees (AIST) public membership database to overcome the issue of lack of 
representativeness17.  
 
The suitability of the case study method for this thesis 
 
The selection of research method depends on the nature of the study and the aim of the 
researcher; “different types of case studies are better suited to some methodologies than 
                                                      
17 A total population survey was not practicable because of time constraints and the sheer volume of 
superannuation funds registered in Australia.  Consequently, the research targeted a small sample of twenty 
funds with the industry. In total there were 63 interviews.  Limitations to this study include: the size of the 
sample; in time available was restricted because of practical considerations; despite these limitations the data 
provided findings on an interesting occupational group that has been rarely researched. This study was 
exploratory in terms of attempting to understand the extent and types of innovation and the impact of 
corporate governance frameworks in the ASI. 
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others” (Scapens, 2006: 266).  The case study method does not imply a particular collection 
method, however, it does represent a particular strategy that can be quantative, qualitative or 
both.  Miller and Friesen (1982) characterised qualitative studies that enable more objective 
and reliable finds. 
 
The advantage of using a single case study approach to examine innovation within 
superannuation funds in Australia is that it can provide rich contextual information on issues 
that may not be developed.  Support for this approach can be found in Eisenhardt’s research 
(1989a), which described case study research as a novel, testable and an empirically valid 
approach that is particularly well suited to new research areas, like this one, or research areas 
for which existing theory is inadequate.  It stands to reason that qualitative data are useful in 
the early stages of research.  Similar support is gained by Kaplan (1986) who argued that a 
case study method provided a mechanism that allowed researchers to understand a 
phenomenon through ‘in-depth’ description and understanding. 
 
From the outset, the objective was to gain as much insight and knowledge on this topic, and it 
seemed most fitting to use a single case study approach to the superannuation industry, as 
qualitative case studies in particular are typified by the researcher spending a substantial 
amount of time on site “personally in contact with activities and operations of the case, 
reflecting, revising meanings of what is going on” (Stake, 1994:242). 
 
In summary, the adoption of the single case study method for this thesis was governed by two 
main factors, namely the outcome of the literature review; and to gain a detailed 
understanding of corporate governance and innovation in the context of the ASI. 
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Literature Review 
 
The literature indicated that the investigation of the relationship between the process of 
innovation and corporate governance has been limited to date because the leading theories on 
corporate governance do not systematically integrate an analysis of the economics of 
innovation (O’Sullivan, 2000).  In addition, a further explanation for being overlooked is that 
empirical research on innovation, to date, has ignored issues of corporate control (for 
example, Nelson, 1993; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998).  As this 
study requires a research method that accounts for both innovation and corporate governance 
interactions within the ASI, a flexible approach that is receptive to emerging themes, 
unexpected relationships and new issues is necessary.  The case study method enables these 
qualities to be studied effectively (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Yin’s (2005) definition of the single 
case study emphasises its particular suitability in the investigation of corporate governance 
and innovation.  It allows the investigation of the phenomena within the real life context, i.e. 
corporate governance frameworks and innovation strategies within an ASF. 
 
Innovation may be defined in numerous ways, however, for the purposes of this research, 
‘innovation’ is defined as the introduction of new investments into the superannuation fund or 
new investment options (Oslo Manual: 2005).    
 
The Australian Superannuation Industry as a Case study 
 
The case study is based on a research agenda that seeks to understand the relationship 
between corporate governance and innovation. Yin (1994:44) would describe it as a “rare or 
unique event” for which the case study method is a highly appropriate research design. 
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The Research Proposal 
 
Given the nature of the phenomena under investigation, the descriptive, explanatory, and 
exploratory purposes of this research are significantly interrelated.  The descriptive purpose is 
realised by gaining insight of the issues and the complexities of the case.  The contextual data 
serves the exploratory requirements of this research, as it informs the process of theory 
building (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and contributes to the explanatory purpose in the 
identification of the causal links that may be present (Yin, 1994).  While the exploratory 
purpose of this doctoral research is concerned with the discovery of theory from in depth 
semi-structured interviews, this research does not seek to generate grounded theory in which 
prior inquiry or the investigator’s perspective are excluded from the interpretive process.  The 
literature review undertaken in Chapters Two, Three and Four indicates that governance is an 
important part of any boardroom agenda and that there are ever increasing challenges for the 
board.  In particular, the current legislative regime and Stronger Super Reforms in 2014 has 
created its own challenges for trustees.  Through the collection of data from multiple sources, 
and by utilising an open coding technique, discussed later in this chapter, the case study 
method may be used to both elucidate issues that have been identified previously, and to 
refine existing theoretical concepts (refer Yin, 2003). 
 
Conduct of the Research 
 
The overall plan of this investigation is based on Yin’s (2003) model for case study research.  
The research process is outlined below. 
 
Sampling 
 
Patton (1990) suggests that sampling captures the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative methods concentrate on in-depth small samples selected 
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purposefully, while quantitative samples concentrate on larger samples selected randomly.  
This is because the former aims to collect information rich data for an in-depth study in order 
to add light to the research questions, and the latter’s purpose is generalisation (Patton 1990). 
Patton (1990) detailed several themes of qualitative inquiry, all relevant to this study.  18 
 
This research is similar to that of other quantitative researchers who work with smaller 
samples of individuals, nested in their context and studied in-depth (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  Sampling in qualitative research involves two actions according to Miles and 
Huberman (1994). Firstly, the researcher needs to set boundaries to define the aspects of their 
cases that can be studied within the limits of the researcher’s time and means that connect 
directly to the research questions. Secondly, the researcher needs to create a frame to help 
them uncover, confirm or qualify the basic processes or constructs that ground the study. 
 
The theory also suggests that the most effective sampling methods are those designed fora 
specific situation, in this case the examination of the ASI; Eisenhardt, (1989) and Linn (1983) 
further claim that there is no single preferable method of sampling.  Sampling methods should 
be designed to achieve the specific purposes of the study, effectively under the limitations set 
by the funds, personnel and other resources that are available at the time. This is an approach 
to sampling advocated by other case-study researchers (Drever, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Neuman, 2000).  
 
The objective here is to select superannuation funds that are representative of the population 
of interest, and will prove useful in theory building (Llewellyn, 2007). Selection of Australian 
                                                      
18 Qualitative data will produce detailed description, in‐depth inquiry including people’s perceptions and 
experiences and personal contact and insight by the researcher. Each case is unique and context sensitivity and 
findings are specific to time and place. Complete objectivity is impossible albeit most researchers attempt to 
understand through personal experience; and is open to adapting inquiry as understanding deepens or 
situations change. 
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superannuation funds for this research occurred by accessing a public list19 of registered 
superannuation funds, via the internet, that were members of the Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees (AIST).  At the time, there were only 45 members recorded on a 
public list and all members were sent a letter requesting them to participate in this research.    
A formal university letter was posted to all of the superannuation funds on the AIST 
publically available list.  From the list of 45 superannuation funds, 20 funds agreed to 
participate and two funds declined to be involved.  One government fund in Victoria, despite 
several attempts to contact the CEO by letter and telephone, and several messages left with 
different staff members made no contact.  Ten letters were returned to sender and the 14 other 
funds did not respond.   At this stage of the process, it was determined not to follow up ASFs 
that did not respond, as there had been 45 per cent of those funds that had already agreed to 
participate.  Details of the letters of request to participate in this research are attached in 
Appendix 4.  Thompson (1992) acknowledged that it is often impractical for a researcher to 
interview an entire group of individuals about whom it is hoped to make generalisations. 
Once the researcher defines the target population, and if it is indeed impractical to interview 
each member, a representative sample will usually be identified for interview (Burgess, 1982; 
Thompson, 1992).  For this study, the target population was 20 superannuation funds. 
 
Where ‘funds’ are referred to in the subsequent results and discussion chapters this represents 
the opinions expressed by the interviewees from that fund. Where there was more than one 
interviewee in the fund, interviews were analysed to determine the overall directions for that 
fund.  That said, board members and CEOs were found to have internally consistent opinions 
on the issues for which ‘funds’ are used as the frame of reference. 
 
Within funds, CEO and board opinions were identified for some issues, for example for the 
issue of who initiates innovation. Where this is the case the position of the individual in the 
fund is given, for example CEO of Fund 15. 
                                                      
19 Refer to www.aist.asn.au 
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Review of the Literature 
 
The literature posed in the introduction of this thesis suggests that there are two broad 
questions to be researched:  
1. Is there innovation in the ASI? and if so, how does innovation manifest in this 
industry?; and 
2. What roles do boards and CEOs play in the innovation process in this industry? 
 
The examination of this particular topic defined the units of analysis, the research question 
and the appropriate method.  
 
The next section in relation to interview preparation establishes the theoretical background to 
interviewing as a qualitative research method. The second section explains the selection of in-
depth interviewing for this study; this includes a description of interview techniques and their 
role in the interview process. The third section identifies issues and potential challenges to 
validity and reliability in a qualitative research project of this nature.  
 
This chapter will now provide detail about commonly used interview methods, identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of each, and finally explain the choice of in-depth interviewing and 
individual participants for this study. 
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Interview preparation 
 
Contemporary academics suggest that qualitative interview models lie along a continuum, 
with structured interviews at one end, semi-structured interviews in between and unstructured 
interviews at the other end (refer: Babbie, 2007; Bailey, 1999; Drever, 1995; Kidder & Judd, 
1986; Patton, 1990; Strauss, 1987). The decision about which interview method to adopt for 
this study was made after considering the characteristics and research orientation of the most 
common forms of interview; structured, semi-structured and unstructured.  
 
Minichiello et al. (1995) and Oppenheim (1992) describe structured interviews as 
standardised interviews, predominantly used in surveys or opinion polls. Each participant is 
asked an identical set of questions in the same order, to ensure comparability and to reduce 
potential bias (Minichiello et al. 1995). The interview schedule, or list of pre-determined 
questions, usually consists of closed questions with multiple choice answer options. Dick 
(1990: 13) acknowledges that while closed-ended questions are inflexible, they do in fact 
enable easier coding of responses and deliver “data which are easily analysed, replicable and 
economical”. One major disadvantage of structured interviews is the limited amount of 
information the participant can provide. Their thoughts, feelings, and interpretations cannot 
be expressed (Minichiello et al. 1995: 61).  Kidder and Judd (1986: 29) suggest that open-
ended questions may sometimes be included in structured interviews, but they concede that 
the information subsequently provided may be difficult to decode and often leads to increased 
research costs. 
 
Babbie (2002) and Roberts (1988) describe the interview situation as a one-way process, with 
the interviewer acting as facilitator to collect primarily quantitative data. Some qualitative 
researchers have criticised the absence of meaningful interaction, resulting in constrained 
information exchange, as being impersonal and unable to reflect the social reality of 
qualitative interviewing (see for example Minichiello et al, 1995; Oakley, 1988; Roberts, 
1988).  
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Minichiello et al. (1995: 77) describes semi-structured interviews as those used to collect 
both qualitative and quantitative data. This usually involves the use of an interview schedule, 
which includes key topics for the interview, without specifying questions or their order. There 
is greater flexibility in questioning, and some divergence is possible to explore issues as they 
arise (Minichiello et al. 1995: 78), albeit this might reduce the comparability of responses. 
This model is expected to elicit more detailed information about the participant’s perceptions. 
Semi-structured interviews are closer in process to the unstructured model of interviewing as 
both allow for more in-depth examinations of people and issues (Minichiello et al. 1995).  
 
Healey and Rawlinson (1994) identify semi-structured interviews as often adopting a two-
tiered approach to the interviews. A semi-structured interview may include a common set of 
factual questions asked of all participants, and an informal conversation to enable participants 
to elaborate on topics of interest.  Interviews for this research occurred in this manner, 
however, the interviews were conducted in format of in-depth semi-structured manner 
because of the obvious advantages that have been highlighted in the theory above. 
 
The interview process relies heavily on the voluntary participation of the interviewees, and on 
their willingness to disclose and discuss potentially sensitive information. To achieve 
interview conditions conducive to such disclosure, Barry (1999) highlights that it is 
imperative that the researcher establishes good rapport.  Good rapport was established with 
all interviewees with this case study.   Qualitative research interviews enable a researcher to 
“see the research topic from the perspective of the interviewee” (King, 2004:11).   
Interviewing is an efficient means of data collection when the research design involves an 
analysis of people’s motivations, actions and opinions (Keats, 2001), as was the case with this 
research.   
 
In summary, the main method of data collection employed in this thesis is in-depth semi-
structured interviews to identify the key themes underpinning innovation with ASI. As 
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highlighted above, in-depth semi-structured interviews were deemed appropriate for this 
research given that the issues studied here are exploratory and the study attempts to gain 
insight into the link (if any) between corporate governance and innovation activities within 
the superannuation industry. The importance of particular individuals within the organisation 
(such as the CEO) may be crucial to influencing whether or not innovation actually occurs 
within the fund by way of an innovation strategy or not. 
 
Individual interviews were scheduled between 45 minutes to an hour determined purely by 
participant’s time availability.  In five instances (Funds 2, 4, 7, 9 and 10) several follow up 
interviews took place with the CEO.  The majority of the interviews involved in-depth 
discussion (with the CEO, Chair, Trustees, Director, senior managers and consultants).  This 
allowed the researcher to elicit both the views of the management and the board as they may 
not necessarily coincide. 
 
In-depth interviewing 
 
Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander (1995) identify a link between in-depth 
interviewing as a research method and the theoretical and methodological assumptions that 
are the foundations of the research approach. By choosing the method of in-depth 
interviewing, Minichiello et al. (1995) recognise that the researcher is making a 
methodological choice and the theoretical antecedents of in-depth interviewing coalesce in 
what is known by these researchers as the interpretive tradition.  
 
In-depth interviewing is one process that can elicit high-quality data in an informal, flexible 
manner.  Seidman (1991: 72) suggests that much of the value of in-depth interviewing as a 
research method lies in the close relationship between the participants and researcher. 
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Seidman (1991) also proposes that the depth of information and exploration of ideas is very 
much dependent on successful research design, technique and implementation and supports 
Berry’s (2000) view that researchers must plan to overcome a number of potential problems, 
including interviewer bias, unreliable or distorted responses and the problem of distance 
between the interviewer and participant’s own frame of mind. 
 
Contents of Interviews 
 
In order to examine whether or not the corporate governance frameworks promote or hinder 
innovation with the ASI questions on overall institutional settings, individual perspectives 
and strategies were asked also during several interviews.  Such as:  
 
a. What are the common governance arrangements within the superannuation industry? 
b. Has there been any significant innovation occur within the superannuation industry? 
c. What is the fund’s governance structure? 
d. What is the fund’s ownership structure? 
 
Interview questions were prepared in advance through extensive research into the area of 
corporate governance, new product development and innovation (refer Appendix 5 and 
Appendix 6).  All questions were developed from first principles based on contemporary 
theory. 
 
Very intensive research was conducted over a 12 week time frame from August 2008 to mid-
December 2008 in Victoria.  Additional interviews took place during 2009.  The original plan 
was to commence interviews from April 2008 to December 2008, the timeline shifted due to 
unforeseeable medical circumstances that occurred in April 2008 and required hospitalisation 
on a daily basis for 16 weeks.  This time delay ended up being advantageous for the research, 
as the interviews commenced during the GFC.  This allowed for the subsequent exploration 
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of issues surrounding ASFs and issues facing the particular interviewees representing ASFs 
during the GFC period which were being addressed as the research was conducted.  There 
were occasions where the researcher was able to reflect with the CEOs of a particular 
superannuation fund on their comments in relation to their superannuation fund that had been 
reported in various print publications at the time, including The Australian, The Age and The 
Financial Review. 
 
In order to fully cover the research questions it was considered important when conducting 
the research to have an interview schedule, which served to guide any discussion, and 
lessened the chance of important topics being neglected.  Babbie (2005: 314) cautions that, “it 
is vital for the qualitative interviewer to be fully familiar with the questions to be asked”.  
Similarly, Schutz (1967, cited in Seidman, 1991) identified an equally challenging problem 
with interpreting interview data; there are internal and external influences on the interview 
process that result from the gap in knowledge and experience that is present between two 
people by virtue of their very existence as the interviewee and interviewer.  
 
Interviews 
 
The objective of any qualitative research interview is to view the research topic through the 
eyes of the interviewee and to understand how and why this individual arrives at this 
particular perspective.  To meet this objective, qualitative interviews will as a general rule 
have the following characteristics: 
a. Low degree of structure imposed by the interviewer. 
b. Preponderance for open questions, and: 
c. Focus on ‘specific situations and action sequences in the world of the interviewee’ rather 
than abstractions and general opinions. 
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The aim of this research is to explore individual perspectives towards innovation activities 
and corporate governance, accordingly interviews were deemed appropriate to do this.  In 
addition, there was a series of twenty questions during the interview process asked in relation 
to innovation and corporate governance of the fund.  Questions 1- 6, 8 -11, 13, 15-18 and 20 
all allowed for quite lengthy discussions with the interviewees on this topic area of 
innovation.   
 
Initially, the interviewees were given the same set of questions so that the researcher could 
compare results.  The advantage of this style of interviewing technique is that it could 
facilitate analysis, allow for validity checks and triangulation administrated.  
 
The data collected was from predominately in-depth semi-structured interviews, including 
direct quotations from individuals about their experiences, opinions and knowledge.  
Secondary data, including written documents such as marketing strategies, the funds overall 
strategic plan, committee structures, and other fund documentation were provided when 
requested. 
 
The majority of the participants interviewed were in the head offices of large industry funds 
and other funds (retail and government) which were based in Melbourne. The majority of 
interviews conducted for this research were face-to-face interviews and were conducted in 
Melbourne during this time frame.  Telephone interviews were also conducted with three 
funds located in South Australia and New South Wales and face to face interviews with 
Tasmanian funds.  I also had a face to face interview with a NSW CEO. 
 
The interviewer arranged times with all the 20 participating fund CEOs who sometimes 
suggested that interview co-ordination occur through another person (for example, executive 
assistants or marketing co-ordinators typically) where there were multiple interview 
participants within the fund.  With three funds, the CEO allocated a contact person inside the 
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organisation to assist with the interviewing schedule, arrange meetings and provided the 
superannuation fund documents, where requested, and where approved by the CEO.  
 
The initial data collection began in August 2008, and the majority of data was collected by 
Christmas Eve, 2008.  The semi-structured questions allowed for elaboration on certain 
topics, which proved beneficial with the majority of interviewees answering questions about 
their superannuation funds (during the peak of the GFC) where global superannuation funds 
were reporting major financial losses to funds under management.   
 
During the interviews, as noted by Strauss and Corbin (1998), the researcher took full 
advantage of every opportunity that presented itself to receive information from company 
documents or from CEOs, Trustees and Chairpersons of other individuals that would add 
value to this research. The interview process encouraged openness advocated by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) and the researcher tried ensure data gathering “too tightly” in terms of the 
timing.  Through adopting this openness interview structure, rich data was obtained from an 
actuary, asset allocation consultants, accountants and marketing personnel, who were experts 
in their fields. 
 
The approach adopted is supported by Flick (1998) who acknowledged that a semi-structured 
approach to interviews allows participants to express their viewpoints in an open manner 
(Flick, 1998).  Nadhakumar and Jones (1997) noted that the lesser degree of structuring in an 
interview, the greater the chance that the researcher will be able to explore the respondents 
answers. 
Interview process 
 
The objective with the interviews was to try and gain access to senior personnel within the 
industry, such as CEOs, Chairpersons, Trustees and executives.  There were initial 
reservations by the researcher that it might not be possible to gain access to senior individuals 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 115  
 
within the ASI, however, upon disclosing that I was currently a trustee of an ASF in Hobart to 
the interviewees, there was no difficulty in gaining participants for the interview process. 
 
Initially, this research was going to ascertain the social, economic and educational 
backgrounds of the interviewees and all of the board members of these participating 
superannuation funds.  However, at the commencement of this research, confidential and 
detailed discussions took place with Mr Andrew Barr, at the AIST to seek guidance on the 
best way to obtain this type of information on trustees.  At the time, the Mr Barr advised that 
the AIST were in the process of developing a survey to send out to all trustee members 
throughout Australia that were members of the AIST to collect information in relation to inter 
alia trustee’s education, skills, education, and qualifications.   So rather than duplicate the 
process at the same time and risk a lower response rate on either or both surveys, permission 
was sought from the AIST to gain access to the raw data from their survey once it was 
collected and collated.  The CEO of AIST approved availability to data sets, at the time and 
the data was eventually provided to me approximately 12 months later. This approach 
assisted me on two levels: firstly, the savings in relation to distribution costs from the survey 
and take up rate by trustees of ASFs.  There were grave concerns that had the AIST survey 
arrived prior to any correspondence from me then the response rate may be nominal and have 
a negative impact on this research. Due to the sheer volume of data from the AIST’s survey, I 
decided to store this data, and use it in further publications and postdoctoral work. The 
outcome of this decision was that the Policy and Research Manager of AIST, agreed to 
provide me with all the results at the completion of their survey. 
 
As mentioned earlier, this research draws on a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews 
carried out with Chairpersons, Trustees, Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, 
Chief Information Officers, Executive Managers, Accountants, Asset Allocation consultants, 
and Actuaries of major superannuation funds in Australia.  This included 14 industry funds, 
two public offer funds, two government (public sector) funds and two corporate funds.  Table 
10 provides a de-identified list of the superannuation funds interviewed for this thesis.  The 
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major questions, refer Appendix 5, asked in the interview process were structured towards 
gaining insight into corporate governance and innovation activities within their fund.   
 
Pilot Interviewing 
 
In Melbourne, research questions (Appendix 5,6 & 7) were piloted in a very large industry 
fund (Fund 2) and with the support of the CEO and its management team, I was able to gain 
excellent data and receive feedback on these specific questions. A consent form was provided 
to all participants (Appendix 8). A senior manager, who had recently completed a Master 
Degree in Strategic Management at Melbourne University and had extensive experience 
within the financial services sector was extremely insightful with this process.  
 
After the pilot interviews in Fund 2 took place, and reflection of the process, the researcher 
felt confident that the research questions would provide insight into the area of innovation 
and corporate governance and allowed for comparison between the funds and theory 
development.  The interview process followed an informal manner to position both the 
interviewer and interviewee on a similar power level, so that the interviewee was not just a 
‘passive vessel of answers’ (Black & Champion, 1976; Holstein & Curium in Weinberg, 
2002). 
As a process it involved a number of predetermined questions (Refer Appendix 5) and 
allowed for the questions to be asked in a consistent manner. The interviewer was able to 
investigate beyond the responses to the prepared, standardised questions.  Consequently, this 
allowed for a greater ‘depth and detail of information’ to be solicited.  The use of open 
questions allowed individual respondents to express their own opinions. Each interview 
followed the same structure, based on the semi-structured style described above.  Therefore, 
the interviewees’ answers were only limited by the specificity of the questions, which were 
designed to prevent deviation from the topics of innovation and corporate governance.  
Accordingly, this type of interview technique allows findings to be more detailed.   
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 117  
 
The selection of in-depth semi-structured questions for this research was a decision informed 
largely by the need to gain insight into the board operations of Australian superannuation 
funds in relation to innovation and corporate governance.  Bryan (1988) contends that in-
depth interviewing is utilised when a particular research question dictates it as the most 
appropriate form of data-collection; case-study research is one such situation.  
 
The next section explains the specific interview techniques employed in the interviews and 
the reasons for their selection.  Perhaps the most obvious element of interviews is the verbal 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. A number of scholars (Dexter, 1970; 
Dick, 1990; Driver, 1996; Minichiello et al. 1995) consider the interviewer’s questioning 
technique as central to the success of an interview. Questioning techniques will vary 
depending on the model of interview employed and these techniques are relevant to this study 
because they facilitate qualitative data collection without restricting the participants’ ability to 
interpret and emphasise events from their own perspective.  
 
In the in-depth interview approach, the first task for an interviewer is to establish rapport with 
the participants. Berry (2000) describes establishing rapport, as a matter of understanding 
another’s view of the world and communicating your understanding appropriately. It is 
regarded as an important interview technique because the dynamic between interviewer and 
participant can significantly affect the interview process. Berry (2000) and Kzale (1996) 
suggest that rapport can be established in a number of ways, including visibly respecting the 
informants’ opinions, supporting their feelings, and acknowledging their responses. 
Minichiello et al. (1995: 80) also advocate reflecting participant behaviour during an 
interview; rapport can be achieved by, “matching the perceptual language, the images of the 
world, the speech patterns, pitch, tone, speed, the overall posture and the breathing patterns of 
the informant.”  
 
Kzale (1996: 128-148) concurs: “A good contact is established by attentive listening, with the 
interviewer showing interest, understanding, and respect for what the subjects say…[a good 
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interviewer] allows subjects to finish what they are saying, lets them proceed at their own rate 
of thinking and speaking.” 
 
Advocates of in-depth interviewing (refer Dexter, 1970; Dick, 1999; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984) 
recommend that the interviewer set the tone of the relationship with the interviewee by 
appearing willing to learn from them, receptive to their ideas and sensitive to emotional cues.  
During the scheduling of interviews, participants could determine the interview locations and 
scheduling to suit their personal commitments initially establishing rapport.  
 
At the start of each interview the interviewer would identify her own background as a 
superannuation trustee, that information would be kept confidential and that the interviewer 
had strong interest in corporate governance within the superannuation industry. By providing 
some context for this research, and the personal motivations and background, as a trustee, the 
researcher was hoping to establish a relationship of mutual respect from the outset.  During 
the interviews, the researcher sought to convey a sense of personal and professional interest in 
their individual account and sought to build greater rapport and elicit information that might 
otherwise have been withheld.   The researcher believes she achieved this goal successfully. 
On five occasions (Funds 2, 4, 7, 9 and 10) it was possible to have follow-up interviews with 
CEOs to seek further clarification and confirmation on data. 
 
The interviews were mostly allocated on an hourly basis (unless otherwise determined by the 
interviewee at the time of scheduling of the interview).  Often back-to back interviews were 
conducted on several occasions within a particular fund on the day or that week, to try and 
gain as much insight as possible in relation to that particular fund. More often than not, 
interviews exceeded an hour.   
 
The challenge for this study is to elicit rich data from the interviewees, without compromising 
rigour. To enhance research rigour, interview data will be triangulated with any secondary 
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source data provided by the fund itself, annual reports, and other data.  At each interview, 
field notes were taken that were transcribed later.  This process allowed an additional 
opportunity to reflect on the content of each interview. 
 
Bobbie (2002) contends that in-depth interviewing elicits information that the researcher can 
use to build on existing theory and knowledge.  Similarly, Driver (1996: 6) and Neumann 
(2000: 168) agree that this approach allows the researcher to select cases cumulatively and 
without the compulsion to generalise to a larger population.  One of the major reasons why 
this research included the approach of in-depth interviews in a semi-structured manner is that 
the interview approach  is most frequently undertaken with participants purposely selected on 
the basis of some unique characteristic, or because they are members of a distinct and 
difficult to access group.   Interviewees were selected because they occupied senior positions 
in the ASI and had a wealth of experience, insight and knowledge and the participants are 
normally a very difficult group to access. 
 
The selection of a research method and study participants, however, does not guarantee a 
valid or reliable study. The concepts of validity and reliability are central to any discussion 
about rigour in research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Burgess (1991) describes validity as whether the 
methods, techniques and approaches used in the research relate to and measure the data 
appropriately. Burgess (1991) and Eisenhardt (1989) note the two problems of validity often 
confronting in-depth interviewers: firstly the potential influence of the interviewer on the 
interviewee’s response (internal validity); and secondly, whether the data obtained can be 
generalised (external validity). To address this, many researchers adopt the use of 
triangulation (see for example Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Dick, 1999; Minichiello et al. 1995; 
Neuman, 2000). Swepson (2000: 3) defines triangulation as the “amalgamation of different 
methods of collecting data in the study of the same phenomenon.”  Triangulation aims to 
avoid problems of bias and validity by mitigating the deficiencies of one method with the 
strengths of another (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Dick, 1999; Swepson, 2000).  
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Triangulation is another term that provides a rationale for using different sources of evidence 
for qualitative purposes. The concept of triangulation is defined as the application of multiple 
methods in one study – to qualitative data to strengthen the depth and breadth of case study 
findings.  Interviews are the most common data gathering method for case studies and using 
several different methods enables triangulation, that is, the information received from 
different data can be compared, which according to Silverman (2011) increases validity.    
 
In this research, qualitative research methodology is informative because exploration of 
relationships of a wide variety of exploratory factors such as corporate governance systems, 
innovation activities, changing legal frameworks are possible and important in the context of 
this research.  This thesis used multiple methods of primary data collection, an approach 
referred to above as triangulation (Denzin, 2006; Flick, 2002).  Mason (2002: 33) noted, the 
aim of triangulation is to “seek to corroborate one source and method with another…and to 
enhance the quality of the data”.   
 
A second problem confronting researchers is that of reliability, or the credibility of the 
research method itself.   Minichiello et al. (1995: 178) identifies some key steps that can be 
taken by the researcher to reasonably assess reliability, including: 
[Documenting] how and why the researcher made certain decisions in the 
research process; their perceived impact on researcher and informant/s; 
how the data were collected (interviews only or personal documents in 
addition to in-depth interviews or multi-method use); and how they were 
analysed. 
 
The goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and biases in research.  Hammersley (1992) 
noted that reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to 
the same category by different observers or by the same observers on different occasions.  
What can be drawn from this quote is that if in the future (and subject to the same 
environmental factors and same legislative requirements for the superannuation funds in 
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Australia) another researcher followed exactly the same procedures and repeated the multiple 
interviews which asked exactly the same questions of the same interviewees, the researcher 
could arrive at the same findings and the same conclusion. 
 
Research validity is enhanced in this research by a high level of interviewee participation and 
feedback, and by reference to secondary source material such as fund documents on strategy, 
marketing, organisational charts, committee charters and investment strategies.  Yin (2003) 
argued that internal validity is only of concern for a casual (explanatory) case study in which 
an investigator is trying to determine whether event x led to event y.  As a general rule, 
validity is in relation to confidence in the interpretation or conclusions drawn from the data 
(Stiles and Taylor, 1993).  Guion (2002) notes that triangulation is a method used to check 
and establish validity in their studies. In summary, this research meets the criteria for 
reliability and flexibility recommended by Dick (1999).  This thesis addresses the issues of 
validity and reliability through triangulation of secondary source material and the transcripts 
of semi-structured in-depth interviews to elicit high-quality data.  
 
Participants interview preparation 
 
In respect of the interview data, each interviewee who represented a superannuation fund 
answered research questions according to their position within the fund, their experience 
within the industry, their insight into the experience, as well as their skills mix and education. 
This could be biased.  Therefore, in order to obtain diverse perspectives from the participants, 
it was important to conduct interviews with employees at different levels within the 
superannuation fund.  Twenty funds agreed to participate in this research and 63 interviews in 
total were conducted.  Table 10 below records the title of each interviewee and their 
representative ASF.  Where multiple interviews were conducted within one fund, the material 
was analysed for an overall opinion of the fund’s performance. 
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Table 10: Interview Schedule20 
Interview 
Number  Fund  Title of Role  Date 
Type of 
Fund 
1. 
  Fund 2  Manager of Strategic Marketing 
21 August 2008 
10.00am – 11.00am  Industry 
2.  Fund 2  Manager – Compliance and Risk  26 August 2008 10.00 – 10.45am  Industry 
3.  Fund 2  Senior – Human Resources Consultant  26 August 2008 12.00 to 12.45pm  Industry 
4.  Fund 2  Manager – Administration and Insurance 
26 August 2008 
11.00am – 11.45am  Industry 
5.  Fund 2  Manager – Investments  26 August 2008 1 hour interview  Industry 
6.  Fund 2  Director – Operations  27 August 2008 12.00 – 1.00pm  Industry 
7.  Fund 2  Director – Marketing  28 August 2008 11.30 – 12.15  Industry 
8.  Fund 2  CEO  21 August 2008 11.45am – 12.30pm  Industry 
9.  Fund 2  CEO  4 September 11.45 – 12.45pm  Industry 
10.  Fund 15  CIO 
30 August 2008  
10.00am ‐ 11.00am 
(via phone) 
Corp 
11.  Fund 10  CEO  15 October 2008  1.5 hours  Industry 
12.  Fund 10  CFO  15 October 2008 1.5 hours  Industry 
13.  Fund 10  CEO  15 October 2008 1.5 hours  Industry 
14.  Fund 14  CEO  22 October 2008 1 hour  Govt 
15.  Fund 14  Client Services Manager  22 October 2008 10.00am – 11.00am  Govt 
16.  Fund 11  CEO  23 October 2008 1.5 hours  Industry 
17.  Fund 11  CEO  6 Nov 2008 12 1.00pm  Industry 
18.  Fund 13  CEO  23 October 2008 1hour  Industry 
19.  Fund 13  CEO  6 November 2008 1hour  Industry 
20.  Fund 12  CEO  23 Oct 2008 1.5 hours  Industry 
21.  Fund 12  CEO  6 November 2008 1hour  Industry 
22.  Fund 1   Trustee 
9 December 2008 
9.30am – 10.30am  Industry 
                                                      
20 RACV Superannuation Fund replied that were unable to participate – as the fund was in the process of being 
outsourced.  AustSafe Super replied advising they would not participate. Westpac Staff Super advised they 
would not be participating with this research.  Cadbury Schweppes replied advising that they would not 
participate as their superannuation fund has now merged with Mercer. Catholic Superannuation & Retirement 
Fund advised that the CEO was away on sabbatical leave, so unable to participate in this research at this stage. 
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Interview 
Number  Fund  Title of Role  Date 
Type of 
Fund 
23.  Fund 1  Manager‐ Client Services  10 December 2008 1 hour (via phone)  Industry 
24.  Fund 9   Marketing Manager  9 December 2008 10.45am – 11.30  Industry 
25.  Fund 9  Manager – Compliance  9 December 2008  Industry 
26.  Fund 9  Director – Marketing  9 Dec 2008 11.30 – 12.45pm  Industry 
27.  Fund 9  CEO  9 December 2008 4.00pm – 5.30pm  Industry 
28.  Fund 5   Trustee  9 December 2008 1hour 
Public 
Offer 
29.  Fund 7  Trustee  9 December 2008 1 hour  Industry 
30.  Fund 20  CIO  28 October 2008 1.15pm – 2.30pm  Industry 
31.  Fund 17  CEO  1 hour  Public Offer 
32.  Fund 19  CIO  1.15 hour  Industry 
33.  Fund 8  CEO  September 2008 2 hours  Industry 
34.  Fund 8  CEO  October 2008 1.5 hour  Industry 
35.  Fund 7  Chair  27 November 2008 11.00am – Noon  Industry 
36.  Fund 16  Chair  27 November 2008 12.30 – 2pm  Industry 
37.  Fund 4  CEO  23 October 2008 1.5 hour  Industry 
38.  Fund 4  CEO  1.0 hour (follow up interview)  Industry 
39.  Fund 4  CEO  2 hours (follow up interview)  Industry 
40. 
Asset Allocation 
Consultant 
(Business A) 
Head of Investment Consulting 
10 December 2008 
10.00am – 11.00am  Expert 
41. 
Asset Allocation 
Consultant 
(Business B) 
Director 
1 hour 
June 2009 
(Hobart) 
Expert 
42. 
Asset Allocation 
Consultant 
(Business A) 
Investment Advisor 
1 hour (via phone) 
December 2008  Expert 
43.  Brokers  Head – Property Derivatives  
1 Hour 
December 2008 – 1 hr 
via phone (NSW) 
Expert 
44.  Superannuation research company   Director – research 
December 2008 – 1 hr   
45.  Fund 18  CEO  January 2009 1.8 hours  Industry 
46.  Fund 18  CEO  18 September 2008 1.5 hours  Industry 
47.  Fund 18  Investment Manager 
via phone (NSW) 
September 2008 
1.5 hours 
Industry 
48.  Fund 18  COO 
via phone 
(NSW) September 2008 
1 hour 
Industry 
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Interview 
Number  Fund  Title of Role  Date 
Type of 
Fund 
         
49.  Fund 18  Company Secretary  via phone (NSW) 1 hour September 2008  Industry 
50.  Fund 18  Chair  via phone (NSW) 1.2 hours September 2008  Industry 
51. 
Funds 
Management 
Entity 
CIO 
April 2008 
via phone 1.5 hours  Industry 
52.  Fund 6  Trustee  June 2009 1 hour  Industry 
53.   Fund 4  CEO  June 2009 1 hour  Industry 
54.  Large Accounting Firm  Actuary 
June 2009 
1.5 hours   
55.  Fund 3  Trustee  July 2009 1 hour  Govt 
56  Fund 3  Trustee  July 2009 1 hour  Govt 
57.  Fund 3  Chair  August 2009 1 hour  Govt 
58.  Fund 3  Chair 
August 2009  
1 hour (follow up 
interview) 
Govt 
59.  Accountancy Firm – Melbourne  Snr. Accountant 
August 2008 
1 hour   
60. 
Asset Allocation 
Firm (From 
Business A) 
Asset Allocation Consultant 
July 2009 
1.2 hours   
61.  Consulting Business  Actuary 
March 2008 1 hour   
62.  Business Entity  Chair  April 2008 1 hour   
62.  AIST  CEO  September 2008 45 minutes   
63.  AIST  Manager  September 2008 – 1 hour   
 
A Case Study Research Approach 
 
The single study of the ASI was researched over a period of 12 months and the process is set 
out below. 
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Combining the Research Purpose with the Research Question 
 
The research question was considered within the descriptive, exploratory and explanatory 
purposes of the study.  Subsequently, a suitable method of data collection and examination 
was constructed.  This provided the researcher with a process upon which the dates were 
gathered and later analysed. 
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
Case studies comprise a single unit of analysis based upon depth that is both holistic and 
exhaustive (Ball, 1996).  Within the single unit of analysis, namely the ASI, it is important to 
analyse multiple units, as with the 20 superannuation funds in this case study.  Yin (1994: 41) 
terms the use of multiple units of analysis in a single case study as an “embedded case study 
design”.  Yin (1994: 44), further notes that the multilevel units of analysis: “… incorporate 
subunits of analyses, so that a more complex – or embedded – design is developed.  The 
subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights 
into the single case.”  
 
Data Collection 
 
Primary data is that which originates from a researcher’s specific inquiry into a research 
problem.  This study incorporates both primary and secondary documentation where 
appropriate, with validation mechanisms to control their validity and reliability. 
 
Due to the weakness and strengths inherent in any single research method, Babbie (2001) 
recommends that multiple methods of inquiry be incorporated into case study research in 
order to overcome analytical and validity problems associated with single research methods. 
Babbie (2001), Hakim (1987) and Yin (2005) recommend the use of several different sources 
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of data and the incorporation of different research methods to capture data, otherwise known 
as ‘triangulation,’ as a valuable research strategy and this was incorporated into this research.   
 
Case Analysis 
 
The aim of the case study analysis is to summarise observations in such a manner that they 
yield answers to research questions (Yin, 2005). As recommended by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), data from the research was continually analysed throughout the data gathering 
process.  With continuous analysis of the interview data any confusion, contradictions, 
missing data could be followed up immediately.  The process for the case analysis is set out 
below. 
 
Transcribing the Data 
 
The contemporaneous transcription of the interviews enables the researcher to account for the 
exchange.   The interview transcripts serve four major functions.  Firstly, it recaptures the 
essence of the exchange and allows the researcher to reflect on the meaning of what 
participants answered during the course of the interview.  Secondly, it encourages the 
researcher to reflect on the relationship between what had been noted and the objective of the 
study.  Thirdly, it assists with determining what material was relevant and what themes are 
worth coding.  The final function is that it enables preliminary coding decisions to be made. 
 
Data categorisation and Coding 
 
The most exacting part of the research method is the approach used to code and analyse the 
interview transcripts, which requires procedures and processes for handling, organising and 
analysis.  
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Data categorisation allows for the organisation of various dimensions of the data, collected by 
grouping together attributes that relate to the concepts being examined.  By arranging 
categories exclusive, exhaustive and based in a single classification (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
data was clustered together to facilitate an interpretive process. 
 
Data coding refers to the appointment of titles to salient elements in the data in order to assign 
them to an appropriate category (Schwandt, 1997).  Fleet and Cambourne (1989) recognised 
that data coding and labelling must fulfil three major criteria.  Firstly, it must be consistent 
across the entire data collection.  Secondly, it must precisely indicate what information is 
constituted by each code.  The final criteria involve the alignment with the locus of enquiry. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend that data codes should be assigned throughout the 
entire data gathering process. By doing this, it allows for the discovery of any other issues 
that may require further investigation, any refocussing of research questions (if appropriate), 
the generation of additional codes (if deemed necessary), and refining of existing codes. The 
complete coding system is provided later in this chapter. 
 
Given the qualitative nature of the research, the data was analysed in the context of relevance 
to the two main research questions.  This was undertaken by using the principles outlined by 
Becker and Geer (1982:245) that the coding should be: 
 
i. Inclusive. For instance, any incident should be coded under a category, if there is 
initially any reason to believe that it might be considered relevant.  An incident which 
is considered irrelevant can simply be eliminated; 
ii. By incidents: either complete verbal expressions or  complete acts by an individual; 
iii. ‘Full’. That is, the incident being coded should be summarised in all its relevant 
detail: the idea expressed, the actions taken, the people present, the date and the 
setting. 
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Data Interpretation 
 
The researcher has an obligation to disclose the manner in which the data will be interpreted 
to the reader (Bachor, 2002).  There are nine tactics for data interpretation according to Miles 
and Hubermann (1994). These tactics include: noting patterns and themes; seeking 
plausibility; clustering; subsuming particulars into the general; factor analysis; noting 
relationships between variables; finding interview variables; building a logical chain of 
evidence and making conceptual or theoretical coherence. 
 
Verification of conclusions 
 
The process of verifying the conclusions of this research arise out of the concerns in relation 
to reliability and validity. Miles and Huberman (1994) provide a number of tactics for 
verifying the outcomes of qualitative research which are used by this study and are outlined in 
Appendix 9.  The tactics were applied throughout the interpretation process, in accordance 
with views by Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest (1996: 66) that researchers should: 
“…begin with tactics that are aimed at assuring the basic quality of the data, then move to 
those that check findings by various contrasts, then conclude with tactics that take a sceptical, 
demanding approach to emerging explanations.” 
 
Method of data analysis 
 
The interpretation of the data was based on NVivo principles. The method used for 
interrogating the data involved first the coding process as described by Strauss (1987) and 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000). The essential tasks associated with coding are sampling, 
identifying themes, building codebooks, marking texts and constructing models.  This is 
based on a methodology where codes or subheadings are formed to link raw data, for 
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example, phrase, quotes or sentences from the interviews (as in this case study) and 
documentary evidence to key concepts and themes based around interview questions on 
corporate governance and innovation in Appendix 5. 
 
As mentioned earlier, evidence was gathered from a series of sources including: interviews, 
company documents and SIS legislation.   Data was under the following categories (which are 
categorised as Tree Nodes in NVivo software): 
i. New product development 
ii. Success of new product development 
iii. Formal processes to bring new product development to market 
iv. Market intelligence 
v. Culture inhibiting innovation 
vi. Culture promoting innovation 
vii. Boards role in NPD or innovation 
viii. Entity’s Product development focus 
ix. Growth rate of new members 
x. Growth rate of new employers to the fund 
xi. Growth of market share 
xii. Industry benchmark 
xiii. Competitive analysis 
xiv. Government impact on Innovation 
xv. Regulatory frameworks of SIS 
 
Other themes that emerged from the data analysis: 
i. Market influences 
ii. Culture 
iii. Insurance offerings 
iv. Legislation 
v. Committees 
vi. Trustees experience and qualification  
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vii. Leadership 
viii. Collaboration between funds 
ix. Innovation process 
x. Innovation strategy 
 
Coding was useful for subsequent analysis as it allowed for the facilitation and interrogation 
of large quantities of data captured in interview transcripts and fund documentation.  This was 
particularly useful as data relating to different themes did not follow a prescriptive order for 
interview questions.  Coding was useful with the identification of relevant themes.  All of the 
data was subsequently arranged in the coded structure described above. 
 
The next phase was to represent the data according to the theoretical construct that was 
developed. This involved outlining a framework around the fund in a systemic context, 
finding out the type and extent of innovation activities in the ASI and the impact on the 
corporate governance framework.  The next and most essential step involved exploring the 
promotion or hindrance of innovation within the context of an ASF.  All data collected was 
analysed in normal qualitative ways, through coding in coherent theoretical categories. 
Reliability and validity issues were also taken into consideration during the whole process of 
data analysis. 
 
Stage One Coding 
 
The initial categories were based upon the subordinate units of analysis, in particular, the 
characteristics of the case study that the researcher sought to understand. Namely:  
 Is there innovation in the ASI, and if so how does innovation manifest in this 
industry?, and: 
 What role do boards and CEOs play in the innovation process in this industry? 
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Based on NVivo software principles these would appear with computer software as Node 
One: Corporate Governance and Node Two: Innovation.  The interview transcripts were then 
scrutinised for significant terms and issues located therein according to units of observations, 
and coded according to the above mentioned two broad categories. 
 
Stage Two Coding 
 
Other categories were created to categorise the results of the analysis of the two main 
categories.  These further categories, refer to the themes above, were determined by the units 
of analysis.  The bulk of the data investigated was based on explicit use of coding principles.  
The manner in which this material was used to develop the outcomes of the study is presented 
in the next section. 
 
Developing Research Outcomes 
 
Consistent with the earlier stated research purposes, the analysis led to descriptive, expiatory 
and explanatory outcomes that are outlined below. 
 
The Descriptive Outcome 
 
The role of description in qualitative inquiry extends beyond mere description of the case 
study.  Rather, it involves the presentation of the issues and themes that are central to the 
analysis either the illustration of a particular theme, or a method of demonstrating a 
combination of issues (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  Considering that this research involved the 
input of 63 participants whose experience of the phenomena stretches over 25 years, the 
issues and themes in this research were contextually bound, and therefore, their purpose and 
meaning could not be captured without first understanding their origins.  The complexity of 
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the industry could only be understood by producing ‘thick descriptions’ of the contextual 
elements, an approach suggested by Guba and Lincoln (1981). 
 
The Exploratory Outcome 
 
The unique feature of inductive inquiry is that the theoretical concepts emerge from the case 
study rather than being imposed upon it (Denzin & Linclon, 1994).  Inductive research is 
related to symbolic interaction (Chentiz & Swanson, 1986), a theoretical model in which 
inquiry focuses on the ways individuals communicate and interpret meaning and produces 
valuable research outcomes that are ‘less sterile’ than hypothesis testing.  The generation of 
theory from a single case study data for this research used four procedures: category 
development; linking categories; examining emerging links; and connecting with existing 
theory.  Each category is briefly outlined below.  Category development was developed 
through the coding process and data was assigned to emerging categories to build a hierarchy 
of ‘units of analyses.’   Field and Morse (1985: 111) suggest that “identified categories are 
accumulated until it becomes clear to the researcher those properties and characteristics of the 
elements which fit into that particular category.  The researcher can then identify the criteria 
for further instances that would fit the specific category.  A category is saturated when no 
new information on the characteristics of the category are forthcoming (1985:11)21. 
Once a category was considered ‘saturated’, a definition based on its inherent properties was 
formulated so as to demonstrate further data collection and encourage theoretical reflection.  
In some instances, categories were refined.  The links between the various categories were 
                                                      
21 A minimum of 100 hours was spent conducting 63 lengthy and in-depth semi structured interviews with 
interviewees by this researcher.  All interviewees were asked the same questions in the first phase of the 
interviewing process.  The researcher reached a point in the interview process where I questioned how many 
more funds the researcher would now need to interview as I felt that the research had reached a saturation point. 
Subsequently, the researcher conducted ten additional interviews, which did not add any new data, and 
interviewees repeated similar answers.  It was clear that the data collection had reached a saturation point.   
Guidance was sought from my co-supervisor on when to cease the interviewing process as it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that no new information on the research topic area was being collected.   Yet other ASFs 
were willing to participate.  Accordingly, no other ASFs were added to the interviewing schedule as it was 
considered the data collection had reached theoretical saturation21. 
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then identified. In order to test the emerging links between innovation and corporate 
governance, individual perspectives were investigated: 
 
A step in shaping hypotheses is verifying that the emergent relationships 
between constructs fit with the evidence in each case.  Sometimes a relationship 
is confirmed by the case evidence, while at other times it is revised, 
disconfirmed, or thrown out for insufficient evidence. This verification process 
is similar to that in traditional hypothesis research. (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542) 
 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach is not dissimilar to Yin’s (2005) tactic of pattern matching.  
Hartwig and Dearing (1979:9) highlight that procedure by recognising that the “underlying 
assumption of the exploratory approach is that the more one knows about the data, the more 
effectively data can be used to develop, test, and refine theory”. 
 
The Explanatory Outcome 
 
Qualitative inquiry explanation is based around the researcher’s observation from case 
description (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Due to the complexity of the interrelationships 
involved here, the explanatory approach process relies on organising and incorporating ideas 
in relation to how the phenomena are interrelated (Polit & Hungler, 1993).  While the process 
of explanation building from a case study approach is not well documented, Yin (2005) notes 
that the final explanation of the data results from a series of iterations and recommends the 
follow procedures are adopted: 
 Make an initial theoretical statement or an initial proposition. 
 Compare the findings of an initial case against such a statement or proposition. 
 Revise the statement or proposition. 
 Compare the revision to the facts;, and: 
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 Repeat the process as many times as required. 
 
While Yin’s (2005) process referred to multiple case studies, the basic principles were 
applied to this research. 
 
Ethical issues relating to case study research 
 
An important issue of this research is to protect the anonymity of the interviewees who 
participated.  Details of the doctoral thesis in relation to the specific issues of anonymity and 
informed consent are filed with the University Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Tasmania.  Ethical clearance for the conduct of this research was obtained from 
the Ethics Committee prior to the commencement of data collection. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter described the methodological issues in relation to this research. Grounded in the 
need for qualitative approach to the broad research question, a single case study method was 
used to provide a discussion on the descriptive, exploratory and explanatory purpose of this 
research. Information was gathered using in-depth semi-structured interviews and documents.  
Verification was essential to the research, and was adopted at every stage of the research.  
The process elements were particularly influenced by Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and Yin (2005).  The categorisation, coding and analysis of the data were 
based on principles outlined throughout this chapter.  
 
The next chapter will present the results from this research, and are discussed as set out with 
the ‘organisation of the thesis’ presented in Introduction. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
Background 
 
As indicated in the Methods Chapter, this research has relied upon in-depth interviews with 
superannuation fund trustees, senior management, middle management, chairmen of 
superannuation funds, chief executive officers, chief financial officers, chief information 
officers, asset allocation consultants, accountants, actuaries, consultants, industry experts and 
other personnel employed by or consult to the sample of 20 superannuation funds in 
Australia. The combination of inside information, experience and the insight in relation to the 
superannuation industry from experts has assisted enormously to better understand the type 
and extent of innovation occurring within an ASF and the ASI and overall the governance 
frameworks operating within the industry.  
  
The sample (n= 20) of ASFs included two corporate funds, three public offer funds, two 
public sector funds and 14 industry funds.  Twenty five per cent of the participants were 
unable to cite any examples of innovation within their ASF. Table 11 details the type and size 
of the funds examined. 
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Table 11:  Classification of the superannuation funds participating in this research 
Fund 
Identifier  Fund Type 
Funds Under 
Management 
$AUD 
No. of Members 
1  Industry  > $20 Billion  >700, 000 
2  Industry  > $20 Billion  >700, 000 
3  Government  > $3 Billion  <100, 000 
4  Industry  < $1 Billion  <100, 000 
5  Public Offer  >$10 Billion  >200, 000 
6  Industry  > $ 3 Billion  > 200,000 
7  Industry  >$20 Billion  <500,000 
8  Industry  >$30 Billion  >700,000 
9  Corporate  >$10 Billion  >100,000 
10  Industry  >$10 Billion  <500,000 
11  Industry  >$10 Billion  <500,000 
12  Industry  >$10 Billion  <500,000 
13  Industry  <$3 Billion  <100,000 
14  Government  >$10 Billion  >200, 000 
15  Corporate  >$1 Billion  <100,000 
16  Industry  <$1 Billion  <100,000 
17  Public Offer  >$ 30 Billion  >700,000 
18  Industry  <$1 Billion  <100,000 
19  Industry  >$10 Billion  >700,000 
20  Industry  <$ 3 Billion  >100, 000 
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The research commenced at the beginning of a Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that posed 
significant threats to the global superannuation industry. Meeting these challenges imposed 
by the GFC was perceived by participants as weighing heavily on the board and governance 
of their superannuation fund.  Participants reported that their fund experienced heavy losses 
at this time.  Interviewees reported that this pattern of major losses to funds had a rippling 
effect throughout the industry globally.  
 
Research Question 1: Is there innovation in ASI? And if so, how 
does innovation manifest in this industry? 
Sub-question 1: To what extent are Australian superannuation funds 
innovative? 
 
The data set provides responses to the extent of innovation within the sample group of 
superannuation funds.  With reference to Appendix 2 and the data set (see Appendix 10), the 
findings reveal that innovation as measured by new product development focus (NPD) and 
the existence of innovation occurs within the ASI despite the heavy regulation of the 
industry.  How this innovation occurs is explored later in this chapter, with reference to 
factors such as government regulations, leadership and any board influence. 
 
The process of innovation in these funds was fostered and developed in different ways.  
Through the interviews it was discovered that the capacity to generate innovative ideas was 
facilitated through several main channels. These include: CEO’s leadership22; the Executive 
Management Team (EMT)23; committees (such as a marketing committee); and individual 
trustees. 
                                                      
22 Several CEOs interviewed were very influential in the promotion of innovation within their fund culture 
(either on an operational basis or at a strategic level). 
23 Innovation could be driven by an executive management team (EMT) or individual members of that EMT 
(normally senior managers) and supported by the CEO. 
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In terms of the process to get ideas from the committee to the board, this included discussion 
papers submitted with board agenda papers or a formal presentation to the board by the 
marketing committee.  Funds 2 and 8 reported this was common-practice within their ASF to 
report on marketing activities that may include NPD.   
 
In relation to whether trustees drove innovation at board meetings, interviewees from 11 
ASFs highlighted that their board actively debated NPD issues (via discussion papers or 
presentations) but seldom did an individual trustee drive innovation ideas. Interviewees 
representing 17 funds (85 per cent) reported that trustees did not drive innovation at board 
level.  
 
Despite a heavily regulated corporate governance framework existing within the ASI, 
innovation occurs and interviews revealed that leadership is crucial to the fostering of any 
culture of innovation within any fund. With reference to the answers provided by the 
respondents, the strength of leadership of the CEO is a key variable in the dynamic with an 
organisation’s capacity to innovate.  
 
To measure whether new product development occurred, questions in relation to NPD were 
asked.  The definition in relation to product innovation and new product development was 
used as a guide and is outlined in Chapter Three. The results recorded that the majority [n = 
16] of ASF interviewed recognised that some level of innovation occurred within their fund.  
Eighty per cent of the sample did focus on NPD and an overall organisational focus on 
product development occurred with 75 per cent of respondents agreeing positively.  
Interestingly, 85 per cent of the sample could not measure the financial impact of the NPD 
within their ASF. 
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Sub-question 2: What types of innovation occur within the ASI? 
 
Interviewees were asked: What type of innovation occurs within the industry? 
In the context of the ASI, funds were trying to acquire and retain members to maintain or 
increase economies of scale. It would be reasonable to propose that some level of innovation 
would occur within an ASF particularly but not limited to marketing related innovations.  
 
Radical innovation and incremental innovation terms were obtained by Moller, Rajala and 
Westerlund (2008:34). “Incremental service innovation describes a value-creation strategy in 
which services are employed for the incremental addition of value.  The key idea is that 
through mutual investments and adaptions a service provider and a client can produce more 
effective solutions than existing ones.  This incremental value-added strategy … adds value 
to the existing market solutions … radical service innovation describes an approach that 
pursues value creation through novel service concepts. The developers of these service 
innovations aim to produce new technologies, offerings, or business concepts as well as their 
commercialization through advances services. Such future-orientated value production often 
involves radical system wide changes in existing value systems and poses great uncertainty in 
terms of the value potential and value capture…”. 
 
Table 12 below was compiled to highlight the different types of innovation, cited by 
participants, that has occurred within the ASI. 
Table 12: Title: The types of innovation discovered within the ASI  
Types of Innovation  Basic Characteristics  Fund Type 
Radical or 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Pension products – 
guaranteed minimum 
pension for life 
A guaranteed income for the life of a 
particular individual that will provide 
a steady income in retirement. 
Industry Radical 
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Types of Innovation 
 
Basic Characteristics 
 
Fund Type 
Radical or 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Insurance products  Death cover and total and 
permanent insurance offered by all 
funds. The introduction of other 
insurance products such as income 
protection and health insurance.  
Industry, corporate, 
government and public 
offer 
Incremental 
Life stage marketing 
segmentation model 
A well thought out strategy to 
communicate with the funds 
members, according to the life stage 
of the particular member. The 
advantages of this life stage targeted 
marketing approach includes higher 
retention rate of members, less 
operational costs for direct mail outs 
to all members and new product 
offerings. 
Industry Radical 
Merger between two large 
industry funds 
Merger small fund with a 
large industry fund 
The merger of two superannuation 
funds creates cost efficiencies and 
member value tangible benefits. 
Industry Radical 
Group life policy  Offered to members by funds. By 
purchasing coverage, the cost to 
each member is less than if that 
individual had to purchase insurance 
individually. 
Industry Incremental 
Disintermediation  Disintermediation is the removal of 
intermediaries in a supply chain or 
‘cutting out the middleman’ to 
reduce transactional costs.  Instead 
of going through the conventional 
distribution channels, which had 
some type of intermediate (brokers 
in this industry).  
Industry Radical 
Online risk and compliance 
system 
Development and implementation of 
an online risk and compliance 
system. 
Public Offer Incremental 
Ownership subsidiary 
direct investment property 
One fund had a $AUD two billion 
dollar property portfolio by investing 
in new building projects including 
office and retail developments and 
residential apartment projects. 
 
Industry Radical 
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Types of Innovation  Basic Characteristics  Fund Type 
Radical or 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Part‐owner of outsourced 
administrative services for 
ASF 
The broader Australian 
administrative industry is 
characterised by a number of 
outsourced (both small and large) 
arrangements offering a suite of 
administrative services. 
Superannuation administration is a 
critical function within this industry. 
Industry Incremental 
Interactive educational 
program for its 
membership 
e‐learning to broader member 
education and financial literacy 
levels of investment markets and 
personal planning needs. 
Industry and Public 
Offer 
Incremental 
Automated online rollover 
process 
On‐line superannuation rollover tool 
that allows members to roll over 
accounts from other superannuation 
funds into a fund simultaneously on‐
line. 
Industry and Public 
Offer 
Incremental 
Clean technology 
investment products 
Superannuation funds investing in 
young off shore start‐up companies 
such as clean technology. 
Industry Radical 
Renewable energy 
investment products 
Investment in energy resources: gas, 
wind and solar. 
Industry Radical 
Microfinance  Substantial investments in private 
debt and equity investments to 
support microfinance activities. 
Commonly referred to as ‘impact 
investments’.  
Industry Radical 
Sponsorship of a national 
sporting team (Melbourne 
Storm – Rugby) 
An industry fund chose a high profile 
sporting team to sponsor. The CEO 
considered that their ‘brand’ plays a 
very important role in the financial 
services industry. 
Industry Radical 
Carbon Friendly 
investment options 
Designed to improve corporate 
behaviour of companies through the 
engagement on climate change 
issues. 
Industry Radical 
Wind Farms 
 
Infrastructure investment in wind 
farms. Infrastructure as an asset 
class has grown in appeal to ASFs 
due to the long term nature of the 
infrastructure returns plus the 
income that is derived from the 
projects. 
 
Industry Radical 
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Types of Innovation  Basic Characteristics  Fund Type 
Radical or 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Cost sharing collaborative 
schemes for taxation, legal 
and corporate governance 
Funds gain potential benefits from 
collaborative strategies such as: 
reduction in transactional costs for 
the fund; and specialised investment 
knowledge. 
Industry Incremental 
Joint venture for 
alternative housing 
Joint venture investment with local 
property developed to develop 
affordable housing. 
 
Industry Incremental 
Mobile Apps24  Smart phone applications that allow 
funds to send and members to 
request targeted individual 
information through the phone 
wherever they are25. 
Industry Incremental 
Web calculator26 for 
retirement superannuation 
income planning 
Online interactive advice calculators. 
Assists members with working out 
how much super members will need 
when they retire.  The calculator 
allows you to test how your choices 
about fees and contributions may 
affect your retirement investment 
over the long term. 
Industry and Public 
Offer 
Incremental 
Technological27  Interactive online tools for members. Industry and Public 
Offer 
 
 
Incremental 
                                                      
24 Interviewees from Fund 17 (a public offer fund) reported that their fund had an IPhone application, and the 
mobile website application enabled its members to monitor their super via mobile devices.  This application 
allowed the membership to access daily unit and pension prices, and their super balances and was noted that 
this was a useful application particularly where members were travelling.  The CEO commented, “this is an 
exciting development – giving our members the opportunity to carry their super around with them”.   
25 The Managing Director, Mr Andrew Boal from Towers Watson in Australia noted that no longer will funds 
need to rely on members reading the information in their member statements, visiting their website or ringing 
their call centre. 
26 Fund 17’s CEO also noted that the fund introduced a website retirement calculator – the first in Australia 
developed to meet a shift in member approach to retirement.  The CEO of this fund noted, “this is the first 
interactive online calculator of its kind in Australia”.  The calculator provided answers to four different 
scenarios that factor a combination of employment income, salary sacrifice, superannuation guarantees 
contributions, income tax, tax on super and their impact on annual take home pay and increases/decrease to 
super balances. 
27 Technology remains a key differentiator for all players within this industry, with the landscape changing 
rapidly.  The industry faces an opportunity to get their foundations correct and to create a new era of 
technological‐driven, member‐focused solutions in Australia’s world‐leading retirement savings sector. 
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Types of Innovation  Basic Characteristics  Fund Type 
Radical or 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Financial Planning  Members and their families can 
access Affordable financial planning 
on most financial matters including; 
pre‐retirement planning; transition 
to retirement; taxation strategies; 
wealth creation; establishing 
appropriate insurance cover; estate 
planning. 
Industry, Government, 
Public Offer and 
Corporate 
Incremental 
Health insurance products  Underwritten by a third party 
insurer. Superannuation funds offer 
their members discounted rates on 
health insurance cover. This allows 
fund members to access health cover 
with no waiting periods for some 
types of health benefits and extras. 
Industry, Government, 
Public Offer and 
Corporate 
Incremental 
Solar Power Project in 
Spain 
International investment in an off‐ 
shore solar power project. 
Government offered guaranteed 
tariffs to investors. 
Industry Radical 
Pension products – 
guaranteed protection 
against negative returns 
A guaranteed income for an 
individual that will provide a steady 
income in retirement and a 
protection against negative returns 
in any asset class of the plan. 
Industry Radical 
‘help a mate’ program  
social innovation 
A valuable programme introduced 
into the building and construction 
industry to improve the health and 
wellbeing of the funds membership, 
which aims to decrease the suicide 
rate. The benefit to the fund is to 
save lives, have more members and 
reduce insurance claims. 
Industry  Radical 
 
Table 12 highlights that most innovation occurs within industry funds. For the purposes of 
discussion of this research, types of innovations are categorised as: investment innovations, 
product innovation, marketing innovations and collaborative innovations.  During this 
section, there will be a more detailed examination on each of the different types of innovation 
within this industry. 
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Investment Innovation 
  
The different types of investment innovations reported by participants which focussed 
primarily on green and sustainable investment options included: 
a. Significant investment into wind farms  (Fund 19). 
b. Carbon friendly investment options (Fund 19). 
c. Clean tech investments (Fund 14). 
d. Renewable energy investments. 
e. Solar power (Fund 19). 
 
In relation to the introduction of green investment options, this has been categorised as 
radical innovation within the context of ASI.  As an investment choice, interviewees from 
two different ASFs reported that this member choice option actually came at a significant 
financial cost to their members.  This was mainly due to this product being in the embryonic 
stage of the developmental cycle, which involves considerably higher costs. With this 
investment option the Return on Investment (ROI) is lower than on other investment choices 
offered by the fund.  When exploring why the board would introduce a costly option for 
members, such as a sustainable investment options (albeit innovative), it was reported by 
interviewees that there was a market demand for sustainable options.  Ironically, it was 
highlighted that the take up of these new options rate was marginal. 
 
With the introduction of different asset classes, such as green or sustainable investments 
options, direct investment into property, or infrastructure asset classes by superannuation 
funds - have all enabled different product portfolios to be developed and offered to its 
membership.    
 
Fund 19’s CEO considered that: “In relation to investment choices, I felt pressured into 
putting funds under management into property and not innovation as a reaction to the 
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market.”  However CEO of Fund 16 recognised that: “Large public offer funds have to be 
innovative otherwise members can join other funds.” 
 
This research so far considers that the above examples demonstrate that innovation is 
occurring within the ASI. New product development will be discussed further in this chapter. 
 
Types of innovations provided by the interviewees were also focused around marketing 
innovations within the ASI.  Two excellent examples included branding and life stage 
marketing segmentation. 
 
Product Innovation 
 
“Our fund has been product focused because of the interpretation of members’ choice…” 
(Manager, Fund 2). 
 
New products introduced into the market included: 
 
 Pension products – aged based default products (Fund 17). 
 Protected pension (Fund 2). 
 Micro finance (financial services, like banks offering small loans to locals in 
developing countries to support their business ideas) (Fund 14). 
 Tax – taking up share buy backs (Fund 19). 
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To determine the occurrence of product innovation within an ASF, a series of questions on 
the topic of NPD were asked of each interviewee to try and gauge a sense of the overall NPD 
focus within the ASF (refer to Appendix 5).  
 
Marketing innovations 
 
“Innovation is valued … and encouraged during the induction process for all staff members 
of this fund” (CEO, Fund 18) 
 
As a general rule, when looking at the needs of working class people you 
don’t need innovative solutions to investment choices, all you need are “set 
and forget” simple solutions… yet in a number of the industry funds they 
are starting to develop complex products as they are looking at competing 
with retail funds… and industry funds have the belief that more complex 
products will help them compete.  
(Marketing Manager of Fund 2) 
 
a) Branding 
 
Sponsorship of a high profile sporting team 
 
The CIO of one large industry fund reported that this ASF was the first ASF to sponsor a high 
profile sporting team within the ASI. The CIO noted this was an isolated occurrence of a 
branding innovation within the ASI28.  The CIO also noted how the APRA regulations of the 
‘sole purpose’ test and the corporate governance framework had not had a negative impact on 
                                                      
28 Subsequently, other ASFs brand through various mediums including: radio and TV advertising campaigns. A 
yacht mast in the Sydney to Hobart International Yacht race.  
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their fund’s strategic decision to be innovative within the marketing arena. The CIO 
confirmed that it was a straightforward process to gain APRA approval to sponsor a high 
profile sporting team in relation to the ‘sole purpose’ test outlined in this thesis Introduction.  
It was reported by other participants representing ASFs29 that in light of the “sole purpose’ 
test imposed by regulation on their fund that it is extremely difficult to innovate for 
marketing and gain approval by APRA.  It is noted that there is a differing of opinion among 
the interviewees on this point. 
 
The CEO was reported in The Australian newspaper as saying there is a strong nexus 
between sports marketing and sponsorship and what his company does as a superannuation 
fund.  For instance the CEO said: “When the Storm are playing, their games are beamed into 
pubs and clubs where our members are actually working. Given the youth demographics of 
our members, the average age is 29, our members are probably out enjoying themselves 
…and watching the teams …we’re sponsoring. Sponsoring sporting teams makes perfect 
sense and gives us greater bang for our dollars” (Fund19). 
 
b) Targeted marketing through a Life stage model 
 
Two industry funds (Funds 2 and 19), representing ten per cent of the sample size, provided 
examples of any marketing innovations occurring within their fund that could be categorised 
as radical innovations by Chesborough (2003). 
 
Fund 2 is highly innovative demonstrated by developing and implementation of a targeted 
marketing strategy for each market segment through a life stage segmentation model which 
targeted to that life stage demographic instead of an overall marketing strategy for all its fund 
members (n = > 700, 000 members).  Fund 2 appeared to be the only fund that allocated 
significant resources to delivering an innovative approach to marketing to its membership by 
this type of marketing segmentation.  The advantages of this life stage targeted marketing 
                                                      
29 Funds 5, 14 and 15. 
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model approach includes higher retention rate of members, less operational costs for direct 
mail outs30 to all members and new product offerings. 
 
Fund 2 had transitioned from one generic annual report to its entire membership, which is 
standard practice within the ASI, to providing three different annual reports tailored to 
different market segments of its membership.  In summary, Fund 2 was innovative by directly 
marketing to its members by lifecycle stages model, which the fund developed through 
detailed research of its membership.  In addition, this fund had adopted marketing plans to 
address the different age demographics within their fund.  Interviewees suggested that it 
addressed members needs better by their direct targeting of its members. 31 
 
Fund 232 has had a membership growth of 6.5 per cent, faster than the industry median over 
the past decade. Fund 2 has developed marketing initiatives focusing on protecting and 
increasing the value of existing members, maximum acquisition within core segments and 
selective acquisition of non-core members within this industry.  One of Fund 2’s marketing 
initiatives was innovative by the fund’s approach to direct marketing to its membership by 
life stages segments developed through the fund’s qualitative and quantities research to build 
the life-stage segmentation model.  The main purpose of the segmentation model is to 
provide members information that is required by law to be communicated to the membership. 
Various targeted communications for the membership were planned for the next five year 
period.  
 
For each life stage, marketing issues that need to be addressed by each individual ASF are as 
follows: 
i. What products are required to meet member’s needs? 
ii. What services are required to meet members’ needs? 
                                                      
30 Direct mail out costs were over $ AUD1M  
31 This is very similar approach to that adopted by Capital One in the USA.  
32 Fund 2 is ranked within the top 15 per cent of all superannuation funds (Super Ratings) and has 
outperformed the industry on most measures.  
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iii. How can we optimise our channels to meet member’s needs? 
iv. How can we best communicate with our members? 
 
Rather than expensive direct mail outs to all members (n = > 300,000 active members plus n 
= > 200,000 inactive members) bi-yearly, Fund 2 strategically allocated significant resources 
to develop a sophisticated marketing segmentation model for its membership by direct 
targeting of different segments.  The segments developed by Fund 2, are based on two 
variables: Life Stage of the member and Employment type.  Life Stage had been identified as 
the most significant driver of member/employee behaviour, with employment type being a 
secondary driver of behaviour.  Segment attractiveness is judged according to the following 
criteria:  
i. Total segment size. 
ii. The fund’s current share of the segment. 
iii. Strategic fit with organisational capability.  
iv. The fund’s ability to achieve differential advantage.   
 
The fund adopted seven life stage segments33 and had adopted marketing plans to address the 
different life stage demographics within its membership.  The second stage involved using 
the life stage model from the research findings and applying it to the fund’s member database 
in order to generate predictions or estimates of the outcome.  Stage three was to determine the 
size of each segment by assigning current members to groups based on characteristics, needs 
and segment profiles.   
 
The Marketing Manager and Marketing Director reported that this initiative addressed 
members needs better through the direct marketing to its members.34  In summary, this fund 
had developed and implemented a targeted strategy for each life stage market segment in its 
membership, instead of one generic marketing strategy for all members.  Through this 
                                                      
33 Due to confidentiality, the seven categories will not be named. 
34 This is very similar approach to that adopted by Capital One in the USA.    
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initiative the fund had gained valuable data in relation to its overall membership. Three main 
segments made up eighty-six (86 per cent) of the fund’s member population.  
 
Classification One had 24 per cent (24%, n = > 120,000, Total FUM$ $500,000,000) of the 
fund’s membership and members in this classification have been there on average for three to 
four years.  Classification Two had 46 per cent (46%, n = >230,000, Total FUM$ 
$4,750,050,900) of the funds membership.  Classification Three had eight per cent (8%, n > 
40,000) of the fund’s membership.  Classification Four had 16 per cent (16%, n = > 80,000, 
total FUM$ $3, 750, 156,100) of the fund’s membership and members in this classification 
have been there the longest with an average of 12 years.  Classification Seven had six per 
cent of the fund’s membership and members in this classification have been there on average 
for four years to five years (Total FUM$ $905Million).  Classification Five and Six had only 
one per cent each of the total fund’s membership (FUM $ 130,000,400 and $ 182,400,860).  
The fund was aware that apart from classification six, the average account balance of active 
members is marginally higher than the account balance of inactive members for all the 
remaining life-stage segments.  Fund 2’s confidential strategic plan35 reported that there 
would be a number of significant changes with emphasis on the development and 
implementation of rigorous new product and service improvement programs.   The life stage 
segmentation model recognised that there were certain segments that their offerings were 
more suited to, and members within each of the target segments have different product and 
service needs as well as different channel and communication preferences, see Diagram 14 
below.   Surprisingly, given the amount of $FUM within the ASI it was surprising that the 
data suggested that Fund 2 was the only superannuation fund where there was an allocation 
of significant resources to delivering an innovative approach to marketing to its members 
within the superannuation industry.   
 
                                                      
35 Not for distribution outside the Fund 2’s Executive Team and Board. 
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Interviewees from 19 of the funds represented in this research acknowledged that they were 
not as commercially orientated with their marketing approach to its membership as they 
should be.   
In summary, the life-stage segmentation model has given Fund 2 a competitive advantage 
strategically over all other ASFs within the ASI.  This model was built by using both 
qualitative and quantitative research findings to group highly correlated member responses 
and preferences.  These then define a set of unique, mutually exclusive member needs that 
occur within this Fund’s industry. The Marketing Manager from Fund 2 noted: 
 
…This makes a huge difference in how you communicate with each of those 
markets …Now we target different messages and allocate resources more 
efficiently to align with members’ needs…This fund is innovative in 
segmentation of work and development of portfolio analysis. 
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Diagram 14: Product Development and Service improvement Framework by Fund 2. 
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Collaborative innovations 
 
The fourth main type of innovation identified by interviewees included different types of 
collaborative innovations: 
i. Cost sharing structures for advice, such as tax, legal, corporate governance, (Fund 18). 
ii. Part-owner in an administrative company (Fund 2) to service outsourced  superannuation; 
fund requirements, and; 
iii. Asset allocation alliances – Frontier advisors (Funds 1, 2, 8, 17). 
 
A collaborative effort – Frontier advisors 
 
In terms of industry funds working together an excellent example of collaborative innovation 
within this industry was the commencement of Frontier Advisors in 1999. This occurred via 
the establishment of an asset-consulting group, which is a highly regarded independent 
specialist asset-consulting firm within Industry Fund Services (IFS).  In 1999, the IFS Board 
resolved to branch off its investment consulting business into a new and separate company, 
Frontiers Advisors.  The company, at the time of writing this report, had four shareholders. 
 
 Fund 2’s CEO36 noted that within his fund: “Innovation has been created where resources 
have been pulled together and established.”  This CEO cited Frontier Advisors, as an example 
of collaborative innovation by the industry funds within the ASI.  This is an example of 
‘radical innovation.’  It is a highly successful business model that many other non-industry 
funds have subsequently used as a funds primary asset allocation consultant.  The CEO of 
Fund 2 noted that Frontier Advisors was their asset allocation consultant for the fund and 
provided investment advice to the board, and continuous oversight of the fund’s investments. 
The total funds under advice as of 31 March 2013 stood at $AUD144B. 
                                                      
36 This fund is one of the four shareholders of Frontier Advisors. 
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Financial Planning 
 
Interviews with participants from different Funds such as 17, 4, 2 and 19 suggested that, 
“financial planning for members had become industry practice and all industry funds were 
going to provide financial planning, if they were not already doing so”. While most 
superannuation funds at the time of this research were developing or implementing this 
service for its funds membership most participants were unaware that competing funds were 
also going to offer this service as a way of differentiating the fund in the current environment.  
 
As mentioned earlier with product innovation, to determine the occurrence of product 
innovation within an ASF, a series of questions on the topic of NPD were asked of each 
interviewee to try and gauge a sense of the overall NPD focus within the ASF (refer to 
Appendix 5).  
 
Interviewees from 16 funds, making up 80 per cent of the sample, reported that there was a 
focus on product development by their fund and interviewees from 50 per cent of these funds 
reported that there was a fairly strong focus on NPD or that NPD was considered important.  
Whereas, interviewees from two other funds, making up ten per cent of the sample group, 
reported that while there was a NPD emphasis, there was “a lot more their funds could do in 
relation to its NPD focus”.   
 
The other interviewees, representing five ASFs, reported that there was no promotion of NPD 
and was it summed up succinctly by one interviewee who said their fund “did not really have 
a product development focus.”  
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Diagram 15: Responses to the question – Does your superannuation fund have an 
emphasis on new product development? 
 
While 80 per cent of the funds said they had an emphasis on NPD, see Diagram 15 above, 
interviewees were generally unable to provide any specific details on any of the innovation 
processes or the outcome, nor time and overall costs involved.  One CEO noted: “There was 
no formal pipeline to promote NPD or any innovative idea within that culture …the process 
to date was random and ad hoc.”   
 
Surprisingly, only two funds only reported that they had any formalised innovative process 
(Funds 2 and 14).   One interviewee from Fund 2 noted: “that there was a bias towards 
innovation …notwithstanding an innovation perspective, there is not a lot of impact.” 
 
The CIO of Fund 18 noted that: 
Our fund used a star gate system for innovation and we focused our efforts in 
this process on passing through various gates…Stage one involves asking the 
question ‘does it fit with sustainable products’ … Stage two involves a risk 
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assessment process …and if there is unmitigated risk then they will not 
continue with the process…Stage three involves a ‘detailed scope’… 
 
When interviewees were questioned as to whether there was an organisational focus on 
product development, it was approximately 50 per cent.  Fund 2 interviewees reported that 
while historically it was not, it is changing with the new CEO. 
 
Fund 8 interviewees collectively noted that their CEO saw the importance for growth in 
products.  CEO and Chairman of Fund 17 also note that competition made us more actively 
aware of the importance of innovation. 
 
Trustees from Funds 1 and 5 believed that: “…the industry didn’t have an innovation focus or 
NPD focus…rather a growth focus…” (Trustee, Fund 1), and, “lack commercial thought and 
if there was NPD, more a reaction to member choice and focus” (Trustee, Fund 5). 
 
Sub-question 3:  Is innovation measured within an ASF? 
Measurement of NPD 
  
“I’m not sure where blame would lay with innovation stuff ups…” 
(CEO, Fund 11). 
 
Participants were specifically questioned on whether their ASF measured the success of new 
products introduced to market by their fund.  Data revealed that rarely did ASFs measure the 
impact or success of innovation and funds lacked any series of measurement metrics to 
measure the success of the new product or services within the ASI.    Only two industry funds 
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(Funds 2 and 18) reported the use of any overall formal measurement system.  Reasons given 
for not measuring NPD included:  
i. NPD was a relatively new process to the business for which to date, no performance 
metric had been prescribed. 
ii. No set targets for the fund in this area. 
iii. Too complex to do so. 
iv. Difficult to measure success. 
v. Prefer to use a ‘take up rate’ of the new product as a measurement37 tool instead. 
 
During the interview process it became obvious that the use of measurement ratios outlined 
by this researcher [refer Appendix 11] was not common-place within the ASI.  Only two 
ASFs were identified as using any formal measurement system for measuring the success of 
NPD for that particular fund. This is alarming given the amount of money, $AUD 1.5 Trillion 
dollars, under funds management in Australia.  The majority of respondents had no formal 
mechanism to measure the impact of NPD. This is despite the fact the sample indicated that 
75 per cent had some measurement system for innovation in general within their fund. 
 
One key commercial metric is used in measuring the NPD success rate for organisations: 
What proportion of projects entering the development stage became commercially 
successful? This was asked during the interview process.  Interviewees stressed that they did 
not measure the success rate of the NPD or service, as it was too difficult to measure. 
 
In summary, Funds 8 and 14 were the only ASFs from the sample group of 20 funds that used 
a formal gateway system to measure innovation within their fund. Interviewees representing 
80 per cent of the funds reported examples of innovation, yet there was a lack of formal 
measurement used by the marketing department or any other business units in their entity to 
                                                      
37 Seven funds relied on this sole method of measurement for measuring NPD success. 
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monitor new products. CEOs from Funds 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 said no measuring of the success of 
NPD occurred within their fund.  
 
Interviewees from Funds 1, 2, 3, 8, 14, 15, reported that they just measured the “take up rate” 
of a new product.   
 
Most interviewees noted that their fund conducted some form of market research, and the 
more commercial orientated funds were conducting regular industry analysis to benchmark 
their fund’s performance against it.  For example, a Trustee from Fund 1 said: “There was 
extensive market research done by this fund.”  Similarly, the CEO from Fund 8 said: “Yes we 
do market research all the time.”   Fund 14 interviewees said: “Market research was 
conducted on behalf of the fund by an external market research company.”    
 
An interviewee from Fund 15 said they were, “keen to know what was going on in the 
industry.” 
 
The Marketing Manager from Fund 2 said: “The fund looked at the best way to go market 
through market research; we looked at the differentiators as well in terms of competitive 
advantage…” Fund 2’s Investment Manager reported how active the fund was in terms of 
market research and said that they held “… a lot of focus groups. Series of focus groups set 
up for ‘protected pension’ to nut out product specifications… and satisfaction surveys are 
conducted annually.” 
 
In conclusion, despite the fact that the majority of interviewees reported examples of 
innovation in the ASI and some form of market research, there was a lack of formal 
measurement procedures in place and only ten per cent of the funds had formal processes and 
systems to bring to market NPD or innovative ideas. 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 160  
 
 
Diagram 16: Interviewees responses to the question – Does your superannuation fund 
measure the success of new product development (NPD)? 
 
In summary, interviewees representing 15 funds reported measuring the success of a NPD 
within their fund. Yet there was no evidence of any formal measurement by the marketing 
department or another business unit of the success or failure of a new product to market by 
these ASFs, see Diagram 16 above, reported to the board.  This suggests a very limited 
overall organisational focus toward measuring innovation. 
 
Most interviewees conducted some form of market research and the more commercially 
orientated funds reported regular industry analysis to benchmark their fund’s performance 
against any industry benchmark. Only ten per cent of the interviewees had formal processes 
and systems in place to bring to market NPD or innovative ideas.  
Further, ASFs were also asked whether there was a chain of decisions in relation to NPD 
within their ASF.   This included questions such as: 
 Whether the first decision was to establish clear objectives for the new products?  
 Whether this involved identifying the target market segment to determine their 
customers’ needs ?, or: 
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 Whether the ASF divided the process into a series of stages, which created gates that 
control movement from one stage to the next.  
 
Overall, the researcher was concerned with the general inability of the interviewees to be able 
to precisely quantify or articulate any type of formal measurement of the success of a 
product, outcomes, time-frames and overall costing’s involved for their ASF. 
 
For example, the CEO from Fund 9 confirmed that this large corporate fund had:  
…no formal pipeline to promote NPD or any innovative idea within the 
culture of their fund and the process to date was random and adhoc.  The 
culture within the ASF did not support innovation through any strategic 
leadership, vision of the board or any formal gateway system at an 
operational level.   
 
Fund 9’s CEO reported that there was no formal process for identifying innovative or NPD 
ideas held by its staff members.  The informal path taken, was that if a staff member had an 
idea for NPD or new services for this fund that “they would make an appointment to see me” 
(CEO, Fund 9) and the CFO agreed with the above statement.    
 
Further there was no measuring of the success of NPD. 
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Sub-question 4:  Are there any differences in the extent and type of innovation between 
the sectors in the ASI? 
 
The differences in the types of innovation between the sectors in the ASI are reflected in the 
Table 13.  The data revealed that the industry funds were more innovative than other sectors.  
Industry funds had a larger variety of different types of innovation ranging from incremental 
to ‘radical’ innovation with the sector.  Industry funds were the ‘first movers’ within the 
industry with different types of innovation such as: branding innovation, collaborative 
arrangements (outsourcing of administrative services and investment advice).   Public Offer 
funds also reported their innovative activities, particularly Fund 17 which was not dissimilar 
to the different types of innovation among industry funds. 
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Table 13: Differences in the types of innovation between the different sectors in the ASI. 
Differences in innovation between ASF sectors.
Industry Funds
1 2 6 7
Insurance Products Online risk and compliance  Interactive educational 
programs for its membership 
No recorded examples
Ownership subsidiary direct 
investment property Insurance products
Part owner of outsourced 
administrative services for ASF
Protected pension (Guaranteed 
minimum income for life)
8 10 11 12
First recorded merger 
of two ASFs
Automated online rollover 
process
Automated online rollover 
process
Automated online rollover 
process
Group life policy
Disintermediation  
 
13 18 19 20
Legal pension products 
superannuation
Clean technology investment 
products 
Sponsorship of a national 
sporting team (Melbourne 
Storms)
Joint venture for affordable 
housing
Renewable energy investment 
products 
Carbon friendly investment 
options
Microfinance (financial loans 
offered in third world countries)
Cost sharing schemes for 
taxation, legal and corporate 
governance 
Wind farms 
Public Sector
3 14
Financial Planning No recorded examples
Health insurance products to be 
underwritten by third party in the 
future  
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Public Offer
5 17 4
Online risk and compliance
No recorded examples Financial planning Financial planning
Aged based default pension 
products
iPhone application
Mobile website
Website calculator
Corporate
9
Financial Planning 
Health insurance products  
 
Funds are de-identified for confidentiality reasons and each fund is given a fund identifier 
number (1 – 20) that is outlined in Table 11 on page 137.  This Table displays information 
using the fund identifiers. 
 
The findings revealed that innovation occurred within three of the four sectors participating 
in this research.  Innovation was minimal or non-existent within the public sector or corporate 
funds compared with other sectors.  The extent of innovation occurring within industry funds 
is far reaching within the ASI and there are both ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ innovations 
reported within this sector. ‘Radical’ innovations were seen only within the industry sector. 
 
Public Offer funds also reported their innovative activities, particularly Fund 17 which was 
not dissimilar to the different types of innovation among industry funds. Seven interviewees 
from industry funds reported that collaborative ventures were innovative within the context of 
the ASI.  For instance, by adopting market-based service agreements to govern the delivery 
of the administration of the fund (Funds 2 and 19) through outsourced administrative 
arrangements.  These particular funds had established wholly-owned companies to deliver 
internal administration services for its fund membership and it was reported that trustees in 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 165  
 
some cases had become company directors responsible for overseeing this business 
arrangement.   
The CEO from Fund 2 believes, “innovation is created within industry funds by pooling 
resources and creating collective vehicles like Frontier.” 
 
Sub-question 5:  What factors inhibit innovation in an ASF? 
 
“Innovation is difficult in this sector...and the fiduciary duty of a trustee runs counter to 
innovation.” 
 (CEO, Fund 9) 
 
This quote sums up the general sentiment of the majority of interviewee’s perceptions of the 
broad topic of innovation within the ASI.  There were many inhibitors of innovation 
identified by participants during the interview process. These inhibitors included, inter alia, 
corporate governance, regulations, cost, cultural and structural aspects, board decision-
making processes, trustee skill sets and board composition. 
 
This Chapter will now explore each one of the inhibitors cited. 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
“Corporate Governance – decision making servant of the board” 
 (Senior Manager, Fund 2) 
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Interviewees pointed out that they perceived corporate governance as an inhibitor of 
innovation.   For example, “…one of the negative consequences of corporate governance 
were that it was an inhibitor of innovation.” (Fund 1, CEO)   
 
Interviewees from Fund 8 also reported that their fund’s lack of innovation was partly due to 
the restrictions placed on them by corporate governance and regulations within the industry.    
 
While the CIO of Fund 17 noted that corporate governance was generally an inhibitor of 
innovation within this industry, the CIO went on to say: “We (the management of the fund) 
are not fussed by regulation… We just get the approval of the Board and APRA, if necessary, 
and we are not stifled by corporate governance in any way.”   
 
Collectively 100 per cent reported that there was some type of negative impact from 
government regulation or corporate governance on innovation within their fund.   
 
Regulations 
“…it is the right environment to spawn innovation; otherwise you may be stifled by the 
regulatory environment.” 
(Fund 19, CIO) 
 
Interviewees reported that there are also legislative limits on innovation within the ASI, due 
to the ‘sole purpose’ test imposed on trustees by the SIS legislation, which was outlined in 
Chapter 1.  
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Regulations imposed by federal law in Australia on the ASI were perceived by interviewees 
of several ASFs as possibly not being, “innovative due to restrictions placed on them by 
current ASI regulations…  (CEO, Fund 8)” and that the “industry was too over regulated to 
support innovation” (Trustee, Fund 6). 
 
The perception of the majority of interviewees was summed up succinctly by one trustee 
from Fund 6, who said that there “was a significant impact on the cost base for good 
governance due to government regulations … the trustee’s general view was that the industry 
was too over regulated…” 
 
Further, the Chairperson of Fund 6 reported that their board of this smaller ASF was 
constantly overwhelmed with regulatory compliance.  The impact of the compliance regime 
was that the fund had an inability to focus on innovation due to the large amount of time and 
resources spent on the compliance with regulations.  Consequently, the chairperson reported 
that this board voted to merge their fund with AustralianSuper as being in the best interest of 
their fund’s membership. 
 
Costs 
 
Interviewees raised cost as another major factor that could inhibit innovation. Within this 
industry one of the key issues affecting the extent of innovation is the cost factors involved.  
The prospective benefits from any investment into innovation by the funds were reported as 
vague, difficult to measure and had a general resistance among employees.  
 
One Chairperson38 noted on the issue of cost, that their ASF was too small to be efficient and 
adhering to regulatory responsibilities came at such a cost to their fund that the board 
                                                      
38 Fund 15 
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resolved to merge their fund with Fund 8.  This Chairperson noted that they were unable to 
offer any innovative products or services due to the day-to-day cost of governing a small 
fund.  
 
Another view offered by the Marketing Manager of Fund 2 was: “The mandate is that 
industry funds have low costs, which automatically mean less innovation as it would cost 
money to develop innovative solutions and money to service innovative solutions…” 
 
Cultural inhibitors of NPD 
 
The question: Are there any structural or cultural inhibitors or promoters of a product 
development pipeline? posed difficulties for the participants and approximately 25 per cent of 
the interviewees had difficulty understanding the question.  Upon reflection it was probably 
in part due to the fact that the interviewees were not provided a clear definition of what 
“cultural inhibitors” were.  In the context of this research, cultural inhibitors are barriers in 
the organisation’s culture that may arise from ineffective leadership and vision and lack of 
value alignment in innovation. 
 
 Interviewees representing six ASFs stated that the cultural aspect of their fund had a neutral 
effect on whether or not innovation occurred.  Several themes that surfaced during this 
section of the interview process included; tensions at board level, CEO’s leadership, risk 
averse nature of the board, and size.   
 
Some examples were provided on each theme.  The CEO of Fund 14 was able to provide an 
excellent example of how the cultural tension between treasury and non-treasury trustee 
representation on their board made it, “extremely difficult to arrive at any constructive 
decision for the fund, let alone making any decision in relation to innovation”.  This tension 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 169  
 
between the trustees was a major cultural inhibitor of product development and innovation 
within the fund.   
 
The next theme raised was that of CEO leadership.  
 
Fund 9’s CEO stated that: “The decisions made by the board would err on the side of 
conservatism with the funds product offerings to its members.”  
 
The CEO noted that he strategically limited the fund’s investment choices on offer to its 
membership due to the overall risk averse culture of the entity. The CEO and CFO both 
reported that the overall risk averse culture of the funds acted as a ‘natural inhibitor of 
innovation (Fund 9).   The CEO also added that;  
Culture comes down to whether they see it as business or service.  Where 
you stand on that spectrum determines level of innovation… innovation 
in this industry is about member services and using your size to deliver 
service to members. 
 
The Marketing Manager from Fund 2 noted that culturally within industry funds that they, 
“are a closed shop. Recycle people, have no best practice, No MBAs…” 
 
Forty-five per cent of respondents stated that culture was an inhibitor to innovation.  
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Structural Inhibitors of NPD 
 
Structural inhibitors are organisational factors such as business unit structure and integration, 
capabilities and systems that hinder the diffusion of innovation in the organisation. 
 
Interviewees from four ASFs reported that they have a greater hurdle to implement a culture 
of innovation, due to structural issues caused by the sheer size of their fund.  Notwithstanding 
this, interviewees from another larger ASF reported the size as having a neutral effect on 
innovation. 
 
What was interesting to note was that interviewees from Fund 2 commented that within the 
context of structural inhibitors, their organisation lacked innovation project management 
capabilities.   
 
In terms of overall challenges faced by all funds, in particular larger funds, included the 
difficulty of getting to market quickly with new products.  For example, in the GFC there was 
a sudden shift in member’s desire or need to change investment choices, including a ‘flood of 
members’39 wanting to convert their asset allocations from shares to cash options to minimise 
the loss.  Unfortunately, interviewees from Funds 9, 11, 12 and 13 noted that the cash option 
sought by its membership could not be delivered to the market in time and there was an exit 
of members from these funds that could not offer this option. This issue was discussed with 
Mr Barr at the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, who noted that he was aware 
of this trend during the GFC and was deliberating on whether or not to research the area of 
‘member exits’ during this period. 
 
Interviewees from the majority of funds expressed that in the context of the GFC, it was a 
priority to offer this option to its members, particularly where it had not been previously 
                                                      
39 Andrew Barr, ASIT 
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offered as a distinct category for its membership.  Interviewees from ASFs raised that 
member numbers would decrease as members switched to other funds, through a rollover 
mechanism allowable under legislation and superannuation fund policy, which offered cash 
options to their members. It was a belief shared at the time by members of funds in 
Australia40 that it this was a safer option at the time. 
 
Interviewees from two ASFs viewed the size of their ASF as a positive impact for its overall 
membership.   For instance, one CEO stated that they “used our size to deliver better service 
to its members.” (Fund 9’s CEO).  
 
Another example, was provided by Fund 8 CEO, who remarked on the fact that:   
…Our sheer size had attracted a large Investment bank, Goldman Sachs 
(located in the United States) which had gained market knowledge of the 
fact that this particular fund had an appetite for infrastructure assets, 
and directly approached the fund, 41… this had dramatically cut costs as 
exorbitant fees had been paid to third parties who traditionally manage 
or brokerage deals within the industry.  
 
The CEO42 in this instance believed that they had been ‘highly innovative’ as the 
management team for the fund had directly engaged in this complex deal with Goldman 
Sachs rather than sourcing through a third party, like Macquarie for example. At the time of 
interviewing, this researcher was unaware of any other examples of this disintermediation 
process occurring within the ASI.  This example is categorised by the researcher as radical 
and extremely beneficial to its members in terms of the cost savings to the membership by 
lower transactional costs. Merton (2006) 43 also acknowledged that in a fully developed 
                                                      
40 Mr Andrew Barr, AIST 
41 Which is not industry practice.  General practice is to use a third party like Macquarie Bank as an 
intermediary. 
42  Fund 8 
43 As well as a leading CEO in the ASI. 
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financial funds system experience, a major trend of disaggregation or “disintermediation” of 
financial services was experienced.  
 
Conversely, the CEO from Fund 2 acknowledged that; “… we miss out on direct investment 
because of size.” 
 
In conclusion, 30 per cent of participants acknowledged that structural inhibitors affected 
NPD. 
 
The Board 
  
“Lay boards lead to bad results.” 
(Marketing Director, Fund 2) 
 
Interviewees from all funds raised one or more of the following concerns about their board 
from their own perspective including: 
i. Particular elected members of the board push their own personal interests; 
ii. The board  is too comfortable with their decision making processes as trustees have spent 
a lot of time together creating ‘groupthink’ rather than active debate on issues; 
iii. Equal representation boards (employer nominations versus employee representation) has 
created a dominant culture of ‘them and us’; 
iv. Personal attributes have interfered with decision making processes with other trustees 
who had had a pre-existing relationship with them; or 
v. Particular trustees have joined the board with their own agenda over and above the fund 
membership interests. 
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Board decision making processes 
 
Data collected from this research suggests that board decision-making errs on the side of 
conservatism (in particular risk aversion with investment decisions) particularly given the 
‘sole purpose test’ (Fund 9).  
 Interviewees from this fund reported that:  “Essentially the industry is expected to be risk 
averse and there is a (perceived) expectation that our board on behalf of the fund membership 
should make conservative decisions.” (CEO, Fund 9).  
 
The impact for the membership of Fund 9 is that there are limited investment choices offered 
to its members.  The risk adverse culture reported by the CIO of Fund 9, “naturally acts an 
inhibitor of innovation.”   
 
This view was shared by other interviewees and the data highlighted that this tendency by 
boards to be risk averse was common place within the public sector boards (Funds 3 and 14). 
Regulation within the industry in respect of asset allocation mandates and the decision-
making of trustees cause a natural risk aversion toward investments within the ASI. While 
not tested, the researcher believes that the real risk aversion of investments is driven by the 
risk profile of the board rather than the fund managers or asset allocation consultants.   
 
A good example of a poor board decision making processes which is ‘poor’ by an ASF board 
was when an interviewee from Fund 19 reported that in relation to the board’s decision 
making process that, “if one board member was uncomfortable with the motion about to be 
resolved by the majority of the trustees, then the entire board ‘would fold’ on that particular 
decision.”  
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It was observed by this particular trustee that this mechanism hindered good decision-
making. 
 
Trustee skill sets 
 
Poor or limited trustee skill sets on an ASF board may act as a barrier to innovation, 
particularly where trustees do not understand the value of innovation.   
 
The area of board skills and capabilities is an extremely important one and the researcher 
believes that it has not been given the attention that it deserves, given that there is over AUD 
$ 1.5 trillion dollars vested in the hands of these Australian superannuation trustees. 
 
Interviews conducted with trustees and CEOs highlighted major gaps in their board’s skill set 
and experience required to supervise these funds.  Several trustees stated that they were not 
always confident in their fellow trustees abilities and skill sets. For example, CEO of Fund 4 
said: “Our board needed more skills to manage the FUM as required by the SIS legislation.”    
 
This was a view also shared by another 10 per cent of the CEOs interviewed.  It was also 
observed that the equal representation attracted different skill sets of individual members, 
depending on whether they were from an employee or employer nomination. This could be 
either an advantage or disadvantage to a board at any given time and three funds reported that 
the elected nominated members required significant development with their skill sets, in 
order to oversee that the fund was governed correctly.  Another fund CEO interviewed 
reported that the skills set of the nominated employee representative for that fund were weak 
and that it had been identified at board level that professional development was required to 
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address these concerns.44 Twenty five per cent of the sample group (Funds 4, 5, 10, 11 and 
12) when asked Does the Board have a skill set that is adequately able to manage your 
superannuation fund?, reported that there was a lack of relevant skills and experience to 
manage an ASF.   
Four funds (15, 16, 18 and 20), representing 20 per cent of the sample group, reported that 
their board had an acceptable level of skills to manage their superannuation fund.  Thirty five 
per cent of the sample size (Funds 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 17) reported that their skill sets at board 
level were strong.   These perceptions are captured in Table 14 below. 
 
Table 14 highlights that 25 per cent of the sample group viewed their incumbent trustees as 
not having an acceptable level of skills to manage their fund.  The fact that the majority of 
                                                      
44  It was also acknowledged by the CEO of FSS‐NSW in his role as Chair of the Education and Professional 
Accreditation Committee for ASFA that many trustees are concerned about the fiduciary responsibilities and 
have been found wanting for the following: 
 Written investment policy statements; 
 Implementation of fund implementation objectives; and 
 Adequate monitoring of fund performance to assist with their responsibilities as trustees. 
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trustees on ASF boards are not recognised as professional trustees should be a major concern 
for APRA, in particular, where trustees were perceived to lack skills, experience and 
expertise to manage the fund.   
 
Board size 
 
There is no formal research that empirically examines the size of ASFs boards and its impact 
in Australia. This research however, found that interviewees from four ASFs stated that the 
size of the fund was a structural inhibitor of NPD, and also applied to one ASF board due to 
the large size of the board.   
 
The CEO of Fund X (which I am unable to identify due to risking anonymity) reported the 
biggest merger in Australia’s history of two superannuation funds involved their fund.  This 
board merger, is categorised as a ‘radical’ innovation and it retained all board members from 
both boards to form a ‘mega-board’, and interviewees perceived this enormous board as a 
structural inhibitor of innovation.  In reality, though the fund was innovative at many levels. 
 
The main challenge faced by larger funds in relation to size concerned the difficulties of 
getting to market quickly with new development options. 
 
Board composition 
 
It was reported by interviewees from public sector boards that there was “a general lack of 
desire to innovate due to the current board composition.” (Fund 15) 
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 From the sample group of 20 funds there appears to be a dichotomy between representative 
boards versus commercial-orientated board, in terms of the board composition. This, 
according to one CEO of an industry fund meant “neither model is extremely good”45.  
 
Interviewees from several funds (Funds 2 and 4) perceived that with the current 
superannuation climate, industry fund larger boards appear commercially focused and 
departing from a not for profit mentality that has predominately existed within the ASI for at 
least twenty years.  
 
It was reported by several interviewees that equal representation by both employers and 
employees in relation to board composition is not in in the best interests of the fund 
membership.  One reason which may be offered for this is that often trustees nominated and 
appointed to the board may lack the requisite skill set for the board.   
 
An interviewee from Fund 14 reported that due to a natural tension that exists between 
employer and employee representation on the board, that in some instances, this tension had 
acted as an inhibitor for progress and innovation. This was also reported by three other ASFs.   
Fund 14 reported that representation by Treasury at Board level is problematic because board 
members were less commercially minded, less innovative and hard to convince. 
 
                                                      
45 (CEO, Fund 4). 
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Research question 2: Does board conduct hinder rather than promote 
innovation in the ASI? 
 
To answer this broad research question, three sub questions were asked of all participants.  
The first sub-question is: 
 
Sub-question 6: To what extent are ASF boards influential in driving innovation? 
  
This research explored the issue of whether trustees drove innovation strategically at board 
level. Interviewees were specifically questioned on whether the trustees of an ASF board 
collectively drove innovation at board level or whether any particular individual trustee 
influenced innovation.  
 
Ninety five per cent of interviewees from ASFs indicated that the trustees did not drive 
innovation at board level.  However, it is arguable that there would be occasions where 
trustees may individually or collectively drive innovation, albeit it may not be considered 
innovative at the time, but rather viewed or discussed in terms of an efficient way to do 
things.  For example, the merger between two of the largest funds in Australia, would have 
been a complex strategic issue facing both boards at the time. The end merger in my mind is 
an excellent example of radical innovation within the ASI.  Yet this was not raised as an 
example of a board of trustees initiative influencing or driving innovation. When this 
researcher asked participants “how independent is innovation to the board”, the general 
feedback was that it was intertwined. 
 
Interviewees from two ASFs were identified as having a board that rubber stamps NPD plans 
by the CEO at board level, rather than being actively involved in debating the topic.  
Whereas, interviewees from 11 funds identified that agenda items actively debated by the 
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board included NPD.    For example, both Fund 8’s CEO and Marketing Director noted that 
the board was very active on the topic area of NPD.  Funds 10, 11 and 12 reported that their 
board was very supportive of new product ideas or any innovative ideas in general if 
discussed at board level, albeit there was no specific agenda item for innovation. 
 
There appeared to be many different approaches taken by the board in the promotion of 
innovation. For instance, interviewees from Fund 6 reported that innovative ideas raised at 
board level by trustees, were collective ideas rather than any one trustee driving innovation.   
Fund 2 noted that while their trustees did not drive innovation at board level, they were 
actually very supportive of innovative activities occurring within the fund.   Funds 14, 17 and 
18 reported that any innovative ideas within their ASF, were driven by management, rather 
than the trustees themselves.  However, the Chairman of Fund 19 reported that their trustees 
were actively engaged with their promotion of innovation within their ASF. 
 
Overall the board played a minor or non-existent role in influencing or driving innovation 
within their ASF.  The data highlights that all the boards involved in this research did not 
actively seek to have the subject innovation on a regular basis for the board to consider.   
While in practice, innovation could be driven at board level, this rarely occurred. Agendas 
did not reflect any innovative activity, ideas or projects for these particular ASFs.   
 
Sub-question 7: Are there any board factors that influence innovation? 
 
There are many board factors that could influence innovation within an ASF. These include 
board-decision making processes, the size of the board and trustees skill sets.  External 
factors such as costs and regulations were raised earlier. However, the interviewees suggested 
that in practice, none of these factors actually drove innovation. That said, it is important to 
consider which of the board factors that may influence innovation.  
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Board Group Dynamics 
Interviewees from 80 per cent of ASFs responded slightly negative to the question: What 
were the dynamics of the current board like within their ASF board?  
 
Interestingly, individual trustees, CEOs and Chairs of their particular fund perceived 
positively the performance of their board overall, despite any negative perceptions they may 
have had about the board dynamics.  Further, many interviewees noted that they did not 
believe that the dynamics of the board had any influence or impact on whether the fund 
promoted innovation or not.  
 
Table 15:  Board Dynamic Themes 
MAIN THEMES  Reported on by 
interviewees 
Member relationships  Funds 7, 15, 18
Member elect mentality “them vs. us” Funds 10, 11, 12
Members Personal interests  Funds 1, 14
Skill Sets  Funds 16, 4
Board Composition  Fund 10
 
Table 15 above highlights five main themes that the interviewees identified as important in 
relation to the board dynamics of their ASF. For example, Funds 1 and 14 reported that 
personal interests of some elected members drove some agenda items at the board-room 
table.  Their agendas never specifically addressed any innovative ideas or projects. 
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 181  
 
Funds 10, 11 and 12 raised the tension with representative boards as another issue that was 
impacting on board dynamics. The interviewees for these funds viewed the tension as an 
attitude of one of ‘them versus us’ at the board-room table.  For instance, employer versus 
employee representation was reported to have a negative impact on the group dynamics of 
these boards – including creating a lot of tension among the trustees. Interviewees from Fund 
10 raised just how important the composition of the board was. They noted that there were 
challenges between an ambitious executive team and a conservative board, when it came to 
raising the topic of innovation for discussion. 
 
Funds 7, 15 and 18 noted that pre-existing relationships between some trustees play a role in 
influencing the board dynamics.  It was also reported that some board members were more 
risk averse than others, which created an environment where it was difficult to drive 
innovation. 
 
When interviewees were asked: “Does the board work well together?, interviewees from 17 
ASFs, representing 85 per cent of the sample, reported that their boards worked well together.  
Issues raised by interviewees on what could influence the board’s ability to work well 
together, included large or small boards. Also familiarity with other trustees was raised as a 
factor that could influence decisions.  It was cited that boards that were too large may cause it 
to become ineffective with their decision-making.  Interviewees of three ASFs (Funds 3, 5 
and 6) acknowledged that their board members did not work well together. 
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Sub-question 8: To what extent are CEOs influential in developing or initiating 
innovation? 
 
This research found that a CEO of an ASF plays a critical role in mobilising the resources of 
decision making within an ASF.  Eighty-five per cent of respondents rated the leadership of 
the CEO as a strong predictor of innovation in their fund.  After a lengthy interview process, 
the interviews highlighted that the main driver of innovation within an ASF was the CEO. 
The CEOs leadership positively affected eight of the twenty CEOs of ASFs, in relation to the 
level of innovation occurring within the fund.   
 
That the CEO was a strong advocate for innovation, was the general perception within these 
eight funds and their leadership style influenced whether or not their fund adopted innovative 
practices throughout their business.   Of these eight funds, CEOs from seven funds (Funds 2, 
8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 17) reported that they personally embraced innovation as a value within 
their fund.   
 
The CEO of Fund 17 reported that he openly promoted innovation throughout the entire 
organisation. Both CEOs from Funds 8 and 17 noted that they supported innovation, either by 
way of changing cultures and norms within the fund to support innovation at an operational 
or at a strategic level, or by way of boardroom discussions led by the CEOs with board 
members.    
 
The Investment Manager for Fund 2 noted that innovation and investments were “driven by 
the CEO and the Executive team in its business plan which they will work with the board to 
develop.” 
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During the interview process, the effects of the GFC were being felt within the ASI, which 
led to conversations about the topic of innovation.  Two CEOs46 confirmed that they were not 
intending to influence any development of innovation now or into the future and had reported 
that their decision had been cemented by the impact of the GFC. It was noted by one CEO 
that: “Innovation would come at a considerable cost to this fund.”  
 
Fund 9’s CEO rationale was that the element of risk and uncertainty of innovation may create 
value or a benefit to its fund members in the long term, but did not warrant any allocation of 
resources to innovation at that time.  Furthermore, this CEO vocalised how he had to report to 
a very conservative board. This board placed little emphasis on NPD and innovation, nor was 
it embraced by the CEO’s leadership or in the future at a strategic or operational level.  As a 
result of this fund CEO’s leadership style, only minimal product investment options were 
available to its members, compared with a fuller range of products offered by comparable 
industry funds.  This CEO’s vision was that, “We were there to serve the members’ best 
interests and innovation did not centre in that.”  At the time of being interviewed, Fund 9’s 
CEO, the CEO commented on their fund experiencing major financial losses which was 
having a major impact on both the CEO and board member’s stress levels. It was noteworthy, 
there was a higher than normal exit rate of individual members from the defined benefit fund 
at this time, due to retirement rates by baby boomers rather than the GFC. 47 
 
One of the key findings of this research was that it was the CEO of ASF who was primarily 
responsible for driving an innovation culture throughout the entity.   
 
 
                                                      
46 Funds 19 and15 
47 Which was also contributing to this.  
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Summary of Research Results 
 
In summary, the following findings are made on the basis of data and analysis of interviews 
conducted on the twenty ASFs that participated in this research:  
 
1. The majority of superannuation funds innovate. 
2. Strategic leadership by the CEO who embraces a culture of innovation, tends to be a key 
predicator of innovation within that ASF. 
3. A large proportion of the ASFs did not have a formalised pipeline innovation process.    
The process was ‘adhoc’ or informal. 
4. Measurement of the impact of innovation is rare within the ASI. 
5. There were no formal innovation strategies identified by any fund. 
6. Increasing competitiveness and member needs are important drivers of change within this 
particular service industry, which by default, drove innovation within the industry rather 
than any formal strategic innovation strategy. 
7. Concerns were raised with the level of skills set and lack of experience of some of the  
elected board members on ASFs boards; and 
8. Of the various factors analysed in this research, the CEO’s leadership is a key influence 
on the outcomes of NPD and innovation.  Other factors on innovation within the ASI, 
such as ownership of the fund, FUM, number of members, inhibitors, board dynamics and 
the role of the board including board decision making, board composition and trustee skill 
sets did not appear to be significant factors in the outcomes of NPD and innovation.  
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Conclusion 
 
Results provided now form the basis for a discussion of superannuation, innovation and 
governance in the ASI. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
The overall findings 
 
This chapter will interpret and discuss the results presented in the previous chapter. Three 
central themes emerged from the data collection.  These themes that expand on the existing 
literature include: the importance of strategic leadership in the promotion of innovation 
within an ASF; trustee skills in the monitoring of an ASF’s performance and a range of 
inhibitors of innovation within the ASI.   
 
The critical theme emerging from this research is that the promotion of innovation within an 
ASF occurs with the strategic leadership by the CEO rather than the board of trustees.  This 
finding is significant and contributes to academic literature on service industry innovation 
and corporate governance.   
 
Another important finding is that the trustees of ASF boards did not appear to question the 
value of innovation in most instances.  There are no formal innovation strategies within the 
ASI, no regular innovation items on the agenda or inclusion in strategic vision or planning.  It 
is recommended that ASFs trustees consider strategically with the topic of innovation.  ICPM 
(2012) recognised that research today is the fuel that will propel “pension sector innovation 
tomorrow.”  
 
At the time of this data collection there had been no other empirical studies conducted in 
Australia in the context of innovation within the ASI.   This is still the situation in 2014, and 
therefore, this is the first study of its type in Australia in the context of innovation and 
governance in the ASI.  
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Research question 1: Is there innovation in the ASI? And if so, 
how does innovation manifest in this industry? 
Sub-question 1: To what extent are Australian superannuation funds 
innovative? 
 
A major research objective was to determine whether ASFs (as service organisations) 
innovate.  In summary, the results highlight that innovation did occur within the ASI, despite 
a heavily regulated corporate governance framework in Australia.   At first glance it would be 
a natural assumption for an outsider to the industry to assume that innovation may be stifled 
given the mandatory ‘sole purpose test’ that trustees in Australia are required to govern by.  
Yet, despite a heavily regulated industry, 75 per cent of ASFs involved in this research had 
reported innovative activity within their fund.  Funds that reported lack of innovative 
activities were classified within the public sector category (refer Table 13). 
 
However, findings in the UK by British researchers Clark and Urwin’s (2009) found “only a 
few instances of fully fledged institutional innovation as opposed to adaption and adoption” 
within the UK pension industry. They noticed that the occurrence of innovation was partial 
rather than systematic in respect of any comprehensive changes to the inherited form and 
functions of pension funds, due to the limits on innovation by government regulation.  
 
After it was established that innovation occurs in the majority of ASFs, another major 
research objective was then to identify what were the different types of innovation that 
occurred within an ASF. 
 
Sub-question 2: What types of innovation occur within the ASI? 
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Contrary to the initial assumption based on an extensive literature review influenced by the 
work by Clark and Urwin (2008) that innovation was ‘rare’ within this industry.  This claim 
is difficult to support in the context of the ASI, since interviewees highlighted that innovation 
was not a ‘rare’ occurrence within the ASI, and that overall industry funds have many 
different types of innovation occurring.  Public and corporate sectors on the contrary had 
reported no or minimal levels of innovation occurring within their ASF.  So it was interesting 
to discover that there were sector differences in terms of innovation within the ASI.  The 
proportion of incremental innovation was approximately 50 per cent of the cited examples of 
the different types of innovation occurring within the ASI, which were categorised as either 
radical or incremental, for the purposes of this research.  The contrast between industry and 
government (or public sector) funds can be accounted for by the extent of rivalry in the 
industry arena.  Industry funds must compete for members and increased market share, while 
government funds have a guaranteed market of public servants, both at a state or federal 
level, who historically are in the fund as a default option. 
 
Investment innovations within the ASI 
 
Different types of investment innovations reported by interviewees of ASFs included a 
relatively new category of investment options called the Green/sustainable investment option. 
These investments include wind farms, carbon friendly investment options, clean tech 
investments and renewable energy investments, an example is Fund 19.  These were driven 
by government policy favouring green technology and member influence.  This indicates a 
degree of responsiveness to the market by industry funds, despite a strict regulatory 
environment. 
 
Product innovations within the ASI 
 
A number of industry participants outlined in the Results Chapter have turned their minds to 
the challenge of product innovation in the ASI.  In the literature review, the Innovation Space 
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Model by Bessant and Davies (2005) was highlighted as a model that recognises that 
different types of innovation that can occur within an organisation; process, product, position 
and paradigm.  With reference to the ASI, process innovations within an ASF context 
involved the creation of technological and interactive educational software programs that 
benefited the fund membership. Product innovation which was the main focus, occurs with a 
range of new products introduced into the ASI. It included; pension products (aged-based 
default products); protected pension, and; micro-financing (Fund 18). Also industry funds 
have introduced new asset allocation categories such as direct investment property or 
emerging markets.  Product innovation in green funds is categorised as a radical innovation in 
the Results Chapter. 
Paradigm innovation involves any change within the structure and strategy of the ASF and 
should be considered in any future research. 
The broad theme of these developments has been to explore ways to better manage the key 
risks to which people are directly exposed in the account based superannuation framework, 
which is investment, longevity and inflation. 
Some of the key product ideas being advanced by different industry participants in this area 
include: 
 The conversion of retirement lump sums into lifetime or deferred annuities.  
 The adaptation to the Australian market of ‘guaranteed minimum benefit’ under which 
investors retain access to their capital, but can still obtain a level of guarantee (either over 
a fixed period or for the remainder of their lives) that is underwritten by the offering 
entities and/or a third party reinsurer. 
 The extension of ‘lifecycle’ investment options beyond a member’s retirement date, in an 
effort to minimise exposure to investment risks through gradual changes in asset 
allocation of a retiree’s portfolio as they age, through some form of built in ‘glide path’ or 
other mechanism.   
 The development of ‘collective pension schemes’. These schemes combine elements of 
both defined benefit and defined contribution structures, with the aim of providing stable 
and predictable retirement incomes for members without imposing open-ended liabilities 
on employers (Super Review, Final Report, 2012).   
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To encourage product innovation, the AFTS Review recommended (recommendation 21) that 
the government should remove the prescriptive rules in the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Regulations 1994, which relates to income streams that restrict product 
innovation.  In the context of the terms of reference of the Cooper Review (2010) , the report 
noted that post-retirement product innovation, while showing promising signs, is still at a 
relatively embryonic stage in Australia.  At this stage, it appears unlikely that any one 
product type will produce a panacea for all of the risks and issues confronting Australian 
retirees, and the public pension system that supports them.  Consequently, it might unduly 
distort the market and the scope for further innovation to recommend that any one product 
type be favoured by regulation to the exclusion of others.  At the same time, it will be 
important for regulators to avoid becoming inhibitors to innovation through unnecessarily 
rigid rules.   
  
Marketing Innovations 
 
Overall the ASI lacks marketing innovations.  Notwithstanding this, Funds 2 and 19, 
representing ten per cent of this sample size, were innovative with their fund’s approach to 
marketing, and interviewees provided several excellent examples to support their 
observations. Firstly, the branding of an industry fund through the sponsorship of a high 
profile sporting team in the NRL is considered innovative for the industry.  In this instance, 
the trustees gained approval from APRA with this branding opportunity.48  Secondly, a 
collaborative TV advertising campaign launched by industry funds (to increase their market 
share) which successfully continues today is categorised as a radical innovation within this 
industry.  
 
                                                      
48 Fund 19 
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Thirdly, a life stage marketing segmentation model adopted by Fund 2’s 49 marketing 
department is also categorised as a radical innovation within the ASI. This direct marketing 
initiative to its members by life stage segments developed through extensive research to 
develop this model is radical for the industry.  The initial purpose of their model was to 
inform members by way of various targeted communication planned for a period of five years 
to reduce costs and increase a more efficient way to disseminate information to the 
membership. This strategically it gave Fund 2 a competitive advantage over other funds 
within the ASI.   
 
The issue of successful targeted marketing was explored by Clemons & Thatcher (2008) in 
their article based on Capital One located in the USA, who had developed and implemented a 
very successful innovative approach to target marketing. It was based on customer 
profitability analysis which achieved outstanding performance as a leading credit card issuer 
within the financial services industry.  The company developed an Information Based 
Strategy (IBS) that allowed them to “develop new and different strategies by exploiting 
fundamental differences between itself and its competitors in organizational structure, 
corporate culture and use of information” (2008: 180). Capital One was able to achieve a 
competitive advantage through the implementation of IBS.  In a similar vein, the life stage 
segmentation model developed by Fund 2, with its departure from a traditional one-size-fits 
all approach to marketing within the ASI, is very similar in strategy to the IBS model.  In 
both instances, successful market differentiation to its members provided a competitive 
advantage to both businesses.  There were no other cited examples of ASFs with such 
sophisticated commercial marketing segmentation model like Fund 2. 
 
The evidence from this research of Fund 2’s approach to marketing segmentation is very 
similar to the findings by Clemons & Thatcher (2008), who acknowledged that the principal 
problem faced by banks in responding to opportunities in the market included their 
organisational structure, information infrastructure, organisation skill set and organisational 
                                                      
49 Fund 2 is ranked within the top 15% of all superannuation funds in Australia (SuperRatings) and has 
outperformed the industry on most measures.  
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culture. Only Fund 2, as well as possibly Fund 8 and 17, within the ASI truly recognised the 
significant value of an information infrastructure for their ASF. Currently, within the ASI 
there is still mass customisation of the dissemination of information into the market place by 
ASFs to its overall membership by way of direct mail.  All other interviewees reported 
general bulk mail-outs approximately twice a year to their membership, which highlighted 
major inefficiencies and additional costs within their Communication Strategy.50 
 
The fact that Fund 2 was innovative in this marketing arena indicates that the scope exists for 
such action in the Australian context.  Other funds have failed to take advantage of this.  It is 
therefore possible to gain competitive advantage from marketing despite regulatory 
restrictions such as those that exist in superannuation.  In summary, there were few marketing 
innovations within the sample group. However, the cited examples did provide insight into 
different types of marketing innovations. 
 
Collaborative innovations 
 
“Changes worth recognising as innovation should be … new to the organisation, be large 
enough and durable enough to appreciably affect the operations or character of the 
organisation” 
H.M. Moore (Innovation in American Government, Challenges, Opportunities, and Dilemmas 
1997). 
There were four different examples of collaborative innovations cited by the interviewees in 
the Results Chapter including: 
1. Part ownership in an administrative company51 to provide outsourced administrative 
services to the ASF. 
2. Asset Allocation alliances – Frontier Advisors52. 
                                                      
50 Note that several ASFS within the sample group did not have a Marketing or Communication Strategy. 
51 Fund 2 
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3. Cost sharing structures for advice (tax, legal, corporate governance), and53; 
4. Tax – taking up share buy backs. 
A culture of collaboration by industry funds within the ASI is important and this drove 
several innovative collaborative projects within this sector.   The motivation for collaboration 
within the industry funds is considered.  Firstly, there is an overall ability to reduce expensive 
transactional costs with large scale processing of daily tasks required within these entities.  
Secondly, industry funds collectively pooled funds to access specialised investment 
knowledge that they do not have individually and thirdly, they have capabilities and resources 
to create entities, such as a specialist provider like Frontier Advisors.  
This research found that the majority of ASFs offered ancillary services such as; financial 
planning, insurance, legal service, banking and payment services to its members in 
conjunction with member superannuation services. Fund 4 provides an excellent example of 
all of these ancillary services offered by one ASF in the below diagram 17. The 
communication processes for Fund 4 is highlighted in Appendix 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 17:  Ancillary Services offered by Fund 4 
Economies of scale may exist in marketing these ancillary products to its membership, albeit 
trustees are still required to consider the ‘sole purpose’ test for all products and services 
provided.   Mechanisms to provide a competitive advantage to the fund in providing such 
ancillary services need to meet the objectives of the ‘sole purpose’ test discussed in Chapter 
One (p.35).    These collaborative projects have commenced through a vehicle of Industry 
Super Holdings (ISH) (Refer to Appendix 13), see Diagram 18.  Notably, Super Partners and 
                                                                                                                                           
52 Fund 2 
53 Fund 19 
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Frontier Investment Consulting were a spin off from IFS during the development of industry 
fund associations AIST and ACSI. 
 
 
Diagram 18 Collaborative projects of Industry Super Holdings Pty Ltd. 
 
DTI (2007) noted that a major driver of innovation in the UK is the trend towards outsourcing 
of business activities. The DTI project recognised that businesses may seek to reduce their 
costs by outsourcing non-core activities to specialist firms. 
 
Similarly, APRA (2010) noted that Not-For-Profit (NFP) and retail funds in Australia both 
outsource most or all of the functions.  Lui and Arnold (2010) report that the outsourcing by 
NFPs is driven by functionality or cost efficiency whereas outsourcing by retail funds is 
integral to the revenue model.  The outsourcing of legal services follows the same pattern as 
both administrative services and asset allocation. Comparatively, APRA highlights that fewer 
retail fund trustees outsourced the function, while a majority of NFP trustees did so.   
 
What is relevant to this research is the increasing separation in the delivery of superannuation 
funds administration and management in Australia.  This research found a mix between funds 
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that outsource their administrative functions versus funds that run their administrative tasks 
internally.  However, an interesting discovery was the actual decision by one large 
superannuation fund to be a part owner of an administrative company that specialised in 
administration for superannuation funds.  Within the ASI this trend has continued with the 
outsourcing of investments, administration and fund management.   
 
Example 1 - Outsourcing 
 
In the context of researching the topic of innovation within the global superannuation 
industry, research by Clark and Urwin (2009) within the UK Pension industry, observed that 
fund governance had one type of ‘adoptive’ response to changes in the environment. 
Primarily it used market-based contracts to govern the delivery of pension fund 
administration.   
 
In these pension funds, companies were established to deliver internal administration 
services. The trustees had subsequently become company directors responsible for these 
administrative businesses.  Respondents in the above example argued that these adopted 
responsibilities provided cost-effective delivery of services for the fund and was consistent 
with the interests of the fund beneficiaries.  Comparatively in Australia, similar practices 
adopted by industry funds were cited as highly innovative by the interviewees and 
categorised as a radical innovation by this researcher. Interviewees considered it innovative 
to adopt market-based service agreements to govern the delivery of their administration 
(Funds 19 and 2).    
The results derived from this research are of value to both theory and practice for a range of 
reasons. For instance, this research found that it was also becoming commonplace within the 
ASI to outsource the administrative arm of their ASF. Several ASFs had reported that they 
had outsourced their administration function, or acquired partial ownership of an external 
administrative service business to provide them this function.  
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Clark and Urwin’s (2009) example of an adoptive response to administrative services in the 
UK pension system was categorised as an incremental innovation within the ASI.  
 
Example 2 – Collaboration 
 
This is an important example of how ASFs within the industry sector drove collaborative 
projects to create successful innovations within the industry. For example, resources were 
allocated by several stakeholders (four ASFs) to create an asset allocation consultancy 
business, Frontier, for industry funds (further details are provided in Chapter 2). This has 
proven to be a very successful business model and has been categorised as a ‘radical’ 
innovative service by this researcher.  Consequently, it not only benefited the industry sector, 
however, all funds within the ASI who chose to use their services could do so on a pay for 
service basis.  
 
Frontier is now a highly regarded independent specialist asset-consulting firm.  Apart from 
the fact the initial innovation to establish an entire asset allocation-consulting business 
specialising in advice for industry funds, it has been a highly successful business model that 
many other non-industry funds have subsequently used.   The CEO of Fund 2 said: “A good 
example of innovation was created where resources had been pulled together to establish an 
asset consultancy business for industry funds…”  
Other collaborations amongst industry funds have seen the sharing of resources to create 
companies that provide administrative services within the ASI, asset allocation advice 
services, as well as other collaborative cost-sharing structures for tax advice and legal costs. 
These are excellent examples of different types of innovation that has occurred within the 
industry.  All interviewees reported considerable cost savings from collaboration of the fund’s 
operating budget as well as the overall membership costs. 
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Another type of innovation within the ASI was the initiative of collective investment vehicles 
for superannuation funds in Australia, which had an impact both at a social and economic 
level nationally.  For instance, the Development Australia Fund (DAF), the Australian 
Chamber of Manufacturers and AMP provided an investment vehicle that focused on national 
infrastructure projects for superannuation funds.  The initial funding contributions were 
sourced from four industry funds and AMP, who invested in the NSW Government’s ‘Rent-
Buy Scheme, which provided affordable housing to lower income groups. In 1994, IFS was 
established and assumed an advisory role to DAF, with AMP as the investment manager. The 
role of IFS was to provide services for industry funds that were able to nonetheless 
accommodate the ‘sole purpose test’.   IFS took on the responsibility of managing DAF, as 
well as asset-consulting services and the development of private equity investment 
capabilities. Other services available for industry funds developed by IFS included a; 
retirement income products, credit control services, insurance broking services, legal 
services, financial services for the membership of any industry fund, and, the development of 
a high profile innovative marketing campaign.  Another example cited by a trustee was an 
ASF that established a joint venture with another private organisation to construct and roll out 
affordable housing in Tasmania. 
 
Two other different types of innovation within the industry sector included: 
1. The establishment of Superpartners (which provides outsourced administrative services to 
twelve industry funds), and: 
2. The establishment of the Members Equity Bank (MEB), which obtained a bank licence in 
2001. 
The above examples are categorised as radical innovation within the ASI.  To create a 
banking entity within the industry, originally an initiative of both AXA and IFS, is very 
innovative from this researcher’s perspective.  Subsequently, ISF raised capital from industry 
funds to achieve a 100 per cent ownership of MEB.  In addition, a subsidiary of MEB, Super 
Member investments provide services to another sector within the ASI -retail funds 
management. 
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Another major collaborative innovative venture was the establishment of the Industry Super 
Property Trust (ISPT,) a trust company originally owned by four industry funds and now 
owned by approximately 26 superannuation funds. The ISPT aims to identify real estate 
investments.   Of interest, is that their property trusts comprise approximately 60 of industry 
funds’ property investments. 
 
These collaborations by industry funds have been a major influence in the evolution of the 
ASI that has ultimately had a positive impact, for both the membership and the industry as a 
whole.   As legislative changes within this industry have created a complex environment for 
smaller funds to ‘survive,’ industry fund collaboration setting up these ancillary services 
provide smaller funds with the opportunity to achieve sustainable economies of scale. 
 
This research considers the above examples to be an excellent illustration of the different 
types of innovation occurring within the ASI.  Protected, or guaranteed, superannuation plans 
are a clever innovation within this industry and would be attractive to baby boomers, as this 
product provides for a guaranteed income stream for life. A result of not including this 
product to their investment choice is that members may use their entire lump sum payout 
earlier than forecasted and may have no other income stream available to them.   
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Sub-question 3: Measurement of innovation  
  
One notable finding is that there was almost no measurement of the success rate of NPD, nor 
did any fund measure the impact of innovation.  This indicates a lack of attention to 
measurement of strategies generally and the unfamiliarity of funds with idea of measurement-
driven marketing.  Arguably, the skill base of funds is deficient in this area and requires 
urgent attention.  Accordingly, it would be hard to justify NPD in these entities because they 
would be unable to account for the impact and response of the market, and there are also no 
quantifiable numbers to defend the value of an innovation. 
 
In summary, innovation in the ASI presents a challenge for the measurement of innovation. 
Tether (2005) highlighted how there are still conceptual gaps in our understanding of 
innovation processes within services and there are problems with measuring innovation in 
services. He points out that service innovations are difficult to capture with existing 
measurement tools because of their tacit and disembodied nature. Similarly, Christensen, 
Kaufman & Shih (2008:100), also acknowledge that it is difficult to accurately forecast any 
investment of innovation where, “the projected value of an innovation must be assessed by a 
range of scenarios”. 
 
Sub-question 4:  Are there any differences in the extent and type of 
innovation between the sectors in the ASI? 
The differences in extent and type of innovation between sectors within the ASI 
 
There were substantial differences in the types of innovation between the different sectors of 
the ASI.  In particular, major differences were discovered between industry funds and public 
sector funds (refer Table 12 in the Results Chapter).  Industry funds were in the main funds 
developing new products or services for the membership while the public sector had minimal 
or no levels of innovation occurring.  The previous section provided examples of ‘radical’ 
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innovation prevalent within the industry sector, such as wind-farms, sponsorship of a NRL 
sports team, or de-intermediary commercial transactions, compared to corporate and public 
sectors which only had financial planning, and insurance products cited as innovations. 
 
The information in Table 12 on page 140 highlights the different types of innovation within 
all sectors of the industry. Ranging from higher levels of risky and uncertain ‘radical’ 
innovations, such as wind farms, are compared to ‘plain vanilla’ examples of innovation such 
as, the financial planning and health insurance used by the public sector and corporate funds. 
Innovation activities were minimal within these two sectors, compared with the evidence of 
high levels of innovation occurring within the industry funds54.  
 
Another theme that flowed from the data collection was the low levels of competition within 
the ASI sectors.  Within other industries, competition between organisations is a common 
driver for innovation as they try to keep up pace with competitors.  Yet, according to the 
interviewees working within the ASI, the industry lacked competition compared with other 
industries such as insurance, banking and IT.55  However, analysis of interview transcripts 
identified that industry funds were definitely more competitive56 than other sectors within the 
ASI. The data also suggests that there is an apparent lack of competition between all other 
sectors, such as public sector funds.57  
 
One expert ranked innovation relatively low within the ASI for two main reasons.  Firstly, 
“low levels of competition” were due to the lack of strong competitor pressure, and secondly, 
                                                      
54 A direct transaction in relation to an asset allocation class with Goldman Sachs occurred for the first time 
within the industry, rather than sourcing through the normal intermediary in the industry (Macquarie Bank). At 
the time of interviewing there were no other examples of this disintermediation process having occurred 
within the ASI.  This transaction is categorised as ‘radical’ innovative within the ASI and extremely beneficial to 
the funds membership in terms of the cost savings in this asset allocation class. 
55 Just compare branding campaigns for the major banks versus the major players within the ASI. 
56 You only need to look at any media campaign in Australia, it is only the industry funds that are marketing 
themselves. 
57 One industry expert from a leading Asset Allocation Consultancy firm confirmed these findings.  
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regulatory constraints which encouraged compliance by trustees of ASF boards rather than 
competition58.   
 
The same expert also suggested the degree of competition within the industry has been low 
and attention had been traditionally towards the execution of task rather than any desire to 
innovate.  This highly regarded expert viewed innovation within the ASI as a desire to be 
more ‘efficient’ in terms of product or service offerings. For instance, doing the same job/task 
better or producing the same product with cost efficiency. This expert also highlighted that 
there is a strong “copycat mentality” within the ASI, by both senior managers and trustees.   
Innovation was viewed as externally driven rather than internally and financial innovations 
have ultimately occurred when fund managers try to solve portfolio optimisation problems 
and chase better returns for the ASF.  This expert did not believe that financial innovations 
were driven by demand, reaction to the market or a fund capacity issue. In essence, focus 
within this industry is “on efficiency rather than innovation”.  An outcome of innovation has 
stemmed from driving efficiency59. 
 
Competition for industry funds came from major retail funds or financial planners suggesting 
SMSFs as an alternative to members, rather than other industry funds.  Exit interviews with 
high balance members from industry funds showed that the majority of members who rolled 
out their funds to retail funds and DIY funds had visited a financial planner, as many of these 
members sought professional advice as they approached retirement.  Results from this 
research support existing theory by Clark (2006) highlighting that there is a “blatant lack of 
competition” amongst different types of entities that deliver pensions in the UK plans. Low 
competition within the ASI historically has probably reduced the need for innovation.  
Notwithstanding this, industry funds within the ASI innovate. This could be partly explained 
by the fact that industry funds innovate because there is a gentile rivalry.  This is a great 
                                                      
58 MySuper recommended by the Cooper Review is an excellent example of this, promoting a non‐innovative 
default option for members to be rolled out by ASFs in 2014. 
59 The UK example of the delivery of outsourced administrative services, offered by Clark (2006) argued that 
these adopted responsibilities are consistent with the cost‐effective delivery of the services to the fund and 
the interests of plan beneficiaries.  In Australia, similar practices occurred within the industry funds and it was 
cited as highly innovative by the interviews. 
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example of how rivalry enhances NPD among industry funds.  As Porter (1990:118) points 
out, “domestic rivalry, like any rivalry, creates pressure on firms to improve and innovate.”  
This is a key part of Porter’s theory of Competitive Nations.  However, government funds 
have been far more limited with embracing the whole notion of innovation.  Porter (1990) 
views that the only way an organisation, like ASFs, can have an advantage is with innovation 
with a clear consistent strategic direction.  Porter considers that there is a new paradigm of 
competitiveness in the market place, one based on innovation. 
 
The importance of innovation activities is higher for industry funds than other sectors, such 
as the public sector.  Industry funds showed the strongest focus towards innovation.  These 
results were not expected as quoted by the CIO of one large industry fund (Fund 19) where 
he noted that, “you would expect all ASFs to innovate or not at all.”  Yet, the data highlights 
a polarized effect, from industry funds at one end of the spectrum to public sector at the 
other.   It is clear that comparatively few ASFs are pursuing a strategy that is focused on 
active involvement in innovation.   From a Baumol’s perspective (2002), successful firms can 
be inefficient in the static neoclassical sense and still remain profitable, however, without 
innovation even the most efficient firms will be forced from the market by its innovating 
competitors.  In the context of the superannuation industry, due to the new regulatory 
reforms, “ASFs will need to be actively competitive and innovate to survive or ASFs will 
have little of remaining viable or a going concern.” (CEO, Fund 4). 
 
Sub-question 5: Factors that inhibit innovation within the ASI 
 
What factors inhibit ASFs from innovating?  Firstly, the culture of the superannuation entity 
is one factor that impacts on the promotion of innovation within a fund.  For instance one 
industry expert noted “…implicit is the view within the industry that innovation is bad, costly 
and not productive” (industry expert, 2009). 
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Numerous other inhibitors of innovation were categorised for ease as either external or 
internal inhibitors. External inhibitors include mainly regulations and cost.  Internal inhibitors 
include; corporate governance frameworks, cultural or structural inhibitors, the board 
composition, trustee skill sets, decision-making processes, and, legitimacy of innovation. 
 
The two most commonly cited examples of external inhibitors by interviewees include the 
costs associated with innovation and legislative requirements.  The issue of costs and 
regulations are discussed below. 
 
Costs 
 
It is important to highlight that the key issue affecting what types of innovations occur within 
any fund or what the extent of innovation was the costs involved with any type of innovation.  
The fact that innovation occurred in 80 per cent of the researched ASFs without any formal 
business or strategic plan or by the development and implementation of a particular type of 
innovation, should be considered poor governance. The board should never sign off on any 
type resource allocation or expenditure without any forecasted gain to the fund.  Given the 
costs of new product development, innovations may occur as product modification rather 
than product invention. Due to the lack of performance records for new products, and the rate 
of adoption, return on investment, production adaption is often preferred by trustees over 
incremental or radical innovation. Clarke’s (2008) research found that instances of innovation 
were more likely to be partial, and this may have been due to the limits on innovation 
imposed by statute and government regulation, as well as trustees themselves often being 
resistant to innovation.60  
 
                                                      
60  Clark’s results are similar in its findings within the Australian context in terms of Australian statutory 
requirements for trustees.  The “sole purpose test” was cited as a major hindrance to innovation within the 
ASF. 
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A common perception amongst the interviewees, and confirmed by an industry expert within 
the ASI, is that “innovation is costly”.  Comments made by interviewees during the course of 
this research, support Monk’s and Merton’s (2004) finding61 that, “pension funds often seem 
unable to deal with the institutional cost of change.” This was a view also shared by Clark 
and Urwin (2009).  It was also reported by interviewees that the cost of innovation affects the 
extent of innovation within an ASF.   
 
One of the difficulties in innovation is predicting the outcome in financial terms (Voss, C., 
Johnston, R, Silverstro, R., Fitzgerald, L, and Brignall, T. (1992). cited in DTI, 2007). It can 
be difficult to measure the impact of a particular improvement of a product or service for the 
ASF. The difficulty in predicting financial returns was recognised by these researchers as 
creating an unwillingness to invest in service innovation and a factor that inhibited innovation 
within the ASI. 
 
Regulations   
 
Legislation requires superannuation fund trustees in the ASI to satisfy a ‘sole purpose test’, 
however, there is no prohibition on funds having an equitable interest in suppliers of ancillary 
services, such as financial planning, insurance, or legal service, provided that the investment 
is considered justifiable by the trustees and approved by APRA as part of portfolio allocation 
on financial grounds.   
 
Cultural and structural inhibitors of innovation 
 
In addition, the issue of whether or not ASFs boards drove a culture of innovation at board 
level was explored. Culture is central to organising for innovation (Dougherty, 1996).   
Different cultural inhibitors emerged as inhibiting innovation within an ASF, including staff 
                                                      
61 Which spanned over a period of over a decade from 1995 to 2008.  
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lacking skill sets to drive innovation processes, which was also acknowledged by a UK 
innovation survey in 2005. This survey found that a lack of qualified personnel was a mid-
level factor for hampering innovation, leadership62 and cultural tensions at board level. It was 
also identified also as a major cultural barrier to NPD.  Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 
(2004:31) note that the, “climate and culture for innovation within the business proves to be 
one of the strongest drivers of NPD performance.” This is clearly not evident within the 
culture and climate of the public sector funds. The culture and climate within Funds (3 and 
14) did not support an environment that fostered innovation through NPD. This is likely to be 
a product of a number of factors including leadership, historical and possible government 
ownership, who traditional exhibit risk averse behaviours. These negative cultural aspects 
inhibited the development of a marketing strategy in which the primary objectives were to 
develop new innovative products and services. As highlighted by Cooper et al. (2004) “…a 
supportive climate is a major difference of best and worst performers of NPD.”  
 
Cultural tension was raised as a significant issue within the public sector funds amongst their 
boards that had equal representation, creating a “difficult environment to arrive at any 
constructive decisions for the fund, let alone making any decision in relation to innovation” 
(Legal Officer, Fund 13).  Within the sample group there was a dichotomy between 
representative63 boards versus commercial-orientated boards, in terms of their board 
composition. According to one CEO on an industry fund, “neither model is extremely 
good”64. The highly acclaimed Australian Cooper Review report (2010:54) states: The equal 
representation model appears to impose rigidity into fund governance practices and reduce 
accountability, without contributing materially to the representation objective on which it 
was predicated. 
A structural factor that proved to be a hurdle for implementing a culture of innovation, for 
larger ASI industry funds, was the sheer size of the fund.  One challenge frequently noted 
was the difficulty of getting to market quickly with new investment choices. 
                                                      
62 Leadership has not been identified as a factor in the DTI (2007) report or any other academic literature to 
date as a cultural hindrance to innovation. 
63 Research by Clark and Urwin (2008a: 15) provided commentary on the representative board “we do not 
dispute the value of a representative board… But we do suggest that the criteria for board selection should be 
balanced against best practice”. 
64 (CEO, Fund 4). 
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To date, there is no published research that empirically examines the impact of the size of 
ASFs in Australia. At the other end of the scale, Clark’s 2004 research, originating in the UK, 
identified that the small size of a fund is a real constraint on governance capacity and 
performance and observed that such resource-constrained entities should explore ways of 
sharing resources or merging into larger entities65.   
 
In relation to the topic of mergers of ASFs within the ASI, interviewees from two specific 
funds reported how it was necessary for their fund to merge with another ASF due to its small 
size fund and the complex legislative environment of the ASI.   
 
For instance, the Chairman of a smaller a fund (Fund 15) in Australia, representing a smaller 
fund reported that the board voted strategically to merge with a larger ASF to create value for 
their fund membership and to maintain economies of scale..  At the other end of the 
spectrum, one CEO reported that their fund was involved in the biggest merger in Australia’s 
history of two ASFs.  This merger of two extremely large funds, the first of its type at the 
date of this research, is categorised as a ‘radical’ innovation within the ASI. The merged 
board retained all board members from both ASFs, to create a mega board and retained 
different asset allocation consultants from both ASFs. 
 
                                                      
65 This research identified that the sharing of resources was common practice within industry funds sector in 
Australia.  Participants from industry funds interviewed reported that there had been a history of sharing 
resources to create economies of scale or just reducing overall costs to the fund’s membership.  Industry funds 
reported examples of sharing asset allocating consulting costs by establishing an asset allocation based 
business (Frontier).  Other examples mentioned in the Results Chapter, include sharing administrative services, 
or owning administrative services to service their fund, sharing costs on complex independent tax advice and 
legal costs. These are all excellent examples of the different levels of innovativeness within the industry funds 
within an Australian context.   
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All interviewees from public sector funds reported that the overall culture of their fund66 was 
conservative, non-innovative and the risk profile of the board was risk averse towards 
innovative investments or ideas.    
Legislative provisions set out in the SIS Act 1993, the board dynamics and the trustees skill 
sets, are three important variables that also contribute to the culture of the boards. 
Interviewees reported that typically their ASFs are bureaucratic in nature, hierarchical and 
slow to change. In addition, there still remains a ‘not-for-profit’ mentality within public 
sector funds.  
 
Board composition 
 
There was a general lack of interest by the board of ASFs to innovate within the public and 
corporate sectors of the ASI.  The question that remains unanswered, is whether this is due to 
the board composition.   
 
The theoretical implications for this research are that there is no best way to organise an ASF 
board. While this researcher would prefer a non-equal representation preference for board 
composition, there are both advantages and disadvantages for the equal representation model 
on boards.  The disadvantages of equal representation is that it may create difficulties at 
board level due to the lack of appropriate skill sets by nominated members at board level, 
lack of experience of trustees and a lack of education with some members elected to these 
boards. 
 
This research identified that trustees with limited skill sets on an ASF board may act as a 
barrier to innovation, particularly where trustees do not understand the value or strategic 
importance of innovation.  Trustee skill sets for ASFs board membership is an extremely 
important area. This researcher’s opinion is it has not been given the due attention it deserves, 
                                                      
66 Where equal representation of board members occurred due to legislative requirements. 
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particularly as there is over $1.5 trillion dollars AUD collectively vested in the hands of these 
Australian trustees.  It is of particular concern when employee representatives appointed to 
the board as trustees do not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to fulfil the role.  
Ambachtseer (2007) acknowledged that in relation to board member competence, the 
capacity to think strategically combined with a relevant skill set and experience is also 
important. 
 
Research conducted by Sy, Inman, Esho and Sane (2008) reported that 90 per cent of their 
sample group of superannuation funds had no explicit requirements on trustees’ educational 
qualifications.  Similarly, the UK Myners Report suggested that pension fund trustees lacked 
the expertise necessary to make independent judgment in the face of influence of consultants 
and the financial services industry (HM Treasury, 2001). 
 
The literature suggests that trustees should have expertise. Evans, Orszag and Piggott 
(2008:10) state that: “Implied by discretion is a supposition that trustees have considerable 
expertise, whereas the reality is a world characterized at best by trustee competence and at 
worst by amateurish confusion.”  
 
Other academics such as Clark and Urwin (2009:4) identified that the expertise of most 
trustees on pension funds in the UK “… does not stretch to deep domain-specific knowledge 
of investment issues” and the ideals of collegial decision making and responsibility is rarely 
realised given the co-existence of very different levels of trustee knowledge and 
understanding (Clark et al. 2007). 
 
Another major theme from the data was that trustees are not always confident in their fellow 
trustees’ capabilities and skill sets.  For instance, one CEO of an industry fund (CEO, Fund 4) 
highlighted that, “our board needed better skills” to manage the FUM as required by the SIS 
legislation. This view was also shared by other CEOs interviewed.   It was also observed that 
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the equal representation attracted different skill sets of individual members depending on 
whether the trustees were nominated from an employee or employer nomination. This could 
be either an advantage or disadvantage to a board at any given time dependent on the 
appointment of a nominated member’s skill set, qualifications, experience, capabilities and 
knowledge of the ASI.   Participants from 15 percent of the sample reported that the elected 
members required significant development with their skill sets. Similarly, one ASF CEO 
reported that the skills set of the nominated employee representative for their fund were weak 
and that it had been identified at board level that professional development was required to 
address these concerns.67   Twenty five per cent perceived trustees on ASFs to lack the 
relevant skills sets to manage the fund with their current skill sets. 
 
Further evidence of trustees lacking proper skills to oversee an ASF was reported on in a 
survey (n=30) conducted by Clark and Urwin (2008:2), where respondents were quite 
doubtful of their colleagues’ competency at board level. Twenty five per cent of the 
respondents indicated that their colleagues did not have the appropriate training and 
experience.  Further, “…trustees are either irrational or uneducated, or both” (Clark, 
2000:153). Whereas 40 per cent of respondents reported that their colleagues had, “for the 
most part”, sufficient skills. This is also not particularly encouraging especially where only 
ten per cent of respondents were of the opinion that their colleagues had sufficient training 
while only 25 per cent were definitely of the opinion that board members had sufficient 
experience (Clark & Urwin, 2008:12).     
 
Clarke and Urwin (2008:12) reported, “board members do not entirely trust the judgement of 
their colleagues”. In another article by Clarke and Urwin (2009:1), Innovative Models of 
                                                      
67 It was acknowledged by the CEO of FSS‐NSW in his role as Chair of the Education and Professional 
Accreditation Committee for ASFA that many trustees are concerned about the fiduciary responsibilities and 
have been seeking information and training for the following: 
 Written investment policy statements; 
 Implementation of fund implementation objectives; and 
 Adequate monitoring of fund performance to assist with their responsibilities as trustees. 
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Pension Fund Governance in the Context of the Global Financial Crisis, it was reported, 
“most funds have felt constrained by the limits of their expertise.”  This sentiment was 
certainly raised by several CEOs interviewed for this research (Funds 14 and 4). 
Table 16: Perceptions of skill sets amongst the Trustees of the Board 
 
Table 16 above highlights that 25 per cent of the sample group interviewed for this research 
thought their trustee colleagues did not have relevant level of skills to monitor their fund. 
Similarly, Clarke’s (2008) results identified also that 25 per cent of the respondents in the 
United Kingdom indicated they did not have the appropriate training and experience to 
manage their fund also. Comments made by three interviewees of this research mirror 
Ambachtsheer view (2007:13) reported in his book the Pension Revolution: A Solution to the 
Pensions Crisis, “that too many people continue to be appointed to pension governance 
positions not for the skills and experience they bring to the governance body, but for the 
interests they represent (e.g., the union or employer)”. 
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Ambachtsheer’s 2007 research, conducted in the United States, observed that it was not 
always professional boards that governed pension funds but sometimes lay people or amateur 
boards.  Further international research revealed68 that many trustees are not especially expert 
in investment. The majority of these trustees had no professional qualifications in finance or 
investment; had little initial training; did not attend training courses during their first twelve 
months of appointment; and spent very little time during the week preparing for fund 
investment decisions. The Myner Report (2001) acknowledged that if funds are to fulfil their 
obligations to beneficiaries and take an active role in the financial services industry 
commensurate with their significance in terms of total assets, then the governance of these 
funds must improve along with the knowledge and expertise of the trustees.  This report also 
found that in the first 12 months of trusteeship only 26 per cent of trustees received more than 
one day’s training. 
 
The topic of board member skills warrants further research, as the findings highlight major 
gaps within ASF’s board’s skill set and experience, which was similar to findings by 
Ambachtsheer (2007).  Capelle and Lum (2007) quite rightly point out that board expertise 
and knowledge affect board practices including strategic thinking. Drucker (1996) was also 
concerned that the US lacked well-governed boards and advocated for professional rather 
than amateur boards with relevant and composite skill and experience sets. Anthropologists 
O’Barr and Conley book Fortune and Folly (1992) described the governance of U.S. pension 
funds as generally ineffective. This view is shared today by Ambachtsheer (2007), who had 
two additional concerns. Firstly, that too many individuals are appointed to pension 
governance positions not for their skills or experience but for the interests they represent, 
such as union or employer, and the result is that too many boards still do not understand their 
role in the managing the pension fund. 
 
Further, where an individual trustee has personality characteristics that detract from overall 
board performance it can often be difficult for the board to take action (Kiel et al. 2012).   
                                                      
68 The Myner Report surveyed 250 trustees of superannuation funds in the United Kingdom  
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Governance theory rests on the assumption that board members have expertise. The report’s 
data, and that from the UK and USA, all indicate that this assumption is flawed with respect 
to superannuation funds. 
 
Trustee decision-making 
 
The question as to why we should be interested in trustee decision-making was posed by 
Clark over a decade ago, resulting in his conclusion that very simply, trustee’s control 
enormous financial resources and how these resources are allocated may have a significant 
impact for the local, national or global economy.  
To gain insight into this issue, we need to understand the objectives of the trustees within the 
ASI.  There has been a detailed explanation given in Chapter 1 on this issue.  In summary, it 
involves two primary goals inter alia, firstly, to ensure that the investment performance of the 
fund is adequate to meet the current expected plan obligations and secondly, to maintain 
funding of expected liabilities set by the Australian Regulator.   
 
A trustee makes decisions in the immediate context in which they find themselves in as a 
member of a board as well as the risk and uncertainty inherent in the financial markets 
(Anand, 1993).  In relation to uncertainty it is difficult to forecast efficient investment 
strategies, and trustees, “do not have the luxury of sitting-out uncertainty; the opportunity 
costs of such a strategy can be extremely high” (Clark, 2000:138).  Trustees of these ASFs 
generally make decisions regarding the fund’s investment strategy in an arena of risk and 
uncertainty, with “limited capacity of trustees to make informed decisions about the available 
set of investment options” (Clark, 2000:142).   As Clark (2004) points out that for many 
trustees they are aware of the consequences of trusting habits, yet are terrified that their 
decisions may be scrutinised by external agencies, in Australia such as APRA and  ASFA, 
which is a sentiment shared by Australian trustee. Accordingly, to involve external service 
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providers, who have established professional reputations in the decision making process, is 
viewed as a way of sharing risk and uncertainty. 
 
The topic of decision-making within the context of superannuation funds is important. 
Research conducted globally by researchers such as Ambachtsheer, Boice and Ezra (1995) 
found that 98 per cent of the participants mentioned poor decision-making processes by 
pension fund executives.  Further, Clark and Urwin (2008a) report that their exemplars in 
their study were conscious of the costs of decision making of a large board. Further, Sunstein, 
(2005) recognised that many board members (n>9) are inclined to fracture collegiality and 
add a degree of heterogeneity in board member competence that undercuts competent 
decision making (Clark et al. 2006).  Clarke et al. (2007)  also revealed that the consistency 
of UK trustee decision making in pensions, in relation to investment related problems, is 
correlated with formal education and training of individual trustees and that experience is not 
a robust predictor of individual decision-making competence. 
 
Data from this research supports an Australian industry expert’s view that “herd mentality 
exists with the board’s decision making within the ASI.”   Respondents noted that the ASF 
boards were generally conservative and this ‘herd mentality’ can actually keep them 
employed in their senior roles longer as they do not have to take risks69 as it was “safer to 
follow the herd” with their decision making than take a risk.  Similarly, Shiller (2002) 
acknowledged that research on institutional decision making suggested that bounded 
rationality is a common feature of financial decision-making, due to an individual’s inability 
to synthesise information or due to the status and reward systems that may tend to encourage 
herd behaviour.   From the evidence above, this so called ‘herd mentality’ exists within the 
ASI and this may be due to many factors. Board members or senior management may not 
want to go against the status quo within the ASI and decision making by board members of 
ASFs appears naturally risk adverse.  Furthermore, Clark and Urwin (2009) note that there is 
evidence that financial decision-making is greatly influenced by past commitments and 
                                                      
69 As by taking a risk there is a perception that this result may have a negative influence on the fund and this 
could result in this employee losing their job. 
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current relationships.  This research confirms that where there was history with board 
members it may create a ‘think tank’ mentality amongst the board membership. 
 
In conclusion, five of the ten barriers of innovation identified by DTI (2007),  including; 
organisational rigidity, regulations, costs of risk too high, lack of key staff and innovation not 
necessary, overlapped in this research, in the sense that regulations and costs were identified 
as barriers to innovation by the participants.  Additional barriers within the ASI that this 
research found, but that were not identified by DTI (2007), included limited trustee skill sets, 
board composition, cultural and structural inhibitors. 
 
Legitimacy and commitment 
 
Legitimacy of innovation with was raised by interviewees. This research found that CEOs 
from seven ASFs were strongly committed to an innovation culture within their ASF and 
promoted and allocated resources to NPD within their fund and innovation was perceived as 
legitimate. DiMaggo and Powell (2003) noted that companies adopt ‘innovations’ to enhance 
their legitimacy. Dougherty (1996) also reported that individuals would need to feel 
committed to product innovation if viable new products are to be developed more than 
infrequently.  
 
In summary, eight factors (costs, regulations, cultural and structural, board composition, 
trustee decision making, legitimacy and commitment) were raised as inhibitors to innovation 
within an ASF. 
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Research Question 2: Does board conduct hinder rather than 
promote innovation in ASI? 
Sub-question 6 – To what extent are ASF boards influential in driving 
innovation? 
 
This research investigated whether individual trustees or the board collectively initiated 
innovation, and whether the board considered this a strategic issue.  
 
This research found that no board of trustees initiated a culture of innovation within their 
ASF.  However, interviewees perceived that a number of ASFs board of trustees did support 
a culture of innovation.   Seventy percent of interviewees from industry funds noted support 
for innovation at boardroom level.  Conversely, interviewees from public sector or corporate 
funds reported no strategic leadership in the area of innovation.   
 
Clark and Urwin’s (2009) research was often referred throughout this thesis70 due to the fact 
that their research into the UK pension industry occurred concurrently with this research. In 
part, there were similar findings.  Firstly, trustees appeared resistance to innovation. 
Secondly, changing the mindset of trustees within the superannuation arena with respect to 
innovation will be challenging.  
 
Deschamps notes (2012:2) “… that promoting innovation … should become a key duty of the 
board” and the role of the board is critical in shaping management’s approach to innovation.  
Neither of these duties raised by Deschamps (2012) were evident within the ASI.  This is an 
                                                      
70 Research conducted by Clarke and Urwin (2009) in the UK in relation to pension fund governance during the 
GFC, suggests innovation has been rare and difficult to achieve.  Research into the area of fund governance is 
limited, and at the time of this collection of data, there had been no formal empirical studies conducted in 
Australia on governance and service innovation.    My research findings differed to Clarke and Urwin’s 
research, that is, innovation did occur in seventy five per cent of the sample group rather than being ‘rare’.  In 
spite of this, some interviewees thought that innovation may not necessarily be in the best interests of their 
fund and one of the key issues affecting the nature and scope of innovation was the costs involved.   
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important finding, that innovation was typically not part of any strategic process of any ASF 
board.   
 
Deschamps (2012) recognised that board members may shy away from innovation issues due 
to the considerable investment involved or the risk profile of the board.  Board meetings are 
limited in number and the duration of the meeting and agenda tabled for consideration are 
inclined to be crowded with other issues, such as corporate governance.71  It is an oxymoron 
that while innovation occurs within some sectors of the ASI, it is clearly not part of many 
boards’ agenda for trustees.  Deschamps (2012:3) noted “despite their general involvement in 
strategy, and barring any discussions on specific and critical new products or new 
technologies, boards often lack opportunities to discuss innovation strategy issues in detail, at 
least in a regular or structured way”.  
 
Sub-question 7: Are there any board factors that influence innovation? 
Board factors that foster innovation 
 
There are many board features that could foster innovation, such as board dynamics, the 
board’s decision-making process, board composition, leadership, size, and the skill sets of 
trustees. However, the data suggests that none of these features individually or collectively 
contribute to the enhancement of a culture of innovation within the ASI.  For example, board 
processes had no bearing on whether innovation occurred or not. 
Data revealed that the ASF boards did not contribute to fostering innovation with their fund, 
albeit it did play a minor role in supporting an innovative culture within their ASF through 
the strategic leadership of the CEO.  The data highlighted that boards do not have innovation 
as a specific agenda item.   While there is an opportunity for innovation to be driven or 
influenced at the board level through agenda discussion items, this rarely occurred. Agendas 
                                                      
71  Confirmed with data collection for this research.   
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did not reflect any innovative activity, ideas or projects for any particular ASF.    There is no 
umbrella strategy that encourages innovations to emerge and develop (Mintzberg and 
McHugh, 1985). The inability to break out of prevailing patterns of decision-making 
(Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) at board level can restrict innovation.  Results from the 
research support existing theory that, the power of process such as agenda setting, budgeting 
and decision-making, channels attention to established businesses, rather than innovation 
(Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). 
 
It is recommended that it is imperative for public sector funds, like Fund 3, to improve the 
climate and culture for NPD and this may be achieved by adopting actionable items offered 
by Cooper et. al (2004), which include: 
 Resource availability; 
 Reward and recognition of idea generators and project team members; 
 Training, leadership and coaching with a NPD process and ‘how to plan a project’; 
 Supportive learning environment (Garvin, Edmondson & Gino, 2008); 
 A culture of support and encouragement of NPD and product innovation;  
 Team accountability; and 
 A framework suited to managing ongoing and open innovation processes. 
   
Innovation drives growth, profitability and sustainability and the management of innovation 
should be strategic (Cooper, et al. 1990).   Similarly, Baumol (2002) notes that large firms 
use innovation as a prime competitive weapon.  Yet if firms are discouraged from pursuing 
innovation, as it is costly, they can be made obsolete by rival innovation.  The key to any 
ASF’s future organisational success is its capabilities and capacity to innovate. In the public 
sectors case, for example, most managers at Fund 3 superficially understood the importance 
of innovation.  However, Fund 3’s lack of inherent ‘innovation capabilities’, lack of strong 
culture for NPD, poor leadership response and a structure that did not support a culture of 
innovation, were all significant drivers of the derailment and failure of their marketing 
strategy project.  
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Reasons for this, at a practical level, were multi-factorial including: 
 Lack of understanding of the superannuation market and how to be successful within 
the context of the boarder Australian Superannuation and Financial Services Market; 
 Lack of management skills and expertise; 
 Complacency; 
 No project team accountability; 
 No marketing research conducted; 
 Lack of a chain of decisions; and 
 Implementation Plan for project not developed. 
 
Sub-question 8: To what extent are CEOs influential in developing or 
initiating innovation? 
CEOs influence in developing and initiating innovation 
 
CEOs within the ASI have direct influence on innovation within an ASF.  This research 
found that a CEO’s leadership could play a critical role in mobilising the resources of 
decision-making for innovation within 57 percent of all industry funds. A CEO of a large 
industry fund noted: “An innovative climate is seen as one of the more important drivers of 
successful product development” (CEO, Fund 2). 
O’Sullivan’s (2000) model of corporate governance should therefore be modified to take into 
consideration the importance of strategic leadership to make this model relevant within the 
context of the superannuation industry.  The findings in Chapter 6 highlight that the main 
driver of innovation within an ASF was the CEO, as it was clear from the qualitative data that 
leadership positively affected the extent of innovation occurring within an ASF.   Where a 
CEO promoted innovation in an ASF through their leadership style within an ASF, this 
heavily influenced the adoption of an innovative culture within the ASF.  Eleven CEO’s were 
reported to have influenced innovation within their ASFs.  Further, Clark and Urwin (2008) 
also consider leadership is an essential ingredient in institutional innovation.   
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The importance of strategic leadership cannot be under-estimated within the organisational 
context in relation to the fostering of innovation within the organisation. As Govingarajan 
and Trimble (2010:39) stated: “the leader of the innovation initiative must set the right tone – 
positive and collaborative”. 
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Diagram 19: Factors Affecting Managerial Discretion 
Source:  Hitt, M. Ireland, R. and Hoskisson, R. (2011:355). Strategic Management: Competitiveness 
and Globalization. (9th ed.). South-Western. Cengage Learning. Mason, OH. USA. 
 
In relation to factors affecting managerial discretion, Diagram 19 above has been included to 
highlight that the, “quality of the strategic decisions made by a top management team affects 
the firm’s ability to innovate and engage in effective strategic change” (Hitt et al. 2011:356).  
 
In conclusion, one of the key findings of this research was that the CEO of an ASF was 
primarily responsible for driving an innovative culture throughout their organisation, rather 
than the board of trustees of an ASF. This provides insight for future research in the fields of 
innovation and corporate governance.  Daly and Donaldson (1990) factor the importance of 
strategic leadership and the link with innovation.  Within this strategic role, leaders play a 
critical role in addressing both the organizational and individual levels associated with 
innovation (Lyons et. al., 2007). 
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Lester and Piore (2004) state that for a successful project of NPD or innovation in general 
there needs to be clear lines of accountability or responsibility for either the project manager 
or the project team. Cooper et. al (2004) argues that the majority of best performers reward 
their NPD project leaders and that there are rewards for project teams as well.  In the case of 
public sector funds there was no strong leadership around NPD or innovation. 
 
In addition to innovative ideas fostered and developed by the CEOs of industry funds, it is 
also worth noting that other mechanisms operate to foster innovation in some ASFs, such as 
the executive management team (EMT)72 and committees (such as a marketing committee). 
 
In relation to committees, it was reported by 16 interviewees, that committees were used as 
part of their governance structure within their fund and nine superannuation funds reported 
that the marketing, or the equivalent committee, was the main vehicle for management to 
discuss innovative ideas such as NPD.  
 
Conservatism at board level inhibited innovation 
 
Fund 9 interviewees reported that, “essentially the industry is expected to be risk averse and 
there is an (perceived) expectation that our board on behalf of the fund would make 
conservative decisions” (CEO). 
 
                                                      
72 Innovation could be driven by an executive management team or individual members (normally senior 
managers) and supported by the CEO. 
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CEO of Fund 9 explained that due to the culture of the fund, he has to strategically limit the 
number of its investment choices on offer to its membership and the risk averse culture 
“naturally acts an inhibitor of innovation”.   
There was also a tendency by public sector boards to be risk averse with their decision-
making processes.  Legislative requirements, imposed by SIS such as the ‘sole purpose test’ 
set for trustees to comply with create a natural risk aversion within their investments 
strategies. This research data suggests that there was a spectrum of decision-making ranging 
from a risk averse board, as in the public sector, compared to industry boards signing off on 
innovative projects with a level of risk and uncertainty involved.  These findings support 
existing theory that, where there is an inability to break out of prevailing patterns of decision-
making … that this will be a major hindrance” (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) and may limit 
any strategic discussion for innovation.  Evans et. al (2008) suggests that a board’s decision 
making practices should be flexible to accommodate the local innovations that go beyond 
common practice. 
 
Only one ASF had a formal innovation strategy at the time of this research and 35 per cent 
included innovation in their corporate values.  Characteristics of generic service innovation 
strategies should be considered as an instrument for ASFs to use with any future adoption of 
an innovation strategy for their fund (Moller, Rajala and Westerlund, 2008).  It is worth 
noting that while an innovation strategy could enable an ASF to generate superior productive 
capabilities, it may also place that enterprise at a cost disadvantage, as such strategies often 
entail higher fixed costs than those incurred by rivals who do not pursue innovation 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
Incremental service innovation highlighted in Table 8 on page 70 in Chapter 3 with product 
and service offerings, describes a value creation strategy in which services are employed for 
the incremental addition of value.   The majority of industry funds could be viewed as 
pursuing incremental or radical innovation within their ASF.  Industry funds had 14 examples 
of radical innovation compared to 12 examples of incremental.  Industry funds were the only 
sector to cite examples of radical innovation.  While radical service innovation describes an 
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approach that pursues value creation through novel concepts which pose greater uncertainty 
for value potential and value capture. The developers of these service innovations aim to 
produce new offerings, technologies or business concepts as well as their commercialisation 
through advanced services.  Funds 2, 18 and 19 at this stage could be categorised according 
to the above criteria outlined by Moller, Rajala and Westerlund (2008) as having an example 
of radical service innovations. With these four funds it was possible to wear a high level of 
uncertainty strategically, due to the age demographics of their fund, through a strategic long 
term vision adopted for innovation in investments. 
 
In summary, despite the lack of any formalised innovation strategies reported within the ASI 
(except Fund 18), this research found that within the ASI there are two types of innovations 
that occur – incremental or radical service.  Four ASFs (19, 8, 2, and 18) had both 
incremental and radical service innovation. 
 
Innovation Processes within the ASI 
 
It was clear from the data that 90 per cent of the funds had no formalised processes of 
strategic innovation and innovation strategies were noticeably absent within these (with one 
exception being Fund 18).    
 
Significantly lacking within the ASFs were any formal project evaluation, with only ten per 
cent of the sample group reporting any evaluation in respect of innovation.  Dated research by 
Kleinschidmt and Cooper (1990) found also that in many organisations project evaluations 
are weak and deficient, or non-existent.  The data only revealed three ASFs with any 
formalised innovative process (Funds 2, 17, and 18).  
 
Theory suggests that established organisations commence their innovation process by 
considering a broad range of possible innovations; they winnow out the less viable options, 
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step by step, until only the most promising one remains (Christensen, Kaufman & Shih, 
2011,)).  However, these findings conflict with this investigation, as the majority of the ASFs 
did not commence an innovation process at all, let alone adopt a three or four stage approach 
offered by different innovation theorists covered in this study. These researchers note that the 
process in general includes three stages: feasibility, development and launch, which are not 
captured within the ASI. Despite that three ASFs had a formal innovation process, only one 
had a formalised star-gate innovation system.   
 
Formal reporting mechanisms to the board were lacking in relation to innovation within the 
ASI.  Reasons provided were: there was a lack of reporting to the board on such issues; that 
their board had not requested this information; it had not occurred to management to report 
on this; and a lack of skills sets and experience at both management and board level to 
develop and implement an internal formal system for innovation.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Governance still only receives sporadic attention in organisations active in the financial 
service arena (Ambachtsheer, 2007), despite its importance. As Seybolt (2006) remarks: “… 
we must embrace innovation or be left behind in our intensely competitive global economy… 
Innovation is a cornerstone to economic growth and prosperity” (Seybolt, 2006:67).  The 
literature review highlighted that there is no adequate corporate governance theory that 
adequately embraces the notion of innovation.  This perspective partially reflects the current 
situation within the ASI.  This research has expanded it further by emphasising that 
innovation is occurring within the ASI as well as emphasising the importance of strategic 
leadership and its link with innovation within an ASF.    
 
In addition, there is an expansion of strategy theory.  Literature suggests that strategy sets the 
framework from which innovations should be developed.  Sundho’s (1997) research found 
that organisations use the strategy as a framework for procuring innovations. Whereas, this 
research found that ASFs did not develop or implement any innovation strategies. This raises 
an interesting future research problem, that is, if the majority of funds interviewees 
acknowledged that their board supported innovation- then why did the participants report that 
their ASF did not have an innovation strategy?  The plausible answer is that innovation 
strategy is emergent and reliant on changes to CEO positions and, as with green technology, 
with changes in the market place. 
 
The outcome of this research discovered inter alia that trustees within the ASI are often 
resistant to innovation and ASF boards do not consider innovation strategically nor do they 
question the value of innovation. Whereas, the majority of CEOs embrace innovation and in 
eight funds the CEO actively drove innovation throughout the fund.  From an Australian 
perspective, innovation is certainly not ‘rare’ within the broad category of the ASI, despite 
placement in a heavily regulated industry and lower levels of competition compared to other 
industries reported by interviewees.   
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Another major finding is that the CEO promotes and embraces innovation within an ASF, 
and the board does not deal with innovation strategically.  The trustees neither promote it 
collectively or individually and there was no reported case of a board having innovation as an 
agenda item or tabling an innovation strategy.  
 
Formal controls within other sectors of the industry stifle innovation.  Notwithstanding this, 
industry funds have embraced innovation and the situation for the majority of interviewees, 
from the retail, corporate, industry sectors within the ASI, was that any promotion of 
innovation within their fund was due to the CEO’s leadership.   
 
There are two key issues affecting what types of innovation occur within the ASI.  Firstly, 
there is a cost factor involved with innovation and the prospects for the benefits to be realised 
of any investment into innovation for the fund were reported as vague, difficult to measure 
and faced a general resistance among employees.  Smaller ASFs face a competitive 
disadvantage due to economies of scale and need to find alternatives to perform some of 
these functions to remain viable.  Innovations within the ASI have been largely product 
driven instead of process driven, which provides one explanation as to why very few funds 
reported any formalised innovation process.  Outsourcing of particular tasks to an 
independent entity (Chesborough, 2003) such as administrative services is one example of 
service innovation.  Another example is collaboration with other superannuation entities to 
create a joint venture to create a specialist provider of a particular service, for instance, 
investment advice which is witnessed by the establishment of Frontier. 
 
Secondly, there are also legislative limits on innovation within the ASI, due to the prescribed 
‘sole purpose’ test imposed on trustees by the SIS legislation.  
 
It has been well published within the literature that in most cases, innovation happens out of 
emergence due to the organisation facing some type of ambiguity. This is not the case within 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 227  
 
the ASI and it is evident that there is no effective system in place to guide employees through 
an innovation process.  The innovation process should be a strategic task (Sudho, 1997) and 
this was not the case within the majority of the ASFs. Where ASFs reported any formal 
innovation process, only one fund confirmed that they used any staged approach as outlined 
in Sudho (1997) research, with the four-staged innovation process or the consideration of the 
uncertainty of returns from innovative investments (Schumpter, 1996; Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (1996).  
 
Many interviewees participating in this research had not considered the relevance or value of 
innovation within or to the industry, as a whole.  Other interviews provided insight that 
management of innovation appears adhoc within the ASI.  Throughout the investigation, 
information provided by participants confirmed that ASFs innovate often on an adhoc basis 
of a quick idea rather than any scientific result. As Sudho’s research (1997) highlighted 
within the service industry it is more a ‘search and learn’ process.  There was no evidence 
that ASFs had an innovation strategy or any formal innovation system linked with their 
corporate strategy, with one the exception of Fund 18.  There appears to be no capacity or 
resources to execute ideas quickly within this industry.  Chesborough’s (2003:xix) view was, 
“ … that while innovation is critical, the usual process of managing innovation doesn’t seem 
to work”, depicts the general sentiment within the ASI by interviewees. 
 
Ambachtsheer’s (2012:3) considers that, “the innovation track record of the pension sectors is 
not inspiring” and this is confirmed by Clark and Urwin’s (2008) research acknowledging 
that incremental and radical innovation does not occur within the context of the UK pension 
system – where only institutional adaption occurs.   Within the Australian context, we appear 
more progressive as 14 different examples of radical innovations were cited by the sample 
group within the context of their own funds. While the majority of the innovations are not 
necessarily breaking new ground, such as financial planning and insurance, it is important to 
re-emphasise that innovation did occur both incrementally and radically in nature within this 
industry, and specifically radical innovations occurred only within the industry funds.   
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Another major finding is the difference in the types of innovation between public sector and 
industry funds (refer Table 13 on page 163 for details).  
 
The challenge in fostering innovation within the ASI is to embrace product and service 
development arrangements that are more appropriate to the current landscape of 
superannuation. The over-governing within the ASI may contribute to the lack of innovation 
in some sectors.  This investigation does not advocate innovation within an ASF, yet it is 
recognised that it should be promoted as an important issue for ASF’s in Australia to at least 
consider its value strategically at a board-room level.   
 
I support the view offered by Govindarajan and Trimble (2005:47) that within today’s 
competitive business environment to “remain viable, corporations must respond with 
innovation”.  Despite the fact that the current regulatory overhaul has been challenging for 
the industry, it has also had a side effect of drawing natural competitors together, as 
witnessed by the collaborative initiatives with industry funds.  In addition, the industry is 
transforming from a vertically integrated environment to a more horizontal structure where 
numerous service providers have become linked in their interactions with other service 
providers and the fund they support.  Accordingly, all parties in the super ecosystem, that is 
the superannuation fund, member administrators, asset allocation consultants, regulators and 
other government agencies, should be considering how new products and services will 
ultimately impact the funds membership. 
 
Given the recent introduction of the superannuation reforms in 2013 and 2014, MySuper 
default accounts, a raft of new regulatory body reporting requirements from APRA, 
transparency, costs and efficiency are now at the forefront.  ASFs have traditionally 
competed on the number of products, ancillary services and their ability to maintain strong 
investment returns.  Competition in the ASI will be driven now by new disclosure standards 
and reporting regime that will allow members to compare and contrast among fund offerings. 
 
An exploration of innovation and governance in Australian superannuation organisations  
Page | 229  
 
In conclusion, innovation is a complex interaction between corporate governance, financial 
performance, leadership, competitive intensity, industry/market, and structure.  Innovation is 
opaque, and is hard to measure in terms of impact on an ASF or the ASI. It takes bold 
thinkers to deviate resources on the basis of hope with no defence to answer if the process 
fails to yield results. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
“Academics also have some way to go to develop their capabilities in pension fund 
governance.  The academic literature on this topic is sparse…” 
(Evans, Orszag and Piggott, 2008:3). 
 
These explorative findings have the potential to improve the understanding of innovation 
within an ASF.  The findings of this thesis have filled part of the black hole that was the 
unexplored tangle of issues centred on innovation and governance in the Australian 
superannuation industry. A range of incremental and major innovations were found as well as 
the factors that inhibited innovation. Also those that fostered innovation have been identified. 
In terms of governance this research identified the issue of CEOs initiating and directing 
innovation and the absence of a direct role being played by the boards in the industry. 
 This is a good start to a larger research program. The complexities of the relationship of 
CEOs and board with respect to innovation deserve further large-scale investigation since 
current governance theory does not explain this well. In addition, the mix of influences that 
affect the initiation and type of innovation needs further study.  These influences: the CEO, 
the board, government regulation that inhibits but does not prevent innovation, and the raft of 
social issues, all create a complex web that must be unstitched if we are to advance 
innovation theory within this increasingly important industry. This is not only important for 
Australia but also other countries that have similar pension or retirement funds. Drilling down 
even further, this research reveals other interesting and important questions, such as: 
 What types of social issues influence innovation in superannuation?  
 Does the education level or other background qualities of CEOs influence the extent 
and type of innovation?  
 What expertise do trustees have, in a general sense and what qualifications should be 
mandated for a more active cohort of trustees?  
 Is the industry subject to strong isomorphic pressures?  
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 Do similar industries in OECD countries with broadly similar patterns affect each 
other? If so, how? 
One limitation of this research relates to the country specific location of the research effort. It 
could usefully be expanded to include the UK and USA, as well as other OECD countries. 
Another limitation is the standard caveat that applies to qualitative research; it is not ‘true’ in 
the classic sense of the word.  This is an account of plausible findings backed up by a 
specified research protocol and careful implementation of a research plan. A step closer to a 
more in-depth understanding will come with further refined topics of discussion and more 
specific questions. A series of full sample quantitative research projects would also help pin 
down some of the issues identified in this broad exploration of a hitherto under-researched 
area.  
Research into the global superannuation industry is in the early stages relative to the 
corporate governance literature, and good governance is supposed to be an important 
prerequisite for efficient innovation activities (Schiller, 2009). As Gummerson (2000) states: 
“Science is a continuing search; it is a continuing generation of theories, models, concepts 
and categories. …a journey in which each program represents a stop on the way” (p.22). This 
study has broken the ground on which further research can build a better understanding of 
innovation and its links with governance in the superannuation industry, especially following 
the findings of this study – that CEOs have a strong role in innovation but boards do not. 
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Appendix 1 - Elements to be implemented to ensure Compliance with the 
Future of Financial Reform Requirements 
 
Elements  Key Statutory Requirements  Suggested Approach 
Best Interests Duty  A statutory duty to act in the best 
interests of retail clients when giving 
personal advice. 
The general duty to be satisfied overall 
or through the safe harbour defence, 
which provides for all the specified 
elements to be demonstrated. 
The Licensee, each participating 
Trustee or other entity and each 
Authorised Representative need to 
demonstrate that they act in best 
interest of clients either by 
satisfying the general duty or the 
safe harbour defence. 
The Licensee, each participating 
Trustee or other entity and each 
Authorised Representative need to: 
 act in the interests of the client, 
provide appropriate advice; 
 warn clients where advice is 
based upon incomplete or 
inaccurate information; 
  give priority to the interests of 
the client; 
  ensure scope of advice for 
personal fund advice or personal 
non‐fund advice meets the best 
interests duty for every client; 
 to review financial Planning 
process to ensure best interest 
duty met; 
 to review advice delivery 
processes and disclosures including 
Statement of Advice Templates to 
provide for best interests duty to 
clients; and 
 to arrange appropriate training 
delivery for implementation of 
FOFA Reforms including meeting 
the best interests duty. 
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Elements  Key Statutory Requirements  Suggested Approach 
Scaled Advice Delivery  All financial advice provided by the 
Licensee must be scaled advice.  
 
 
The FOFA Reforms enables single issue 
advice to be provided to clients. 
 
To develop a clear processes for 
provision of information, general advice 
and personal advice. 
 
 
 
 
The scoping of advice is to be provided 
to each client is to be undertaken by 
the Licensee and each participating 
Trustee and other entity and the 
Authorised Representatives. 
 
 
The charging regime is to align with the 
advice process of the Licensee and the 
participating Trustee or other entities. 
The Licensee to obtain legal 
opinion on the authorisation 
structure and advice processes. 
The Licensee should develop a Plan 
to enable single‐issue advice and 
combined single issue to be 
provided for personal fund advice 
delivery. 
The Licensee and each participating 
Trustee or other entity and the 
Authorised Representatives are to 
enter into Agreements to provide 
for general advice to be provided 
by AFSL of Trustee or other entity 
and personal advice by AFSL of the 
Licensee. 
Each participating Trustee or other 
entity is to put in place policies and 
procedures required for general 
advice delivery. And a process to 
ensure appropriate personal 
advice, which meets the ‘best 
interest duty’, is provided to every 
client. 
The Licensee in conjunction with 
each participating Trustee or other 
entity and the Authorised 
Representatives is developing 
policies and procedures for 
personal fund and non‐fund advice 
delivery. 
Each participating Trustee or other 
entity is to review disclosures 
relating to advice delivery such as 
in Financial Services Guide. 
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Element  Key Statutory Requirements  Governance 
Delivery and Charging Regime  Compliance required with Future of 
Financial Advice Reforms and 
Stronger Super Reforms. 
 
 
Each participating Trustee or 
other entity to determine 
business model and allocate 
costs to administration fee, 
advice fee from member 
account or advice fee paid 
directly by client 
Each participating Trustee or 
other entity to review 
disclosures relating to charging 
such as in Financial Services 
Guide. 
Conflicted Remuneration  Authorised Representatives by 
participating Trustees or other 
entities needs to meet all the 
conflicted remuneration 
requirements. 
 
 
The Stronger Super Reforms require 
the Trustee of a superannuation fund 
to ensure conflicted remuneration is 
not paid from a MySuper product. 
The Licensee is to obtain a 
legal opinion on satisfaction of 
the conflicted remuneration 
requirements once the pricing 
model of the Licensee has 
been determined.   
Each participating Trustee or 
other entity is to identify any 
bonuses paid to Authorised 
Representatives which will 
need to comply with all 
requirements. 
The Licensee is to adopt a 
Conflicts Policy to address all 
requirements of conflicted 
remuneration. 
Each participating Trustee or 
other entity is to review 
policies and processes to 
ensure that the FOFA Reform 
and Stronger Super Reform 
requirements with respect to 
conflicted remuneration are 
met. 
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Appendix 2 – The Global Superannuation Industry in 2008 
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Appendix 3 - The division of board roles by leading international 
academics. 
The Board’s role Researchers 
Performance enhancement role and 
monitoring role 
Hilmer (1993) 
Supervisory function and 
Management function. 
Monitor and Audit 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) 
Demb and Neubauer (1990) 
Strategic and Financial Control. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
Service, strategic and control roles Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) 
Sheridan and Kendall (1992) 
Tricker (1984, 1994) 
Cadbury (1995)  
Accountability, supervision, direction 
and executive action 
Tricker (1984) 
Monitoring role and a participative 
role 
Williamson, (1984) 
Decision management and decision 
control 
Fama and Jensen (1983) 
Ratifying and monitoring roles Bosch (2005) 
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Appendix 4 - Doctoral Thesis Research Letter – Requesting participation 
Contact Name 
Contact Title 
Superannuation Fund 
Postal Address 
Suburb State Post Code 
 
Dear Contact Name 
 
Doctoral Thesis Research – Innovation and Corporate Governance within the 
Superannuation Industry 
 
I am writing to you about a doctoral research project being undertaken by myself at the 
Australian Innovation Research Centre, at the University of Tasmania. 
 
This research will look at superannuation funds in Australia to determine the level of 
innovativeness and corporate governance within the superannuation industry. In 
particular, the focus will be on the development of new products and processes by 
superannuation funds in Australia and whether the boards conduct promotes or hinders 
the development of these products and processes.   It will look at your superannuation 
fund by way of case study to provide invaluable data in producing a way to ‘measure 
innovativeness’. The aim is to explore the extent of new product innovation, investment 
strategy innovations, investment in new technologies, administrative innovations or any 
other innovations specific to the superannuation industry. 
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This study will enable a better understanding of innovation across the superannuation 
industry in Australia, and will provide an insight into whether board conduct hinders or 
promotes innovation within the industry. 
 
The research will be carried out by telephone or face-to-face interviews, which ever is 
deemed most appropriate at the time. This should take between thirty minutes and one 
hour depending on your level of involvement with innovation and corporate governance 
within your fund.  No commercially sensitive questions will be asked, and all 
information collected will be strictly confidential. Results will be held in a secure 
database by the AIRC.  
 
Your participation will be highly valued, and will contribute to a better understanding 
of the Superannuation industry in Australia. In due course, I hope that you will find the 
results both interesting and helpful.  
If you have any questions about the process, please call me on 0409 975 249 or 03 62 
26 7379. In addition, if you have any ethical concerns or complaints about the way this 
research is conducted you may contact the Executive Office on 
 62 26 7479 or by emailing: human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 
 
With best wishes 
 
KIM BACKHOUSE MBA LLB GAICD AFAIM 
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Appendix 5 – Interview Questions (Part A) 
 
Question 1 Is there a Fund emphasis on NPD? 
Question 2 Does the superannuation fund measure success of NPD? If yes, 
How? 
Question 3 Are there any processes and systems to bring NPD to market? 
Question 4 Does the fund conduct market intelligence on NPD and Innovation? 
Question 5 Are there any structural or cultural inhibitors or promoters of a 
product development pipeline? 
Question 6 Does the board play a role in promoting or driving NPD at board 
level? 
Question 7 Is there an organisational focus on product development? 
Question 8 Is there any impact of new products on the overall productivity of 
the fund? 
Question 9 What is the current growth rate of new members and new 
employees of the fund? 
Question 10 Has there been a growth rate of market share for the fund? 
Question 11 What is the growth rate of funds under management? 
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Question 
12 
Does the fund conduct any industry bench marking?  
Question 
13  
What are the operating costs per employee versus industry average? 
Question 
14  
Is there any competitive analysis conducted by the fund? 
Question 
15 
Training and development budget per staff member of the fund? 
Question 
16 
% Snr Management with tertiary qualifications?  
Question 
17 
Is there anything else like to discuss on the topic of innovation? 
Question 
18 
In your opinion, is there any impact from current regulations on 
corporate governance and innovation 
Question 
19 
Do trustees drive innovation at board level? 
Question 
20 
How does the fund judge the funds performance? 
Question 
21 
Describe the Chairperson’s style of the Board? 
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Question 
22 
 “Does the board works well together”?   
Question 
23 
What were the dynamics of the current board like? 
Question 
24 
Is there anything you would like to discuss? 
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Appendix 6 – Interview Questions (Part B) 
 
Innovation 
i. Was there were any formalised innovation process within the fund?; 
ii. Was there were any formal innovation strategy signed off by the board?; 
iii. Whether innovation was discussed as a specific agenda item at board level on a 
regular basis or adhoc basis or at all?; 
iv. Was innovation part of the culture of the fund?; and  
v. Was innovation somehow measured by the ASF. 
 
General Questions 
 
i. What impact does government and industry regulation in respect to corporate 
governance have on innovation? 
ii. Do trustees or directors of superannuation funds drive an innovation strategy to 
support organisational and the financial growth of the superannuation fund? Does board 
conduct matter at all? 
iii. Over what period of time are you asking the organisation to judge its performance 
(such as revenue)? 
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Appendix 7 – Pilot Questions 
 
A question that this researcher planned to investigate within the ASI included: 
 
What percentage of your firm’s new or improved products (processes) were introduced 
using any of the following methods?  
 
1. Buying in   ________%  
2. In-house development ________%    
3. Collaboration  ________%  
      100%  
 
 
However, after piloting this question with an experienced management team within Fund 2, 
in particular with a senior strategic marketing manager, of a large industry fund, who has 
valuable insight into the financial service industry with marketing and innovation practices, it 
became apparent that this level of data, would not be readily available within the sample 
group due to the general lack of measuring innovation. 
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Appendix 8 - The Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM  
Title of Project: How does board conduct in Australia hinder or promote innovation within 
the Australian financial Sector (in particular, the Superannuation Industry) 
  
1. I have read and understood the Introductory Letter for this doctoral thesis. 
2. I understand that the study involves measuring innovativeness within the 
Superannuation Industry. 
3. The methodology involves an interview approach and a case study format. 
4. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for a minimum of five years. 
5. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
6. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published 
provided. I may indicate to the Investigator that I do not wish to be identified as 
a participant. 
7. I understand that the researchers will maintain my identity confidential and that 
any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes 
of the research. 
8. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I 
may withdraw at any time without any effect, and if I so wish, may request 
that any data I have supplied to date be withdrawn from the research. 
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
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Statement by Investigator  
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation 
in it to this participant and I believe that the consent is informed 
and that he/she understands the implications of participation  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior 
to them participating, the following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my 
details have been provided so participants have the opportunity 
to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
Name of 
Investigator  
Signature of 
Investigator  
 
Name of investigator   
   
Signature of investigator    Date 
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Appendix 9 – Processes for verifying conclusions 
  
TACTIC PROCEDURE 
Checking for researcher effect A major issue in qualitative data 
analysis concerns the potential 
contamination of data caused by the 
researcher during their research. 
Potential sources of contamination in 
any study include: holistic fallacy, 
whereby extreme evidence is ignored 
so data are interpreted as being more 
patterned or having greater congruence 
than they actually did; ‘going native’, 
whereby researcher-informant 
relationships preclude the pursuit of 
further investigation lest it damages the 
rapport between the parties; and © 
over-reliance on particular well 
informed respondents.  These 
influences were minimised by 
considering the material presented by 
interviewees. 
Triangulation Triangulation refers to the use of a 
combination of methodologies in the 
research of a singular phenomenon, and 
may be applied to both data and 
theories.  Data triangulation was 
achieved by gathering material from 
primary and secondary sources. 
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Weighting the evidence Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggest 
the differential weightings be applied to 
the data according to (a) informant 
characteristics and t(b) circumstances 
under which data were gathered. 
Ruling out spurious relationships Explanatory conclusions depend on 
inferences drawn that suggest that some 
factor is related to the other.  Kidder 
and Judd (1987) recommended that 
researchers inspect each apparent 
relationship in order to ascertain that 
other casual processes have not 
produced the inferred relationship. 
Checking out rival explanations Miles and Huberman (1994) 
acknowledge that explanations should 
not be accepted until all possibilities 
had been explored.  On finding 
alternative explanations, resolution 
between competing analyses maybe 
reached by retaining all probable 
explanations until one became more 
compelling as the result of stronger 
evidence or the weight of various 
sources of evidence. 
Looking for negative evidence Yin (2005) reports that conclusions 
should be interrogated for evidence that 
might disprove an established result 
accordingly, this case study process 
remained open to contrary findings. 
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Getting feedback from informants As part of the triangulation process the 
solicitation of feedback involved the 
participants reviewing field notes73.  
Yin (2005) emphasises the importance 
of this test as a way of corroborating 
the essential facts and evidence 
presented in the case report and 
enhancing the research’s construct 
validity. 
Comparing and contrasting variables Sowden and Keeves (1998) 
acknowledge that making comparisons 
ad contrast between individuals, cases, 
groups, roles, activities and sites will 
significantly assist with the verification 
process. 
This table is adapted from published work by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
 
                                                      
73 The major source on which the findings were based is the interview field notes and documentation was used 
to verify or elaborate the interview data to increase its validity.  Field notes were taken during each interview 
and then the information was transferred as soon as possible after the collection of data from the interview 
onto the researcher’s personal computer.  Other documentation was also requested and obtained from the 
superannuation fund at the time, such as strategic plans, annual reports and committee structures.  Material 
available in the public domain was also obtained to support any theme emerging from the data.   
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Appendix 10 - Data Set 
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Appendix 11 - Proposed Measures of Innovation 
 
1. New business/products revenues per employee 
2. Number of new revenue streams 
3. Product Development Ratio (Revenue from non super products/Revenue from core 
super products) 
4. Growth rate of new members and new employers 
5. Growth rate of market share and funds under management 
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Appendix 12 - Communication Processes Diagram 
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Appendix 13 - Examples of collaboration by industry funds categorised as 
innovative within the Australian Superannuation Industry (by Kim 
Backhouse adapted from Drew and Stanford (2003)). 
Organisation Structure   Activities 
ACSI Membership Body for NFP 
funds 
Research and activism 
AIST Membership body 
primarily for AIS Trustees 
Professional Development 
for Trustees 
ISTP Trustee Company Property Investments 
ISH (formerly 
IFS) 
 
IFS  
IFM 
MEB 
MEPM 
Established by Multiple 
Funds (40+) 
Services offered to these 
funds include: Retirement 
income products, 
infrastructure, private 
equity investments 
Services to members: 
Banking, Funds 
management 
Super 
Partners 
Established by Multiple 
Funds (12) 
Fund administration 
services provided to ASFs 
Frontier 
Investment 
Consulting 
Owned by 4 funds 
(shareholders) 
Asset consultants within 
the industry 
 
